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Abstract
We study approximation algorithms and design truthful mechanisms for optimization
problems in networks that have direct applications in smart cities and urban planning.
We present new models and new techniques which could be of independent interest.
More speciﬁcally, in Chapter 2 we introduce a new model for pollution control and
propose two applications of this model. This is the ﬁrst time this problem is studied
from the computational perspective. The network is represented by a graph where
nodes are the pollutants and edges between pollutants represent the eﬀect of spread of
pollution. The government sets bounds on the levels of emitted pollution in both local
areas and the whole network. We mainly study the classes of planar graphs and trees
which model air and water pollution and design truthful approximate mechanisms.
In Chapter 3 we introduce a new mechanism design model for a new model for
the budgeted maximum lifetime coverage (BMLC) in wireless sensor networks (wsns).
BMLC generalizes the known maximum lifetime coverage problem to the case where
sensors are owned by selﬁsh agents, where each agent has a private cost per unit time
of how much to be paid for deploying his sensor. We introduce a random instances
model for BMLC and design a novel approximate mechanism by reducing BMLC to
the fractional knapsack which is truthful under some technical assumptions. For a
closely related minimum coverage problem in wsns on unit disk graphs, we generalize a
recent PTAS for this problem to obtain a truthful PTAS for the problem where sensors’
costs are agents’ private data.
In Chapter 4 we study approximation algorithms which are based on the primal
dual method for network connectivity problems. We then prove that these algorithms
are monotone and thus can lead to truthful mechanisms.
Finally in Chapter 5 we study the problem of facility location on the real line under
non utilitarian objective functions. We extend previous models and derive inapproxima-
bility bounds for deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms. As a byproduct
we show that the same approximation guarantees hold for the social utility objective.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Internet is the most complex and valuable artifact among all the computational sys-
tems. This network of networks that grew with an immense speed since mid 1990’s,
has become undoubtedly a necessary means of communication in every day life. Its
universality, its availability as well as its robustness have attracted rapidly the global
economy. Through the years the economic activity has increased surprisingly on the
Internet. Many markets have now moved to the Internet and plenty of new online
stores have opened. Except from being an unlimited source of information and bring-
ing the global communications at a higher level, its bloom coincided with the inception
of online markets, e-services and e-commerce. It has become an environment where
entities with diverse economic interests and goals interact. As Papadimitriou points
out “The most novel and defining characteristic of the Internet is its socio-economic
complexity” [114]. Game Theory and Mathematical Economics have been proved useful
to model the online markets resulting in what is today called Internet economics. But
how did this term arise?
Over the last decades one of the directions that Theoretical Computer Science has
focused on, was the design of eﬃcient algorithms for computationally intractable prob-
lems. Challenging and important problems have been studied extensively from an
algorithmic perspective; the scheduling of tasks to machines, the allocation of memory
to computer systems or the routing of messages in network environments are some
paradigmatic examples. The input to these problems has been taken for granted with-
out taking into account the human factor and the presence of incentives. In environ-
ments with multiple participating entities that require services from the owners of the
resources, an algorithm must consider the diﬀerent preferences of every participant.
The environment can be seen as a somewhat multidimensional chessboard where the
participating entities are the players, each having as goal to “win” in the game. Each
of them will not play fair if cheating is more proﬁtable. However the rules can change
in a way that cheating is not beneﬁcial. This is the desired outcome for the central
authority who designs the game. In a larger scale the situation is pretty much similar.
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On the other side, economic theory has given solutions to problems in which dif-
ferent entities interact, such as auctions, supply chains or types of markets to name
a few. The ﬁeld of game theory and economics which studies the design of economic
mechanisms towards the optimization of a given objective in settings where the players
act strategically is called Mechanism Design. Mechanism design studies solution con-
cepts in a class of games where there is some information that is kept private by the
participating players. A central authority, known in the literature as the mechanism
designer who is interested in the outcome of a game, is responsible for the design of its
structure. As Leonid Hurwicz points out in mechanism design the goal is given and the
mechanism is unknown, in contrast to the traditional game theory where the attention
is drawn in the analysis of a mechanism. This is the reason why mechanism design is
also called reverse game theory.
In problems like the house allocation or facility location a mechanism is simply an
algorithm. This area of problems is known under the term mechanism design without
money. However, due to the impossibility results by Gibard [59] and Satterthwaite [124]
the design of mechanisms that fulﬁll desired economic properties are restricted to very
speciﬁc ones. In order to overcome this obstacle there are several ways one of which is
the addition of money and thus the introduction of payments in the mechanisms. For
problems such as combinatorial auctions and bilateral trading a mechanism is simply
speaking an algorithm together with a payment scheme. This area of problems is known
under the term mechanism design with money.
Previous studies had not taken into account the computational issues of computing a
solution for a mechanism design problem. This factor was not considered until a decade
ago. The works by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [87], Roughgarden and Tardos [123]
and Nisan and Ronen [111] were the ﬁrst to study algorithmic aspects of game theory
and economic concepts that arise from problems on the Internet, establishing the ﬁeld
of Algorithmic Game Theory. Speciﬁcally [111] studied the design of computationally
eﬃcient mechanisms in the presence of incentives and applied the tools of mechanism
design to algorithmic problems establishing the area of Algorithmic Mechanism Design.
Algorithmic Mechanism Design models mathematically problems where both com-
putational and economical issues coincide. A direct application is on the Internet. As
a ﬁrst example, the sponsored search auctions taking place in search engines every
second are one of the problems where Algorithmic Mechanism Design can be applied
to. The applications of this new area are numerous and not limited to the Internet.
Auctions constitute a problem of major importance that has been extensively studied,
with applications in various sectors, apart from sponsored search. The sale of licences
for the use of a band in the electromagnetic spectrum by telecommunication compa-
nies (spectrum auctions), the purchase of transportation services by a company from
a number of bidding suppliers (transportation auctions) and the purchase of paths to
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connect pairs of speciﬁed nodes in a communication network are some paradigmatic
examples [113].
In the aforementioned applications the information which is given as input to the
mechanisms (roughly speaking the algorithms that solve the problem) is provided by
the participating entities, which from now on will be called agents1. The auctioneer,
which in this case is the mechanism designer, aims at computing an outcome that is
optimal according to an objective, e.g. his revenue, or the overall satisfaction of the
agents, a notion termed in the literature as the social welfare. In general, every agent
has a preference for each of the outcomes and thus orders them accordingly. Each
one of them declares this information (for cardinal mechanisms studied in this thesis
this preference is expressed by a number) to the mechanism designer and the latter
computes an outcome based on it. There are two issues that arise:
1. First, the declared information might not correspond to the true preferences of
the agents. Every agent acts selﬁshly and will try to manipulate the mechanism
by lying, if this strategy of his will result in a more beneﬁcial outcome for him.
2. Second, the underlying problem that needs to be solved is not always tractable.
What is needed is the design of a mechanism that will ﬁnd eﬃciently a solution,
possibly not the optimal, with respect to the objective, but which guarantees that no
agent will have an incentive to lie about his preferences. In other words, an agent
cannot gain by lying. In Mechanism Design the mechanisms that fulﬁll this property
are called truthful. For the hard optimization problems, one way is to design ﬁrst
an approximation algorithm i.e. an algorithm that approximates the objective of the
mechanism designer and then modify it accordingly to achieve the property of truthful-
ness. We note there is no general way to convert an algorithm to a truthful mechanism
and so far there have been only seldom works in this direction. However, this task is
very demanding and for many problems there is a trade-oﬀ in between eﬃciency, ap-
proximation and truthfulness. Roughly speaking, we cannot always achieve them all,
thus we need to sacriﬁce one, or two of these factors in order to obtain the third e.g.
get a worse approximation for the underlying optimization problem in order to obtain
a truthful mechanism.
In this thesis we follow this line of research drawing our attention to Algorithmic
Mechanism Design aiming at designing approximation algorithms and truthful mecha-
nisms for optimization problems on networks. We extend the existing works, we propose
new network models and design truthful mechanisms. The ultimate goal is to get a
better understanding on what criteria a mechanism should fulﬁll in order to be truthful.
1For simplicity reasons we ascribe all agents the property of masculine gender.
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1.1 Urban planning
Governments and local authorities in many cities worldwide have managed to ensure
the success of their countries and cities in social, economic and environmental terms.
Urban planning has been proved a very important tool that contributes to the overall
urban planning modelling. With optimization being the base of sketch modelling, social
planners and regulators are enabled to ﬁnd solutions to several urban planning problems
establishing minimum resource consumption, eﬃcient routing of data on sensor devices,
the control of pollution and the socially “suitable” positioning of facilities. Keirstead
and Shah in a recent survey demonstrate the importance of optimization techniques
in urban planning modelling [78]. In this thesis we study optimization problems on
networks all related to urban planning. We extend previous models and introduce new
ones investigating in parallel the underlying game and the incentives of the participants
in it. Since most of these problems are intractable, we provide approximate solutions
(in some cases the best we can hope for) and design mechanisms based on existing
approximation algorithms or on their modiﬁcations.
One of the most important environmental problems in urban planning is the control
of emitted pollution by industrial units and means of transportation. In Chapter 3 we
introduce a new model for this problem. The government as a regulatory authority of a
country, is responsible to make eﬃcient environmental policies to ensure that a balance
between the economic growth and the protection of the environment. To achieve this
goal, restrictions are set on the allowable levels of pollution globally in whole country
as well as locally in small regions along a country. Factories and cars consist the main
sources of pollution. The government auctions a ﬁxed number of licences for factories
each one corresponding to a ton of CO2. The factory owners have to comply with these
pollution allowances, otherwise they are charged with a ﬁne for any extra emission in
the environment. If theses levels are exceeded signiﬁcantly, then the government is
responsible for shutting down the factories that are most harmful for the environment.
Furthermore, pollution licences are distributed to the mayors who then sell them to car
drivers.
The overall problem has been studied mainly in the environmental economics liter-
ature where the methodology of game theory is applied for the pollution control. In our
network game model, we not only study the problem from an economic perspective but
also make the ﬁrst attempt (to the best of our knowledge) to analyze algorithmically
pollution control from the perspective of the regulator. In the underlying game, each
of the players (i.e. factory owners, mayors of cities) declares to the regulator his cost
of cleaning the area around him (around the factory for the owner and around a city
for the mayor). Each player has as strategy to be allocated as many licence permits as
possible and thus might lie for a more proﬁtable outcome for him. We derive algorithms
that approximate the optimization problem and mechanisms for the game, studying it
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from a computational perspective (to the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst time in
the literature).
The next problem after controlling pollution, is the detection of pollution levels in
the atmosphere and waters as well as the detection of ﬁre in forests. This is achieved
through wireless sensor nodes i.e. multi-functional sensing devices that can measure
the temperature, the humidity and the pollution levels in the atmosphere. In Chapter
4 we focus in two problems that have been extensively studied in the literature and
investigate them from the mechanism design perspective. More precisely, we ﬁrst study
the problem of lifetime maximization i.e. the problem of ﬁnding a proper schedule of
active/sleep wireless sensor nodes that monitor a set of target points in a predeﬁned
area. The goal of a base station, who acts as a regulatory authority, is to monitor these
targets for the maximum time possible, known as the lifetime of the network under
the battery constraints of the sensor nodes. We introduce the underlying game of the
problem, in which each player (i.e. owner of a sensor node) declares an amount of cost
per unit time of monitoring his sensing area, which is then paid by the base station.
This cost consists a private information of the players, who may strategically lie about
it to the base station in order to be paid more. We introduce a random instances model
for this problem and design a novel approximate mechanism for the game.
We also extend this problem by introducing a budget constraint on the amount of
money that the base station is allowed to spend. The second problem that we study is
that of the weighted sensor cover in the plane. Given a set of target points and a set
of weighted sensor nodes, we are asked to ﬁnd a subset of the sensor nodes that can
monitor all the target points having the minimum possible weight. We introduce the
underlying game of this problem providing also a mechanism for it. The mechanism is
based on the modiﬁcation of a recently designed algorithm for the optimization problem.
This modiﬁcation does not aﬀect the approximation of the produced solution.
After setting a wireless sensor network, the next step is to ensure that, once a signal
is received or a measurement exceeds a speciﬁed level, this message will be broadcast
in the network and routed to the base station as soon as possible. In this new problem
we do not ask for an energy eﬃcient solution but rather for the cheapest one. In large
networks the components are heterogeneous and thus can be owned by diﬀerent owners.
The problem also diﬀers from the previous one in that the owners do not possess nodes
of the network (sensors in the previous problems) but rather its edges, which in this
case are the interconnecting routes between sensor nodes in the network. In Chapter 5
we survey algorithms for these network design problems based on a speciﬁc algorithmic
technique and introduce the underlying game. We prove that their approximation
guarantee is preserved when we design the mechanisms for the game.
In cities with large populations it is the responsibility of mayoralty, which acts as
regulatory authority, to make a plan for the location of facilities such as schools, facto-
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ries, gym courts etc. in order that fairness is preserved among its inhabitants. Consider
for example the case where the government is planning to build a school and a factory
on a street. Citizens’ preferences for these facilities might signiﬁcantly diﬀerentiate.
Those who work at the factory and also have children that go to school wish both facil-
ities to be built close to their homes. Citizens without children might want the school to
be build far because of the noise. Finally, those who do not work at the factory, prefer
its location to be far from their home to avoid the emitted pollution. It is clear that
preferences of the inhabitants are heterogeneous since each one of them might want to
be close to a facility, be away from it, or be indiﬀerent about its presence. In Chapter 6
we extend previous models for the problem of heterogeneous facility location, we derive
inapproximability results and design mew mechanisms for this problem. We also note
that in contrast to the other three Chapters, in the designed mechanisms of Chapter 6
there is no presence of money.
This thesis is based on the following papers:
• Eleftherios Anastasiadis, Xiaotie Deng, Piotr Krysta, Minming Li, Han Qiao,
and Jinshan Zhang. ”Network Pollution Games.” In Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, pp. 23-31.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016.
• Eleftherios Anastasiadis, Xiaotie Deng, Piotr Krysta, Minming Li, Han Qiao, and
Jinshan Zhang. ”New Results for Network Pollution Games.” In Computing and
Combinatorics: 22nd International Conference, COCOON 2016, Ho Chi Minh
City, Vietnam, August 2-4, 2016, Proceedings, vol. 9797, p. 39. Springer, 2016.
• Eleftherios Anastasiadis, Dionisis Kandris, Piotr Krysta, Paul Spirakis. ”Mech-
anism design for coverage problems in wireless sensor networks”, Unpublished
manuscript.
• Eleftherios Anastasiadis, Argyrios Deligkas. ”Maxmin Heterogeneous Facility
Location Games on the Line”. Submitted.
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Chapter 2
Background
We continue by giving some basic deﬁnitions from optimization and mechanism design
which are necessary for the chapters that follow. We note that some of the deﬁnitions
are for maximization problems. For minimization problems the deﬁnition can be derived
in a similar way.
2.1 Optimization problems
We study constrained optimization problems under the presence of incentives that can
be formulated as Linear Programs (LPs) or an Integer Linear Programs (ILPs). More
formally let x ∈ Rn be a vector of n variables, A ∈ Nm×n be a known matrix of
coeﬃcients and c ∈ Nn and b ∈ Nm be a vector of coeﬃcients of the variables and a
vector of the bounds of the constraints, respectively. Let also opt ∈ {max,min} and
∈ {≤,≥}. The LP formulation of an optimization problem is the following:
opt cTx
s.t. A · x  b
x ≥ 0
We refer to opt cT ·x as the objective function. Similarly, an Integer Linear Program
has as additional requirements that the values of the variables be discrete i.e. x ∈ Nn.
If in the above formulation opt = max, =≤ and both A and b have non-negative
entries, then the maximization problem is called a Packing LP (PLP). The most notable
problem of this class is the Set Packing problem; given a universe of elements and a
family of subsets of the elements the goal is to ﬁnd the maximum number of subsets
which are pair-wise disjoint.
In a similar way if opt = min, =≥ and both A and b have non-negative entries,
then the minimization problem is called a Covering LP (CLP). The most notable
problem of this class is the Set Cover problem; given a universe of elements and a
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family of subsets of the elements the goal is to ﬁnd the minimum number of subsets
the union of which is the universe.
Both PLP’s and CLP’s constitute very important classes of problems in computer
science, optimization and operations research. These problems as well as special cases
of them have numerous applications and have been extensively studied in the literature.
Although a problem in the continuous space can be tractable, it usually becomes
hard to solve eﬃciently if we impose the discretization requirements on x. Most of the
optimization problems of paramount importance, which can be be formulated as ILPs,
are NP-hard and thus no polynomial time algorithm exists unless P=NP. In order to
cope with the intractability of NP-hard problems, the research turns to approximation
algorithms, the study of heuristics and special cases of the problems as well as param-
eterized complexity. In this thesis the study is focused on approximation algorithms
for optimization problems. More formally let OPT denote the optimal value of an
optimization problem Π and let c(A, I) denote the value of the objective function that
polynomial-time algorithm A achieves for Π on instance I. We denote by |I| is the
binary encoding of input I. A β-approximation algorithm is deﬁned as follows:
Definition 1. An algorithm A is a β-approximation for a maximization problem Π if on
any instance I of Π, the value c(A, I) ≥ 1β ·OPT , where β ≥ 1. If Π is a minimization
problem then c(A, I) ≤ β ·OPT . The factor β is called the approximation ratio of A.
The approximation ratio can be a function that depends on the size of the input of the
problem. Several problems are hard to approximate within some factor. For example,
the Set Packing problem is known to be hard to approximate within O(m1/2−ǫ), where
m is the number of elements in the universe [66]. On the other hand, there are problems
for which the approximation ratio can be arbitrarily close to 1 whose running time is
inversely proportional to the approximation ratio. Roughly speaking we can trade the
approximation of the solution we want to derive with the running time. We say that
these problems admit a PTAS :
Definition 2. A polynomial time algorithm A is a Polynomial Time Approximation
Scheme (PTAS) for a maximization problem Π if for any ǫ > 0 and any instance I of Π
it returns a solution with value c(A, I) ≥ (1−ǫ)OPT (I) and runs in time O((1ǫ |I|)
g( 1
ǫ
)),
where g is a function independent from I. Similarly for a minimization problem the
value of the solution is c(A, I) ≤ (1 + ǫ)OPT (I).
Definition 3. An algorithm A is an Efficient Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme
(EPTAS) for a maximization problem Π if for any ǫ > 0 and any instance I of Π it re-
turns a solution with value c(A, I) ≥ (1−ǫ)OPT (I) and runs in time O(g(1ǫ )poly(|I|)),
where g is a function independent from I. Similarly for a minimization problem the
value of the solution is c(A, I) ≤ (1 + ǫ)OPT (I).
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The best family of algorithms we can hope for an NP-hard optimization problem,
assuming that P 6=NP is an FPTAS:
Definition 4. An algorithm A is a Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme
(FPTAS) for a maximization problem Π if for any ǫ > 0 and any instance I of Π it
returns a solution with value c(A, I) ≥ (1−ǫ)OPT (I) and runs in time O(poly(1ǫ , |I|)),
where g is a function independent from I. Similarly for a minimization problem the
value of the solution is c(A, I) ≤ (1 + ǫ)OPT (I).
2.2 Mechanism design basics
A mechanism design problem is described by a set of goods or alternatives X and a set
N of the participating agents or players (the two terms will be used interchangeably
throughout the thesis). Every agent i ∈ N is associated with a value θi ∈ Θi called his
type, where Θi denotes the type space of agent i. The designer of the game also called
mechanism designer or social planner has complete information about the type spaces
Θ1, . . . ,Θn. However, the type θi consists the private knowledge of agent i, for every
agent i ∈ N .
A mechanism maps a type proﬁle θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) to an allowed outcome o ∈
O = 2X . Every agent i has a preference on an outcome which is expressed by a real
valued function vi : Θi × O → R
d called his valuation function. Let Vi ⊆ Θi × O and
V = V1 × . . .× Vn. Let also V−i = V1 × . . .× Vi−1 × Vi+1 × . . .× Vn and V = (Vi,V−i).
In this thesis we follow this standard notation for players’ vectors with subscript −i.
Definition 5. A mechanism M = (A, p) for a given game Γ = (O,N ) is composed
of two elements: An allocation function A : V → O specified by an algorithm and a
payment scheme p = (p1, . . . , pn), where pi : V → R for each agent i. More specifically
a (direct revelation) mechanism consists of the following steps:
• Revelation: Every agent i submits a bid bi ∈ Θi to the mechanism designer. The
bid of an agent represents his strategy in the game.
• Allocation: The mechanism designer decides on an allocation of the alternatives
to the agents based on the declared strategy profile b = (b1, . . . , bn).
• Payment scheme: The mechanism designer charges every agent some monetary
payment (if the payment is negative, then the mechanism designer is charged to
pay this amount).
The payment scheme in the above deﬁnition applies only to mechanisms with money.
In mechanisms without money a mechanism is simply the allocation function. Every
agent is associated with a utility function ui ∈ V × O → R, where ui(bi|θi, b−i, o)
denotes the satisfaction of agent i over outcome o = A(b) when his bid is bi, his type is
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θi and the bids of the other agents are b−i. In mechanisms without money the utility
of agent i is his valuation whereas in mechanisms with money the utility is the quasi
linear function ui(bi|θi, b−i, o) = vi(θi, o)−pi(b) where pi denotes the amount of money
that agent i has to pay to the mechanism designer (or receive if pi is negative). Let
Ui denote the set of utility functions of agent i and let U = U1 × . . .× Un. We assume
that the agents act rationally i.e. they aim at maximizing their utility regardless of the
other agents’ declarations.
Definition 6. A bid bi is a dominant strategy of player i if it maximizes his utility for
any possible bids of the other agents. If all players have a dominant strategy and each
plays these strategies in the game then we reach a dominant strategy equilibrium.
The goal mechanism design is the design of mechanisms that guide the agents to
behave in a desired way, assuming that each one has some private information. In
game theoretic terms, we aim at designing a game that implements a social choice
function f : U → O in equilibrium, given that the mechanism designer does not know
the private information of the agents. In this thesis we study the implementation in
dominant strategies:
Definition 7. Given a game Γ = (O,N ) and a set of utility functions U , a mechanism
with allocation function A is an implementation of a social choice function f : U → O
if for any utility functions u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U the game possesses a dominant strategy
equilibrium b∗ such that A(b∗) = f(u).
The importance of designing an implementation in dominant strategies arises from
the fact that it leads to the design of truthful mechanisms:
Definition 8 (Truthful mechanism). A mechanism M = (A, p) is called truthful or
strategy proof if for any strategy profiles b = (bi, b−i) b′ = (b′i, b−i) with respective
outcomes o ∈ O and o′ ∈ O, it is a dominant strategy for all the agents to report their
types i.e.
ui(bi|θi, b−i, o) ≥ ui(b′i|θi, b−i, o
′), ∀b′i 6= bi = θi, b−i ∈ V−i
In other words, in a truthful mechanism the utility agent i gets on outcome o′ when
he reports b′i 6= θi cannot be greater than the utility he gets on outcome o when he
declares his true type bi = θi. We note that if o
′ = o for diﬀerent declarations bi 6= b′i,
the utility of every agent remains the same.
By the revelation principle (see below) a mechanism can be converted into a truthful
one that implements the same social choice function:
Theorem 1 (Revelation principle [113]). If there exists a mechanism that implements
a social choice function f in dominant strategies, then there exists a truthful mechanism
that implements f .
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For randomized mechanisms i.e. mechanisms whose allocation function is speciﬁed
by a randomized algorithm, we have the following weaker notion of truthfulness:
Definition 9. A randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation if for any b−i, bi
and b′i, E[ui(bi|θi, b−i, o)] ≥ E[ui(b
′
i|θi, b−i, o)], where E(·) is over the random bits.
Randomized algorithms and thus randomized mechanisms are useful since in many
cases they can achieve a better approximation ratio than the deterministic ones.
In a mechanism design optimization problem Π the outcome is speciﬁed by an
objective function f(o, t) and a set of feasible outcomes F ⊆ O. In an optimal solution
of Π we require that o ∈ F such that f(·) is optimized, while in an approximate solution
we require that o ∈ F and f(o, t)  β · f(o′, t), where o′ ∈ F , ∈ {≤,≥} and β is the
approximation ratio. We say that a mechanism solves an optimization problem when
it assures that a required outcome is given as a result. In this thesis we study the
following objective functions:
• minimization of the total costs of the agents or equivalently the maximization of
the social welfare i.e. the aggregation of the valuations of all the agents (Chapter
3, Section 4.4 and Chapter 5)
• the maximization of the network lifetime i.e. the total time that a set of con-
straints is fulﬁlled (Chapter 3)
• the maximization of the minimum utility of an agent (Chapter 6).
Conditions for truthfulness
From the above deﬁnitions we have that Vi ⊆ R
d. When agent i is single-parameter
i.e. d = 1, monotonicity is a property of social choice functions that is suﬃcient
and necessary condition to guarantee the truthfulness of a mechanism (see Chapter 12
in [113] and [14]). In simple words monotonicity means that if an agent changes his
valuation and the social choice function changes too, then this is because the agent
increased the value on the new choice in relation to the value of his old choice.
As an example consider the problem of combinatorial auction where the set of
alternatives is a set of items to be allocated to the players and the objective is the
maximization of the social welfare. Let S =
∑
i∈N vi and suppose that player i is
allocated no item. If he changes his valuation to v′i ≥ vi and the allocation of the items
also changes (and thus i is allocated an item or a bundle of items), then the change in
the social function S′ =
∑
j 6=i vj + v
′
i happened because of the change in i’s valuation.
Let now X consist of identical and divisible items. Suppose that each of these items
can be divided into k pieces. If k → ∞ then X becomes a continuous set. For an
outcome o ∈ O we deﬁne as load (sometimes denoted as work) wi : O → R the amount
of X allocated to agent i. Let us also deﬁne ci(θi, o) = θi · wi(o) to be the cost that
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agent i incurs when he is assigned load wi(o) over the outcome o = A(b). The valuation
function of agent i is then vi(θi, o) = −ci(θi, o) and the type θi denotes the cost per unit
of load assigned to agent i. We will abuse notation writing wi(b) instead of wi(o) when
the allocation function A is known in the context. Let b−i be ﬁxed. Then the produced
outcome o is a non-increasing function if the load curve wi(bi, b−i) is non-increasing on
bi for every agent i. More formally:
Definition 10 (Monotone algorithm [14]). Let the bids b−i be fixed and let wi(b−i, bi)
be a single variable function of bi called the load or work of agent i. The allocation
function A is non-increasing if each of the associated load curves in non-increasing
i.e. wi(b−i, bi) is a non-increasing function of bi. An algorithm that preserves the
non-increasing load property for all agents is called monotone.
We will say that a mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary participation condition if every
agent who declares his true type to the mechanism does not incur a net loss. Archer
and Tardos provided a characterization of truthful mechanisms for single-parameter
agents by the following:
Theorem 2 (Payment scheme [14]). For single parameter agents, a mechanism is
truthful and admits voluntary participation if and only if the load of each agent is non-
increasing
∫∞
0 wi(b−i, u)du <∞ for all i, b−i and the payments are
pi(b−i, bi) = bi · wi(b−i, bi) +
∫ ∞
bi
wi(b−i, u)du. (2.1)
With the above characterization, in order to design a truthful mechanism it is suﬃ-
cient and necessary to design a monotone algorithm to specify the allocation function
together with a payment scheme as stated in equation (2.1) (for maximization prob-
lems), assuming that no externalities exist, i.e. the agents care only about their assigned
loads.
In discrete settings, monotonicity for a social welfare maximization problem means
that if agent i with original valuation vi is allocated a bundle of alternatives (a winning
declaration), then he will either be allocated the same bundle or a diﬀerent one with
higher valuation for i, if he declares to the mechanism designer a valuation v′i ≥ vi.
Similarly, for a cost minimization problem agent i with original cost ci will be allocated
the same or another bundle of alternatives with higher valuation, when he declares a
cost c′i ≤ ci. More formally for discrete settings we have:
Definition 11. An algorithm A is monotone if for every agent i and any declarations
of the other agents b−i, if vi is a winning declaration then every higher declaration
v′i ≥ vi also wins.
By this deﬁnition, for a monotone allocation algorithm A and for any v−i there
exists a critical value ζi such that for all vi > ζi, vi is a winning declaration and for all
vi < ζi, vi is a losing declaration.
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Figure 2.1: A bitonic curve of a bitonic allocation algorithm
Consider now a setting where the objective is the maximization of the social wel-
fare. Let the allocation function be speciﬁed by an algorithm with several subroutines.
Mu’Alem and Nisan presented an array of algorithmic techniques in [107] to obtain
truthful mechanisms for special cases of algorithms as the one above. One of the stud-
ied cases is the “max” construct i.e. taking the best outcome as a solution from a
combination of diﬀerent monotone algorithms. In the case where an allocation func-
tion is speciﬁed by an algorithm A that returns the outcome of one of its monotone
subroutines, then A is not necessarily monotone. Thus, they provided the stronger no-
tion of bitonicity which is suﬃcient for special cases of monotone allocation algorithms
which are called bitonic. For a monotone algorithm A, bitonicity provides a connection
between bi and the social welfare of the allocation A(b−i, bi). Roughly speaking, in the
allocation by a bitonic algorithm, the social welfare does not increase with respect to
bi, when agent i loses i.e. bi < ζi, and does not increase with respect to bi when i wins
i.e. bi > ζi (see Figure 2.1 reproduced from [107]). More formally:
Definition 12 (Bitonic algorithm [107]). A monotone algorithm A is bitonic if for
every agent i and every b−i, the social welfare denoted as SWA(b−i, bi) of the allo-
cation is a non-increasing function of bi when bi < ζi and a non-decreasing func-
tion of bi when bi > ζi. The value of the social welfare is then SWA(b−i, bi) ≤
max{limbi→ζ−i SWA(b−i, bi), limbi→ζ+i SWA(b−i, bi)}.
Generally speaking, an algorithm is bitonic if it is monotone and the computed cost
is proportional to the parameters i.e. improves when they improve. We now have the
following composition theorem which states that the combination of bitonic algorithms
for single-parameter agents is a monotone algorithm:
Theorem 3 ([21]). Consider a game with single-parameter agents and let M be a
procedure with m subproblems P1, . . . , Pm. Each subproblem is solved by a different
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procedure Mi and returns the optimal solution with respect to a cost function ci(·). If
every procedure Mi is bitonic with ci(·), then M is monotone.
We note that for multi-parameter agents monotonicity is not a suﬃcient condition
for truthfulness. In such cases, we need the stronger condition of cycle monotonicity
[94]. If we restrict to social welfare maximization for multi-parameter agents, then
the celebrated VCG mechanism due to the works by Vickrey [140] Clarke [33] and
Groves [65] is known to be the optimal mechanism. In order to ensure truthfulness,
VCG charges payments to the agents, based on Clarke’s pivot rule [33]. Although this
mechanism solves the economic problem of maximizing the social welfare, it does not
take into account that the allocation algorithm can be NP-hard. Thus, despite the
fact that VCG can ensure truthfulness it cannot be computed in polynomial time for a
plethora of problems. A natural way to avoid this obstacle and have a computationally
eﬃcient mechanism would be to compute an approximately optimal allocation based
on the solution produced by an approximation algorithm combined with the VCG
payments. The results of Lehmann et al. [96] and Nisan and Ronen [111] indicate that
such mechanisms are not truthful. Further study on this direction was made by Nisan
and Ronen [112], Holzman et al. [68] and Lavi et al. [93].
However, there are approximation algorithms that can be used to obtain truthful
mechanisms for social welfare maximization, when we use the VCG payments:
Definition 13. Let R be a subset of the allocations’ space. An algorithm is called
Maximum In Range (MIR) if on any possible input of valuations of the agents, it
returns the allocation which maximizes the social welfare in R.
The randomized variant of MIR mechanisms is to consider a set D of distribu-
tions over the allocation set. After choosing set D the resulting allocation rule, called
Maximal in Distributional Range (MIDR) is to choose the distribution that maximizes
the expected social welfare taking into account the reported valuations of the agents.
Based on MIDR mechanisms Lavi and Swamy [95] proposed a general technique to
obtain truthful in expectation mechanisms given an approximation algorithm for the
problem. The technique is based on the LP relaxation of the problem using the VCG
mechanism.
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Chapter 3
Network pollution games
3.1 The problem
The advance of technology and commercial freedom have fused and accelerated the
development process to an unprecedented scale. Environmental degradation however
has accompanied this progress, resulting in global water and air pollution. In many
developing countries, this has caused wide public concerns. As an example, in 2012,
China discharged 68.5 billion tons of industrial wastewater and the CO2 emissions
reached 21.2 million tons (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). China has
become one of the most polluted countries in the world with industrial emissions as
the main source of its pollution. The recent annual State of the Air report of the
American Lung Association ﬁnds that 47% of Americans live in counties with frequently
unhealthy levels of either ozone or particulate pollution, see [5]. The latest assessment
of air quality, by the European Environment Agency, ﬁnds that around 90% of city
inhabitants in the European Union are exposed to very damaging air pollutants at
harmful levels, see [1]. Environmental research suggests that water pollution is one of
the very signiﬁcant factors aﬀecting water security worldwide [142]. It is the role of
regulatory authorities to make eﬃcient environmental policies in balancing economic
growth and environment protection. Pollution control regulations are inspired by the
managerial approaches in environment policies, where models based on game theory
are proposed and analysed.
From a diﬀerent point of view, Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin [37] focus on min-
imizing the sum of pollution damages, abatement costs and individual rationality for
consumers. Spulber [129] develops a market model of environmental regulation with in-
terdependent production, pollution abatement costs and heterogeneous ﬁrms who have
private information about costs and pursue Bayes-Nash strategies in communication
with the regulator. Their paper illustrates that the full information optimum cannot be
attained unless gains from trade in the product market net of external damages exceed
the information rents earned by ﬁrms and aggregate output and externality levels are
lower at the regulated equilibrium than at the full information social optimum. A more
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extended literature overview can be found at the end of the chapter.
Pollution has a diﬀusion nature: emitted from one source, it will have an eﬀect on
its neighbours at some decreased level. We consider two applications using a network
model. In the ﬁrst application, the vertices represent pollution sources and edges are
routes of pollution transition from one source to another similar to Belitskaya [18]. Our
model measures the pollution diminishing transition by arbitrary weights on the edges,
which is also present in the model presented by Montgomery [106]. The polluters’
privately known clean-up cost and damage of the emitted pollution in our model are
inspired by Kwerel [92]. In the second application, the vertices represent mayors of
cities and the edges represent the roads between cities. The percentage of cars moving
from one city to another is represented by the weight of the corresponding edge.
Our model covers both aforementioned applications with details given in Section
3.2. The government, as the regulator, can decide to either shut down or keep open a
pollution source taking into account the diﬀusion nature of pollution. It sets bounds on
the global and local levels of pollution, while trying to optimize the social welfare. The
emissions that exceed the licences, if any, must be cleaned-up (hence, agent’s clean-up
cost). Furthermore our model allows the regulator to auction pollution licences for cars
to mayors. In this case, the pollution level of an agent (mayor), i.e., the number of
allocated licences, is set by the regulator together with the prices that the agent pays
to get them.
Furthermore we study water pollution in rivers modelled by tree networks. In
water pollution the government decides which pollution sources should be shut down
so that the eﬄuent level in water is as low as possible. Water pollution cost sharing
was introduced in [109] where the network is a path (single river). This model was
extended to tree networks (a system of rivers) in [44]. We model a system of rivers as
a tree, but study a diﬀerent pollution control model.
As a variant of the ﬁrst application described above, we also consider the case in
which the government is allowed to sell licences to the pollution sources instead of decid-
ing to shut it down or keep it open. This is a widely used approach to control pollution
levels by auctioning a ﬁxed number of licences or pollution allowances. For instance,
the European Emissions Trading System sells EU Emission Allowances (EUAs), each
one representing the right to emit one ton of CO2. In such an auction, ﬁrm’s bid is
a number of EUAs and per EUA price. The auction ranks all the bids in descending
order of per EUA price and determines the per EUA clearing price. The clearing price
is the ﬁrst bid price such that the total volume of EUAs in the bids (demand) in this
descending order meets the total volume of EUAs oﬀered by the regulator (supply).
All the bids above this clearing price are awarded and they all pay the clearing price,
see, e.g., [2]. This very simple auction does not take into account the diﬀusion relations
between polluters, etc.
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General objective function Linear objective function
Bounded Degree ∆ Trees Planar
Lower bound Ω
(
∆
log∆2
)
NP-hard strongly NP-hard (δ violation)
PG(poly) O(∆)a FPTAS TiE O(1) DT PTAS (δ violation)
PG(general) O(∆) TiE b FPTAS TiE c O(1) TiE [10]
a Monotone increasing obj. function. b Piece-wise linear obj. function with one shift
and an additional mild assumption. c Running time is polynomial in q.
Table 3.1: Our results. TiE/DT: truthful in expectation/deterministic truthful mech-
anism. PG(poly) is PG with poly-size integer variables, PG(general) without this
assumption.
Finding an optimal social welfare solution to our problem, which we call Pollution
Game (PG), is NP-hard, since even in the special case of tree structures the well known
Knapsack problem can be reduced to PG. That is why we study polynomial time ap-
proximation algorithms which can lead to incentive compatible (truthful) mechanisms.
We study linear cost and damage functions and derive approximation algorithms and
truthful mechanisms focusing on planar network topologies. In contrast, Belitskaya [18]
assumes quadratic cost functions and linear damage functions deriving optimal social
welfare and Nash equilibria solutions by explicit analytic formulas. We focus our study
on planar network topologies which model realistic scenarios.
Most of the cited economics papers derive equilibria by closed analytic formulas.
Some of these papers provide computational mechanisms without investigating polyno-
mial running time. Our approach is algorithmic and focuses on eﬃciently computing
these solutions. We also analyze the computational complexity/hardness, of comput-
ing the social optimum in our model. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
ﬁrst attempt to algorithmically analyze pollution control from the perspective of regu-
lators by a network game model with information asymmetry between regulators and
polluters. Our results are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.2 Model and applications
We ﬁrst give a brief description of our model for PG. In this model we are given a set of
agents each of whom gets a beneﬁt by doing some work (production of goods, traﬃc on
roads) that results in emission of pollution. The beneﬁt of each agent is expressed by
a function. The government sets some bounds on the total emitted pollution in local
area around every source and in the global area. Its objective is the maximization of
the social welfare (the sum of the beneﬁts of the agents). More precisely PG is deﬁned
as follows:
Definition 14 (Pollution Game). We are given a network represented by a graph
G = (V,E,w) where V is the set of polluters, E is the set of connecting edges (roads)
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between them and wuv is a percentage of the effect of pollution from u to v. Let p and pu
be bounds on the total allowable emitted pollution in whole network and in the local area
around polluter ui, ∀ui ∈ V respectively. Let also ru(·) denote the valuation function of
polluter u. In the Pollution Game we are asked to find an allocation of pollution permits
x = (xu, x−u) for the polluters of the network such that the social welfare
∑
u∈V ru(xu)
is maximized under the constraints that the emitted pollution does not exceed the bounds
both locally xu +
∑
v∈δG(u)wvuxv ≤ pv, ∀u ∈ V and globally
∑
u∈V xu ≤ p.
The game will become more clear in the following two applications. In the ﬁrst
the government as the regulator of the game, allocates pollution licences to mayors of
cities which are then sold to car drivers. In the second application, the government has
to decide which pollution sources among many need to be shut down and which can
remain open.
We note that in this model no geometric assumptions are made.
3.2.1 Application 1: Allocation of pollution licences
Consider an area of n cities, each administered by its mayor (agent). In every city,
statistical observations are used to measure the traﬃc to the neighboring cities. More
precisely let G = (V,E,w) be a weighted digraph representing a network, where V is
the set of n agents (mayors of the cities), E is the set of roads connecting cities such
that (u, v) ∈ E if and only if u and v are neighbouring cities, and w : E → R represents
the percentage of cars entering a city from a neighboring one i.e. wuv denotes the
percentage of cars driving from u to v in some time interval measured by observations.
The duty of the regulator is to allocate a number of pollution licences (i.e. a licence
additional to the car licence) to the agents (mayors) such that the total welfare is
maximized while fulﬁlling a number of constraints. We denote by xu the number of
licences allocated to agent u. The agent with xu licences gains a beneﬁt of bu(xu) which
is a monetary income coming from selling these xu licences to car drivers (our model
does not model this explicitly but just assumes for simplicity that all xu licences are
sold). We assume that bu(xu) is a concave increasing function (economic diminishing
marginal utility phenomenon)1 with bu(0) = 0.
The pollution damage caused in the area of agent u is given by the non-decreasing
damage function du
(
xu+
∑
v∈δ−
G
(u)wvuxv
)
(the damaging eﬀect of more emitted pollu-
tion is accelerating), where δ−G(u) = {v ∈ V : (v, u) ∈ E}. The total valuation of agent
u is his beneﬁt minus his damage cost:
1 [92] uses cost function rather than benefit function, which can be viewed as Mu − bv(xu), with
Mv a large constant for any u ∈ V . The author assumes that cost function is convex decreasing and it
is equivalent to bu(xu) being a concave increasing function. We use benefit function rather than cost
function for ease of analysis.
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ru = bu(xu)− du
(
xu +
∑
v∈δ−
G
(u)
wvuxv
)
(3.1)
The damage function shows that player u is aﬀected by the damage of his own dis-
charged pollution if xu = 1 and by the total discounted pollution of his neighbours.
This models the fact that pollution spreads along the edges of G. The total utility that
the regulator aims to maximize is:
∑
u∈V bu(xu)− du
(
xu +
∑
v∈δ−
G
(u)wvuxv
)
.
The total number of licences for the whole network is bounded by a number p given
in the input of the problem. This constraint is called the global constraint :
∑
v∈V
xv ≤ p (3.2)
Naturally a percentage of cars with licences from city u remains in u and the rest
is split and drives into the neighboring cities. We denote by wu the percentage of cars
remaining in u and w′vu the percentage of cars entering u from neighbouring city v. It’s
realistic to assume that wu 6= 0 since not all the cars with licence from city u move
to neighbouring cities at the same time. The maximum number of cars (maximum
number of licences) allowed at any moment in city u is bounded by p′u also given in the
input. This is represented by the local constraint: wuxu +
∑
v∈δ−
G
(u)w
′
vuxv ≤ p
′
u. The
last inequality can equivalently be written to the following constraint, called the local
constraint of u:
xu +
∑
v∈δ−
G
(u)
wvuxv ≤ pu (3.3)
where wvu = w
′
vu/wu and pu = p
′
u/wu. Furthermore, the number of licences that can
be issued in city u, ∀u ∈ V , is bounded by qu which is decided by the government and
is given on input.
Combining the objective with all the above constraints, the problem of social welfare
maximization can be formulated in the general form by the following integer program:
max R(x) =
∑
v∈V
(
bv(xv)− dv
(
xv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu
))
(3.4)
s.t.
∑
v∈V
xv ≤ p (3.5)
xv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu ≤ pv, ∀v ∈ V (3.6)
xv ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qv}, ∀v ∈ V (3.7)
We call the above convex integer program Pollution Game (PG) with integer variables
(if xv ∈ Z) or with binary variables (if xv ∈ {0, 1}). For an instance I of PG, |I| denotes
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the number of bits to encode I, and if q ∈ poly(|I|), where q = maxv∈V {qv}+1, we call
this problem PG with polynomial size integer variables.
We assume that the networks of this application are represented by planar graphs.
These graphs are close to real applications and it is natural to study planar net-
works [139]. Imagine a collection of cities (each being a contiguous geographic area)
and roads connecting them. This deﬁnes a planar map where we only consider edges
(roads) between neighbouring cities, which implies a planar graph. We disregard other
roads and we consider only frequent driving patterns in a time interval measured by
observations. They correspond to frequent commuters, e.g., between house and work,
which typically are neighbouring cities.
3.2.2 Application 2: Regulation of pollution sources
We are given an area of pollution sources (e.g. factories) each one owned by an agent.
The goal of the government as a regulator is to optimize the social welfare while restrict-
ing the levels of emitted pollution. More formally, given a weighted digraph G = (V,E),
where V is the set of n pollution sources (players, agents) and edge (u, v) ∈ E repre-
sents the fact that u and v are geographic neighbours i.e. (u, v) ∈ E if and only if the
pollution emitted by u aﬀects v. For each (u, v) ∈ E weight w(u,v) = wuv denotes a dis-
count factor of the pollution discharged by player u aﬀecting its neighbour v. Without
loss of generality we may suppose that wuv ∈ (0, 1], ∀(u, v) ∈ E.
The government has to decide which pollution sources must remain open and which
must be shut down. For each source u the variable xu ∈ {0, 1} denotes this where 0
means it must be shut down and 1 it will remain open. Furthermore the government
sets the total pollution quota discharged to the environment (by the number of pollution
sources that remain open) to be p. The global constraint, as it will be called in the
following, is: ∑
v∈V
xv ≤ p (3.8)
Each agent v has a non-decreasing beneﬁt function bv : R≥0 −→ R≥0, where bv(xv) is a
concave increasing function (economic diminishing marginal utility phenomenon)2 with
bv(0) = 0 which represents the beneﬁt incurred by v. Each v also has a non-decreasing
damage function dv : R≥0 −→ R≥0 (the damaging eﬀect of more emitted pollution is
accelerating). The total valuation rv of player v is his beneﬁt minus his damage cost:
rv = bv(xv)− dv
(
xv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu
)
(3.9)
2 [92] uses cost function rather than benefit function, which can be viewed as Mv − bv(xv), with
Mv a large constant for any v ∈ V . The author assumes that cost function is convex decreasing and it
is equivalent to bv(xv) being a concave increasing function. We use benefit function rather than cost
function for ease of analysis.
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where, δ−G(v) = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}, δ
+
G(v) = {u ∈ V : (v, u) ∈ E}. Thus, the damage
function shows that player v is aﬀected by the damage of his own discharged pollution
if xv = 1 and by the total discounted pollution of his neighbours. This models the fact
that pollution spreads along the edges of G. We assume that the government decides
on the allowable local level of pollution pv, for every v ∈ V . This imposes the following
local constraints, as will be called in the following for every player v ∈ V :
xv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu ≤ pv (3.10)
xv ≤ qv (3.11)
Thus we can model this application by the convex program (3.4)-(3.6) assuming
now that xv ∈ {0, 1} and qv = 1, ∀v ∈ V .
3.2.3 Basic definitions
We will introduce some basic deﬁnitions and propositions which will be necessary later
in proving the approximations of our algorithms. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and
I = (G,b,d,p,q,w, p) be an instance of PG, where b = (bv)v∈V is the beneﬁt function,
d = (dv)v∈V is the damage function p = (pv)v∈V is the bound of the local constraint,
w = (wuv)uv∈E , p is the bound of the global constraint and q = (qv)v∈V denotes the
total quota of every player (bv is assumed private information of v and other parameters
are public). Let I be the set of all instances, and X the set of feasible allocations. For
a given digraph G = (V,E) we consider the undirected graph Gun = (V,Eun) where
Eun = {(u, v) ∈ E or (v, u) ∈ E}. An undirected graph G is k-outerplanar if for k = 1,
G is outerplanar and for k > 1, G has a planar embedding such that if all vertices on
the exterior face are deleted, the connected components of the remaining graph are all
(k− 1)-outerplanar. A planar graph is k outerplanar where k can be equal to +∞. We
will use the notation i ∈ [N ] to denote i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
In the following we will denote by OPT frG (PG) the value of the optimal fractional
solution of PG on G. Similarly OPT inG (PG) denotes the optimal integral solution.
The integrality gap of PG on G is deﬁned as
OPT fr
G
(PG)
OPT in
G
(PG)
. The approximation ratio of
an algorithm A with respect to OPT inG (PG) (OPT
fr
G (PG) respectively) is ρ
in(A) =
OPT inG (PG)
R(A) (ρ
fr(A) =
OPT fr
G
(PG)
R(A) respectively), where R(A) is the objective function of
the solution produced by A. Unless stated otherwise, the approximation ρ will be with
respect to OPT frG (PG).
When bv and dv are both linear functions we assume they have slopes s
0
v and s
1
v
respectively, i.e. bv(x) = s
0
vx and dv(y) = s
1
vy, for any v ∈ V . Let V = {v1, . . . , vn}.
The social welfare function is:
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R(x) =
∑
v∈V
[
bv(xv)− dv
(
xv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu
)]
=
∑
v∈V
[
s0vxv − s
1
v
(
xv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu
)]
=
∑
v∈V
[
(s0v − s
1
v)xv − s
1
v
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu
]
=
[
(s0v1 − s
1
v1)xv1 − s
1
v1
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v1)
wuv1xu
]
+ . . .+
[
(s0vn − s
1
vn)xv1 − s
1
vn
∑
u∈δ−
G
(vn)
wuvnxu
]
=
[
s0v1 − s
1
v1 −
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v1)
s1uwv1u
]
xv1 + . . .+
[
s0vn − s
1
vn −
∑
u∈δ−
G
(vn)
s1uwvnu
]
xvn
∑
v∈V
[
s0v − s
1
v −
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
s1uwvu
]
xv =
∑
v∈V
ωvxv
(3.12)
where ωv = s
0
v − s
1
v −
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v) s
1
uwvu. For every variable xvi in the fourth line of the
above equations we have considered all the occurrences of xvi in all the terms in line 3.
In the following sections we will consider k-column sparse ILP packing problems
i.e. those in which each variable j participates in at most k constraints. The following
propositions will be useful in obtaining approximation algorithms and mechanisms for
packing problems:
Proposition 1 ([17], [117]). There is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm for
k-column sparse linear packing programming problem with binary variables, achieving
the approximation ratio ρfr = γk, where γk = (e+ o(1))k = O(k) for a fixed k.
Proposition 2 ([17]). There is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm for k-column
sparse convex packing programming problem with binary variables, achieving the approx-
imation ratio ρfr = eγke−1 , where γk = (e+ o(1))k = O(k) for a fixed k.
Proposition 3 ([95]). For any linear packing programming problem, if there is a poly-
nomial deterministic algorithm with the approximation ratio ρfr for this problem, then
there is a polynomial, randomized, individually rational, ρfr-approximation mechanism
for the same problem that is truthful in expectation.
3.3 Hardness
Observe that PG is weakly NP-hard even on stars and even without the global con-
straint with linear valuation functions. Consider the star where the central node u is
connected to nodes v1, v2, . . . , vn with valuations ωv1 , ωv2 , . . . , ωvn and the edges that
connect them have weights wuv1 , wuv2 , . . . , wuvn respectively. Then PG on this instance
(omitting the local constraints of all the nodes except u) can be formulated by the
following ILP:
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max ωuxu +
n∑
i=1
ωvixvi
s.t. xu +
∑
vi∈δ−G(u)
wviuxvi ≤ pu
xvi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀vi ∈ δ
−
G(u)
The above ILP is the Knapsack problem [137]. In the Knapsack problem we are
given n items each having a weight wi and a value vi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. We are also given
capacity W and we are asked to choose those items whose total value is maximized
under the constraint that the capacity is not exceeded. In the instance described above
the weights on the edges are the weights of the items and the values of the nodes are
the values of the items. Knapsack in known to be weakly NP-hard, thus PG on stars
is also weakly NP-hard.
v1
u
v2 vn. . .
wuv1 wuv2 wuvn
Figure 3.1: An instance of PG on a star
We note that inequality (3.5) can also be written as equality
∑
u∈V
xu = p (3.13)
since the upper limit of the total amount of the pollution is controlled by the govern-
ment. If
∑
v∈V xv < p in the ﬁnal allocation, then the government can simply set p
equal to
∑
v∈V xv without any changes. However, for computational issues, these two
representations lead to diﬀerent computational complexity of the problem. If inequality
(3.5) is replaced by (3.13), then even ﬁnding a feasible solution to PG is NP-complete
as shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 4. Finding a feasible solution to PG when pv = 1 ∀v ∈ V and wuv > 0 for
any (u, v) ∈ E and after replacing constraint (3.6) with (3.13), is NP-complete.
Proof. It is straightforward that the problem is in NP. Consider now a formula of
monotone 1-in-3 SAT where an instance of this problem consists of n Boolean variables
andm clauses. A YES instance is one in which there exists an assignment to its Boolean
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variables such that exactly one literal from each clause is true. The problem is known
to be NP-Complete even when there are no negations [125]. The following proof is
inspired by the reduction of 3-SAT to Independent Set (p. 248 [38]).
Let us represent a clause, say (x∨ y ∨ z), by a triangle with vertices labeled x, y, z.
Repeat this construction for all clauses. Next consider one of the literals, say x, which
appears in k clauses Ci1 , . . . , Cik . Let Tri1 , . . . , T rik be the triangles of the clauses
Ci1 , . . . , Cik respectively. Then connect x of Tri1 with all the vertices of Tri2 , . . . , T rik
except those labeled with x. Repeat this construction for x in all these triangles and
for all literals. For example consider the formula Φ = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3)(x1 ∨ x4 ∨ x5) (see
Figure 3.2). First construct the triangles labeled x1, x2, x3 and x1, x4, x5 for the two
clauses respectively. Then connect vertex x1 of the ﬁrst clause with the vertices x4
and x5 of the second clause. Similarly, connect vertex x1 of the second clause with the
vertices x2 and x3 of the ﬁrst clause.
x1
x2 x3
x1
x4 x5
Figure 3.2: A gadget of reduction
Consider now an instance of 1-in-3 SAT which is true and let G = (V,E) be the
corresponding graph constructed as explained above. Furthermore for every vertex
u ∈ V , let pu = 1, p = m and 0 < wuv ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ δ
−
G(u). Suppose that we have a
truth assignment which satisﬁes all the clauses in 1-in-3 sense. This means we choose p
vertices in G without violating any of the constraints. Indeed if any two vertices have
the same label, they are not connected. If they have diﬀerent labels, say x from clause
C1 and y from clause C2 and they are connected, then their corresponding clauses have
a common literal, either x or y. Thus if one of them has value true, the other will have
value false for the formula to be satisﬁable. Finally, if two vertices belong to the same
clause, only one of them will have the value true.
Suppose now that we can decide in polynomial time whether there is a solution in
an instance of a graph constructed by a formula as described above with p = m vertices
when pv = 1, ∀v ∈ V . Then setting the literal in the set {v : xv = 1} is a solution of
1-in-3 SAT. The argument is as follows: in each triangle, there is exactly one vertex
such that its value is one since at most one vertex in each triangle can be selected and
there are m triangles and p = m. By the construction of G, these vertices consist of
a solution of 1-in-3 SAT. Thus exactly one literal in every clause has the value true in
the formula.
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In the following, unless stated otherwise, we will assume inequality (3.5) as a constraint
of PG.
Theorem 5. It is strongly NP-hard to find an optimal solution to PG when pv, ∀v ∈ V
is any constant number ≥ 1, bv(xv) is linear, dv(y) is piecewise linear (with at most
two pieces) and for any (v, u) ∈ E, wvu is a positive constant.
Proof. The reduction is based on the following construction. Given a graph G and an
instance of the Maximum Independent Set (MIS) problem on G we construct a bipartite
graph G′ and an instance of PG on G′. In MIS we are given a graph and we are asked
to choose the maximum number of pairwise disjoint nodes.
We will only consider undirected graphs, however, our reduction also applies to
directed graphs. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with degree d(G) ≤ d. Next construct a
bipartite graph G′ = (V ′, U ′, E′) with |V ′| = |V | and |U ′| = |E|, where each vertex of
V ′ corresponds to a vertex of V and each vertex of U ′ corresponds to an edge of E.
Connect a vertex v ∈ V ′ with a vertex u ∈ U ′ if the corresponding vertex of v is incident
to the corresponding edge of u in G. It can easily be seen that every v ∈ V ′ has degree
at most d and every u ∈ U ′ has degree 2. Let bv(xv) = xv and dv(xv) = 0, ∀v ∈ V ′.
Furthermore, for any u ∈ U ′, let bu(xu) = 0 and du(y) =
|V |(y−max{wvu,wv′u})
min{1,wvu+wv′u}−max{wvu,wv′u}
if y > max{wvu, wv′u} and du(y) = 0 otherwise, where (v, u) ∈ E
′ and (v′, u) ∈ E′ .
Let W be an independent set of G with |W | = k ≤ p. Then the welfare of W for PG
on G′ is k. Suppose now there is a better solution W ′ with |W ′| > |W |. We then have
the following two claims:
Claim 1. W ′ ∩ U ′ = ∅.
Suppose W ′ ∩ U ′ 6= ∅. If a vertex u ∈ U ′ is included in W ′, then the valuation
((3.1)) is ru = bu(xu) + du(y) ≤ 0, where bu(·) and du(·) are as deﬁned above. Hence,
removing u from W ′ ∩ U ′ will not decrease the total welfare.
Claim 2. Any two vertices u, v ∈W ′ are not connected to the same vertex in U ′.
Let u, v ∈ W ′ be two vertices connected to the same vertex in u′ ∈ U ′. Then
ru = rv = 1 since u, v ∈ V
′ (Claim 1) and bv(xv) = xv, dv(xv) = 0, as deﬁned above.
However, since for the local level of pollution in u′ is y ≥ wvu+wv′u > max{wvu, wv′u},
we have ru′ = −du′(y) ≤ −|V |. Hence, the total welfare achieved by W
′ is at most
|W ′ ∩ V ′| − |V | ≤ 0 < k . Removing either u or v from W ′ will increase welfare by
|V | − 1.
Therefore, W ′ corresponds to an independent set in G with size larger than |W |.
Thus, any independent set W gives a welfare of |W | in G′. As a consequence, if we
can ﬁnd the optimal solution of PG on G′, we can ﬁnd a maximum independent set on
G.
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From [56] we know that it is strongly NP-hard to ﬁnd the maximum independent
set on a planar graph with degree at most 3.
Corollary 1. For a planar graph G = (V,E) with degree at most 3, the problem of
finding an optimal solution in PG setting as in Theorem 5.10 is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. For any planar graph G = (V,E), the constructed graph G′ = (V ′, U ′, E′) in the
proof of Theorem 5.10 is planar. To see this, just add one vertex to the center of each
edge in G representing the edge vertex in U ′. The resulting graph is planar and the
same as G′. The corollary follows from the reduction in the proof of Theorem 5.10.
Theorem 6. PG is Unique Games-hard 3 to approximate within n1−ǫ and within ∆
log2∆
for graph G with degree ∆ when pv is any constant number ≥ 1, bv(xv) is linear and
dv(y) is piecewise linear (with two pieces) ∀v ∈ V and wvu is positive constant for any
(v, u) ∈ E.
Proof. According to [80], maximum independent set is Unique Games-hard to approx-
imate within n1−ǫ in general graphs and within ∆
log2∆
for graph G with degree ∆. The
theorem follows from the reduction in the proof of Theorem 5.10.
Theorem 7. There is no EPTAS for PG with binary variables on the directed planar
graph G = (V,E) when bv and dv are both linear functions, for any v ∈ V .
Proof. We reduce PG with binary variables on planar graphs to the two-dimensional
Knapsack problem. Recall (see beginning of section 3.3) that in Knapsack we are given
n weighted items and a maximum weight capacity. In the two-dimensional Knapsack
the weight of item i is given by a two dimensional vector wi = (wi1, wi2), ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Furthermore the Knapsack has a two-dimensional capacity W = (W1,W2).
Consider now PG on the following simple planar graph. There are n + 2 vertices
labeled as {v1, v2, . . . , n, u, x} and the edge set E = E1∪E2 where E1 = {(u, vi), i ∈ [n]}
with weights wu,vi , i ∈ [n] and E2 = {(x, vi), i ∈ [n]} with weights wx,vi , i ∈ [n]. Let
pu and px be the bounds of the local constraints and ωv and ωx be the objectives of
nodes u and x respectively. Clearly for any two-dimensional Knapsack problem, there
exists an instance of PG with binary variables without the global constraint on such a
simple graph exactly corresponding to this two-dimensional Knapsack problem, where
W1 = pu, W2 = px, the weights of set E1 correspond to the weights wi1, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
and the weights of set E2 correspond to the weights wi2, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. According
to [91], there is no EPTAS for two dimensional knapsack. Hence, there is no EPTAS
for PG on this simple planar graph.
3The Unique Games Conjecture(UCG) [79] is used to prove inapproximability results for NP-
Complete problems which researchers are not able to prove otherwise. The conjecture is based on
the inapproximability of the Unique Game. A detailed survey can be found in [81].
26
v1
u
v2 vn. . .
x
wuv1 wuv2 wuvn
wxv1 wxv2 wxvn
Figure 3.3: The two dimensional knapsack on an instance of a planar graph
3.4 Directed trees
We present approximation algorithms and mechanisms for PG on directed trees. A
digraphG is called a directed tree if the undirected graphGun is a tree. We consider trees
whose arcs are directed towards the leaves. We ﬁrst obtain a truthful in expectation
FPTAS for PG on directed trees by a two level dynamic programming approach and a
3-approximate deterministic truthful mechanism which is Maximal in Range (MIR).
We will also need the following tool from mechanism design for packing problems.
Recall that an integer linear packing problem with binary variables is a problem of
maximising a linear objective function over a set of linear packing constraints, i.e.,
constraints of form a · x ≤ b where x ∈ {0, 1}n is a vector of binary variables, and
a, b ∈ Rn≥0.
Proposition 4 ([46]). Given an FPTAS for an integer linear packing problem with
binary variables, there is a truthful in expectation mechanism that is an FPTAS.
3.4.1 Truthful in expectation mechanisms
We obtain our truthful in expectation FPTAS for PG with binary variables on any
directed tree by a two-level dynamic programming (DP) approach. The ﬁrst bottom-
up level is based on a careful application of the standard single-dimensional knapsack
FPTAS. The second level is by an interesting generalization of an FPTAS of [26] for a
special multiple choice multi-dimensional knapsack problem with a constant number of
constraints most of whose coeﬃcients are of size poly(|I|) where I denotes the instance.
This FPTAS generalizes the results in [26], where the authors consider the one dimen-
sional knapsack problem with cardinality constraint. We ﬁrst present an FPTAS on
directed trees without global constraint which captures our main technical ingredients.
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FPTAS without global constraint
The algorithm uses a dynamic programming approach and the FPTAS for knapsack
problem as a subroutine. Note that on a star, any instance of knapsack can be reduced
to a PG instance without global constraints. Thus, an FPTAS is the best we can hope
for such PG unless P = NP (see the reduction to Knapsack in the beginning of the
section).
We keep four values for each v ∈ V . Suppose that the father of v is v′ and let nv
denote the number of children of v. Let also Mv
′in
vin denote the optimal value of PG on
the subtree rooted at v when both v′ and v are selected in the solution. Similarly, we
also have Mv
′in
vout, M
v′out
vin and M
v′out
vout , where in denotes the fact that a node is chosen
and out that a node is not chosen in the solution. Let ui, i = 1, . . . , nv denote the
children of v. Suppose Mvinuiin, M
vin
uiout, M
vout
uiin
and Mvoutuiout have been calculated, for any
i = 1, . . . , nv. Some of them may be undeﬁned due to infeasibility. We will calculate
now Mv
′in
vin . Observe that M
v′in
vin is equal to the optimal value of the following knapsack
(IP1):
max
∑
i∈[nv ]
(Mvinuiinxui +M
vin
uiout(1− xui)) + ωv (IP1)
s.t. 1 + wv′v +
∑
i∈[nv ]
wuivxui ≤ pv
xui ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ [nv]
where Mvinuiin and M
vin
uiout have ﬁnite values (otherwise we remove them).
If this knapsack problem has a feasible solution, we get the value Mv
′in
vin , otherwise
we set Mv
′in
vin to be undeﬁned. Similarly we calculate M
v′in
vout, M
v′out
vin and M
v′out
vout . Thus,
if we can calculate an optimal solution at each step, this solution will be obtained by
the above DP approach. For knapsack with nv variables, there is an FPTAS. Hence,
at each step we get an approximate value M¯v
′in
vin ≥ (1 − ǫ)M
v′in
vin in time polynomial in
nv and
1
ǫ by knapsack’s FPTAS. In a similar way we compute approximately the other
three values. Thus, in the ﬁnal solution, M¯root ≥ (1− ǫ)
kMroot, where k is the number
of levels of the tree and Mroot is the optimal value of PG without global constraints,
terminating in poly(|I|, 1ǫ ) time where |I| is the input size. If we let 1 − ǫ
′ = (1 − ǫ)k,
we have that ǫ = Θ( ǫ
′
k ). The running time is poly(|I|,
k
ǫ′ ) = poly(|I|,
1
ǫ′ ) due to k ≤ |I|,
giving an FPTAS for PG without global constraint.
FPTAS with global constraint
Suppose without loss of generality that p ≤ n, otherwise let p = n. For each vertex
v, we will keep 4p values. Suppose that the father of v is v′. Let Mv′invin (s) denote the
optimal value of PG on the subtree rooted at v when both v′ and v are selected in the
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solution, and the total pollution level allocated to the subtree rooted at v is no more
than s, s = 0, 1, . . . , p. Similarly, we also have Mv
′in
vout(s), M
v′out
vin (s) and M
v′out
vout (s). Let
ui, i ∈ [nv] denote the children of v. Suppose that M
vin
uiin
(s), Mvinuiout(s), M
vout
uiin
(s) and
Mvoutuiout(s) have been calculated, for any i ∈ [nv] and s = 0, 1, . . . , p. Some of them
may be undeﬁned due to infeasibility. Note that Mvinuiin(0), M
vout
uiin
(0) are undeﬁned and
Mvoutuiout(0) =M
vin
uiout(0) = 0. Now we calculate M
v′in
vin (ℓ). Observe that M
v′in
vin (ℓ) is equal
to the optimal value of the following knapsack problem (denoted Knapsackv(ℓ)) plus
ωv:
max
∑
i∈[nv ]
∑
s∈[p]
(Mvinuiin(s)xis +M
vin
uiout(s)yis) (IP2)
s.t.
∑
i∈[nv ]
∑
s∈[p]
s(xis + yis) ≤ ℓ− 1
p∑
s=0
(xis + yis) = 1, ∀i ∈ [nv]
1 + wv′v +
∑
i∈[nv ]
[wuiv(
p∑
s=0
xis)] ≤ pv
xis, yis ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [nv], s = 0, 1, . . . , p.
IfMvoutuiin (s) andM
vout
uiout(s) do not have ﬁnite values they are removed fromKnapsackv(ℓ).
Note that xi0 ≡ 0, for any i ∈ [nv]. If Knapsackv(ℓ) has a feasible solution, then we
get the valueMv
′in
vin (ℓ), otherwise we setM
v′in
vin (ℓ) to be undeﬁned. Similarly we calculate
Mv
′in
vout(ℓ), M
v′out
vin (ℓ) and M
v′out
vout (ℓ), ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , p. From the analysis of the dynamic
programming approach without global constraints, we know that if there is an FPTAS
for Knapsackv(ℓ), then there is FPTAS for Knapsackroot(p) giving an FPTAS for PG
with binary variables on directed trees. Note that the constraint
∑p
s=0(xis + yis) = 1
can be replaced by
∑p
s=1(xis+yis) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [nv]. This constraint indicates that exactly
one variable from all the possible levels will be chosen in the solution.
FPTAS for the Special Knapsack Problem
We will now show how to obtain an FPTAS to compute (IP2). Consider the follow-
ing instance I of a Special multiple choice and multi-dimensional Knapsack Problem
(denoted as SKP):
29
max H(x) =
∑
j∈[J ]
∑
k∈[K]
Cjkxjk (SKP )
s.t.
∑
j∈[J ]
∑
k∈[K]
A′jkxjk ≤ B
′
∑
k∈[K]
xjk ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [J ]
∑
j∈[J ]
∑
k∈[K]
Aijkxjk ≤ Bi, ∀i ∈ [N ]
xjk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ [J ], k ∈ [K]
The coeﬃcients of the objective Cjk correspond to the coeﬃcientsM
vin
uiin
(s) andMvinuiout(s)
J is the number of items available for selection,K denotes the number of diﬀerent classes
of items where at most one item can be chosen from each class and N is the number of
dimensions of the constraints or items, where Bi = poly(|I|), ∀ i ∈ [N ] and N = O(1).
Without loss of generality suppose all the parameters in the above knapsack problem
are integers and Aijk ≤ Bi = poly(|I|), ∀ i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [J ], k ∈ [K]. Let C = OPT (I)
and B = maxi∈[N ]Bi.
Lemma 1. There is a pseudo polynomial optimal algorithm for SKP, terminating in
O(CJKBN ) time.
Proof. Let ℓ = (ℓ1, ℓ2, · · · , ℓN ). Consider now the following linear program:
min hs(M, ℓ) =
∑
j∈[s]
∑
k∈[K]
A′jkxjk
s.t.
∑
j∈[s]
∑
k∈[K]
Cjkxjk =M
∑
j∈[s]
∑
k∈[K]
Aijkxjk = ℓi, ∀i ∈ [N ]
∑
k∈[K]
xjk ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [s]
Initially, h0(M, ℓ) = +∞, for all M , ℓ. Then set h0(0, 0) = 0. As a result, the recursion
can be calculated as follows:
hs(M, ℓ) = min{hs−1(M, ℓ), min
k∈[K]
{hs−1(M − Csk, (ℓi −Aisk)i∈[N ])}}.
Then the optimal solution of SKP is
max
M≤C,ℓi≤Bi,i∈[N ]
{M : hJ(M, ℓ) ≤ B
′}
Note that the running time of this dynamic programming approach is O(CJKBN ).
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Let Cmax = maxj∈[J ],k∈[K]Cjk. Note that
OPT in(I)
J
≤ Cmax ≤ OPT
in(I)
We now scale all the coeﬃcients in the objective function H(x). Let
C˜jk = ⌈
CjkJ
ǫCmax
⌉ ≤
CjkJ
ǫCmax
+ 1, ∀j ∈ [J ], k ∈ [K]
The optimal value C˜ of scaled SKP is then upper bounded by
CJ
ǫCmax
+ J ≤
J2
ǫ
+ J
Consider the dynamic programming approach running on the scaled SKP as Ascaled.
Then we have
Theorem 8. Ascaled is an FPTAS for SKP, terminating in O(J
3KBN
ǫ ) time.
Proof. We only need to show the approximation part i.e. that the optimal solution
returned is within 1 − ǫ of the optimal value of SKP, since the running time straight-
forwardly follows from the running time of the dynamic programming approach
O(C˜JKBN ) = O((
J
ǫ
+ 1)J2KBN ) = O(
J3KBN
ǫ
)
Let S˜ and S denote the optimal solution of the scaled and the original SKP respectively.
Note that S˜ is a feasible solution to the original SKP. By scaling,
ǫ(C˜jk − 1)Cmax
J
≤ Cjk ≤
ǫC˜jkCmax
J
(3.14)
Then
H(S)−H(S˜) ≤
ǫCmax
J
(C˜(S)− C˜(S˜) + |S|)
≤
ǫCmax|S|
J
≤ ǫCmax ≤ ǫH(S)
where the last inequality comes from |S| ≤ J .
By Proposition 4 we have the following:
Theorem 9. There is a truthful in expectation mechanism for PG with binary variables
on directed trees, which is an FPTAS.
For general xv ∈ Z, we can replace each xv by qv duplicated variables xvj , j =
1, · · · , qv, i.e., {xv ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qv}} = {
∑
j∈[qv ] jxvj |
∑
j∈[qv ] xvj ≤ 1, xvj ∈ {0, 1}}.
Note that this transforms a polynomial size integer constraint into a multiple choice,
one dimensional knapsack constraint. Hence, for directed trees, by a DP approach,
we can construct a pseudo polynomial time algorithm to compute the exact optimal
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value of PG with integer variables, in time poly(|V |, q, OPT in(PG)). In addition, we
can remove OPT in(PG) from the running time by a loss of ǫ of the optimal value
using scaling techniques. Thus, there is a (1− ǫ)-approximation algorithm for PG with
integer variables with running time in poly(|V |, q, 1/ǫ). Finally, by Proposition 4, we
obtain the following:
Theorem 10. There is a truthful in expectation mechanism for PG with polynomial
size integer variables on directed trees, which is an FPTAS.
3.4.2 Deterministic truthful mechanisms on directed trees
We will use a maximal in range (MIR) mechanism to obtain a (3 + ǫ) approximate
deterministic truthful mechanism for PG with polynomial size integer variables on
directed trees. By transformation from integer constraint into multiple choice and one
dimensional knapsack constraint (see paragraph before Theorem 10), we only need to
show such an approximation algorithm for binary variables. Our mechanism is based on
a recent deterministic truthful PTAS for two-dimensional knapsack problem4 [28,42,88].
We will ﬁrst need the following:
Definition 15. A vertex in a rooted directed tree is called at level i if the distance
between the vertex and the root is i in the undirected version of the tree.
Let Li denote the set of vertices of level 3k+i, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , µ, for any i ∈ [3] where
µ = ⌈d3⌉ and d is the depth of the tree. For each vertex v, suppose that the number of
children of v is nv and that children are u1, u2, · · · , unv . Let ∆ = maxv∈V {nv}+1. Let
Gv denote the subtree constructed by v and its children. Then restricting PG on Gv
with capacity (global constraint) cv (enumerating on the values of cv < p) and xv = 0
is equivalent to solving the following linear programming problem (denoted as PGv):
max
∑
i∈[nv ]
ωuixui (PGv)
s.t.
∑
i∈[nv ]
wuivxui ≤ pv
∑
i∈[nv ]
cuivxui ≤ cv
xui ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [nv]
where cuiv = 1, for i ∈ [nv]. For any solution sv of PGv, we use ω(sv) to denote
the objective value of this solution (recall from (3.12) that linear functions b(·) and
d(·) are replaced by ω(·)) given the input I = (G,b,d,p,q,w, p). Let us denote by
Iv = (Gv, ω(sv), p, q,w, cv) an instance of PGv restricted on Gv and OPT (PGv(cv)) to
denote the optimal value of PGv(cv) given input Iv.
4This PTAS also works for multiple choice and constant dimensional knapsack problem, which will
be used for PG with polynomial size integer variables.
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Lemma 2 ([28,88]). There exists a range Sv(cv) of solutions of PGv(cv), which does not
depend on the declarations in Iv and only depends on cv such that maxsv∈Sv(cv){ω(sv)} ≥
(1− ǫ)OPT . Besides, there exists an O(∆4+
1
ǫ ) algorithm Av(cv) that finds the optimal
solution of the range Sv(cv), for any ǫ > 0.
Denote now by PGi the restriction of PG on Li and let Si =
⋃
v∈Φ Sv(cv), where
Φ = {v ∈ Li|cv ∈ [nv] ∧
∑
v∈Li cv ≤ p}. In other words Si is a range restricted to Li
such that the nodes which are in its solution are no more than p. Then Si is a range of
PGi, i ∈ [3]. The high level idea of the range is to omit pairs of consecutive levels of
nodes such that the externalities between neighbouring nodes are avoided.
Lemma 3.
(1). maxsi∈Si{ω(si)} ≥ (1− ǫ)OPT (PGi).
(2). There exists an O(|Li|∆
6+ 1
ǫ ) algorithm Ai that finds the optimal solution of the
range Si, for any ǫ > 0.
Proof. Suppose that in the optimal solution of PGi, each vertex PGv is allocated c
∗
v
amount of global pollution level. As we know
∑
v∈Li c
∗
v ≤ p. Then
max
si∈Si
{ω(si)} ≥
∑
v∈Li
max
sv∈Sv(c∗v)
(ω(sv)) ≥ (1− ǫ)
∑
v∈Li
OPT (PGv(c
∗
v)) = (1− ǫ)OPT (PGi)
where the ﬁrst inequality comes from
∑
v∈Li c
∗
v ≤ pv, the second one is due to Lemma 2,
and the third one is from the deﬁnition. Suppose the fathers of vertices in Li are labeled
as v1, v2, · · · , vℓi . Let gi(C) denote the optimal value of PG restricted to vertices with
fathers v1, v2, · · · , vi on the range Si when the capacity allocated to this subproblem is
no more than C. We have the following recursive function:
gi+1(C) = max
cvi+1≤C
{gi(C − cvi+1) +OPT (PGvi+1(cvi+1))}
where OPT (PGi) = maxi∈[ℓi],C≤p gi(C). The total running time of this dynamic pro-
gramming approach is O(|Li|∆
2∆4+
1
ǫ ) = O(|Li|∆
6+ 1
ǫ ).
Theorem 11. There is a deterministic ρin-approximate truthful mechanism for PG
with polynomial size integer variables on directed trees, where ρin = 3 + ǫ. For binary
variables the mechanism terminates in O(|V |2∆6+
1
ǫ ) time.
Proof. We only need to prove this theorem for PG with binary variables. Note that
maxi∈[3]{OPT (PGi)} ≥ 13OPT (PG) since OPT (PG) =
∑3
i=1OPT (PGi). Then by
Lemma 3 we have
max
i∈[3]
{max
si∈Si
{ω(si)}} ≥
1− ǫ
3
OPT (PG)
Using VCG payment rule on the range S =
⋃
i∈[3] Si, we can get a deterministic truthful
mechanism for PG on directed trees, achieving 1−ǫ3 OPT (PG) social welfare. The run-
ning time O(|V |2∆6+
1
ǫ ) follows directly by Lemma 3 and the payment rule of VCG.
33
3.5 Planar graphs
We present two algorithms for PG on planar graphs. The ﬁrst has a constant approx-
imation ratio, obtained by decomposing the graph without violating any constraint.
The second algorithm is a PTAS, obtained by rounding the variables and a dynamic
programming approach on a tree decomposition of the graph. This PTAS violates the
local constraints by a small value δ > 0.
3.5.1 Constant approximation without violations
Given a digraph G = (V,E) and a subset U ⊂ V , we call signiﬁcant neighbours of U ,
SNG(U), all the vertices in V \ U with at least two neighbours in U (see Figure 3.4).
Consider a partition {V i}αi=1 of V . Now let SNGun(V
i) = {u /∈ V i | ∃v ∈ V i, s.t.u
is a signiﬁcant neighbour of v w.r.t.V i} denote the signiﬁcant neighbours of V i in
Gun. Let Gi be the induced subgraph of V i ∪ SNGun(V
i) in Gun. A partition {V i}αi=1
of V is called an (α, β)-partition (or (α, β)-decomposition) of G if for any i ∈ [α] and
v ∈ V i, |δ−
Gi(v)
| ≤ β, where α, β are two given positive integers and |δ−
Gi(v)
| is the number
of neighbours of v in Gi.
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7 v8
SN(V 1)
V 1
Figure 3.4: Signiﬁcant neighbours SN(V 1) = {v2, v4, v6} of V
1 = {v3, v5, v7, v8} in the
graph of solid black lines.
According to the following Lemma 4, we can obtain a constant approximation for
PG with integer variables for any graph with (α, β)-decomposition, where α and β are
constants. Such a decomposition of planar graphs will be presented later. Recall from
Propositions 1 and 2 that γk = (e+ o(1))k = O(k).
Lemma 4. If a directed graph G has an (α, β)-decomposition, then there is a determin-
istic (ρfr = αγβ+2 + 1)-approximation algorithm for PG with integer variables, and, a
truthful in expectation mechanism for the same problem with the same approximation.
Proof. If there is an ρfr-approximation algorithm for a linear packing problem with bi-
nary variables, then there is an (ρfr+1)-approximation algorithm for the same problem
with integer variables [17]. Hence, it is suﬃcient to show that there is an (ρfr = αγβ+2)-
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approximation algorithm for PG with binary variables. Now we consider PG with bi-
nary variables. Let {V i}αi=1 be an (α, β)-decomposition of graph G. Let x
∗ be the opti-
mal fractional solution of PG with binary variables. Then R(x∗) ≤ αmaxi∈[α]{R(x∗V i)},
where x∗
V i
is a fractional solution such that its value is equal to x∗v, for any v ∈ V i and
0 otherwise. Let PGi denote the PG on G by setting xv = 0, for any v /∈ V
i. Note that
x∗
V i
is a feasible solution for PGi, which gives R(x
∗
V i
) ≤ OPT fr(PGi). Without loss
of generality, we suppose wuv ≤ pv, for any (u, v) ∈ E and v ∈ V (otherwise xv = 0
for PG). Observe that in PGi, only xv, v ∈ V i are variables. Now for any v ∈ V i, let
us see how many constraints in PGi contain xv. Suppose u ∈ V \ V
i is a neighbour
of v in Gun. If u is not a signiﬁcant neighbour of v, since wvu ≤ pu, we can remove
the constraint wvuxv ≤ pv in PGi. Hence, only the local constraints of the signiﬁcant
neighbours of v remain containing variable xv. As {V
i}αi=1 is an (α, β)-decomposition
of graph G, there are at most β + 1 local constraints containing variable xv (which
includes the local constraint of vertex v itself). Together with the global constraint, we
know xv appears in at most β+2 constraints in PGi, for any v ∈ V
i, which means PGi
is β+2 column sparse. Therefore, by Proposition 1, there is a polynomial deterministic
algorithm for PGi with binary variables, ﬁnding an integer solution yi for PGi such
that γβ+2R(yi) ≥ OPT
fr(PGi), for any i ∈ [α]. Then
αγβ+2max
i∈[α]
{R(yi)} ≥ αmax
i∈[α]
{OPT fr(PGi)} ≥ αmax
i∈[α]
{R(x∗V i)} ≥ R(x
∗) = OPT fr(PG)
A truthful in expectation mechanism with the same approximation ratio is guaranteed
by Proposition 3.
Planar graphs. The integrality gap of PG on planar graphs is at least 4 as shown by
a complete graph with four vertices. For a small ǫ > 0, let wuv = ǫ, for any (u, v) ∈ E,
and pv = ωv = 1, for any v ∈ V . There is no global constraint. The optimal integer
solution of PG on this graph is xv = 1 for some v ∈ V and xu = 0 for all u 6= v, implying
the optimal objective value 1. However, setting xv = 1 − 4ǫ, for any v ∈ V provides
a feasible fractional solution, which gives the objective value 4 − 16ǫ. Therefore, the
integrality gap is at least 4, meaning that our LP relaxation cannot lead to better than
4 (e.g., PTAS) approximations.
We provide an (α, β)-decomposition of any planar graph, with α = 18, β = 6. We
did not attempt to optimize these two parameters. However, we note that this is the
ﬁrst algorithm with constant approximation for PG on planar graphs.
Theorem 12. There is an (α, β)-decomposition of a directed planar graph G = (V,E),
where (α, β) = (18, 6).
Proof. Let G′ = Gun. Suppose G′ is connected, otherwise we can run the algorithm on
each connected component respectively. Deﬁne the sequence of vertex sets {Ni}i of G
′
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as follows. Fix an arbitrary vertex v0 ∈ V , and let N1 = {v0}; Ni is deﬁned recursively
as
Ni = {v ∈ V \
i−1⋃
j=1
Nj | (v, u) ∈ G
′, for someu ∈ Ni−1},
for i = 1, 2, . . . , |V |. By this deﬁnition, for any v ∈ Ni and u ∈ Nj , if |i− j| ≥ 2, then
(u, v) /∈ E′. We also observe that Ni is the set of vertices with distance i − 1 to v0
in G′ (i.e., the shortest path distance with respect to the number of edges). Suppose
the length of the sequence {Ni}i is K. Let Si = {j ≡ i (mod 3) | j ∈ [K]}, i ∈ [3]. Let
S0 = S3, and V
i =
⋃
j∈Si Nj , i ∈ [3]. We will need the following Lemmas 5, 6 and 7.
Lemma 5. For each v ∈ Nj, the number of significant neighbours of v in Nj−1 with
respect to Nj is at most two.
Proof. Suppose there exists v1 6= v2 6= v3 ∈ Nj−1 ∩ δG′(v) and v 6= u1, u2, u3 ∈ Nj such
that (ui, vi) ∈ G
′, i ∈ [3] (see Figure 3.5). By the deﬁnition of Nj , there is a path from
v0 to vi, i ∈ [3], and (v, vi) ∈ G
′, i ∈ [3]. Suppose without loss of generality that v2 is
inside the circle constructed from the path of v0 to v1, v3 and edges (v, v1) and (v, v3)
in the planar embedding. Then (u2, v2) will intersect this circle, which contradicts that
G′ is planar.
v1 v2 v3
v0
u1 v u2 u3
. . . layer Nj−1
layer Nj
Figure 3.5: An illustration of relations between Nj and Nj−1
Next, we partition Nj into two sets N
1
j and N
2
j such that each vertex in N
i
j , i ∈ [2],
has at most two signiﬁcant neighbours in Nj+1. We say two vertices v, u ∈ Nj are
connected by a zigzag path if there exists a path (v, v1, v2, v3, . . . , vs, u) in G
′ such that
vi and vi+1 alternatively belong to Nj+1 and Nj , i.e., v1 ∈ Nj+1 and v2 ∈ Nj . Note
that s must be odd. We deﬁne the zigzag length of this zigzag path as s+12 . The zigzag
distance between v and u, denoted dzuv, is deﬁned as the zigzag length of the shortest
zigzag path between v and u if there exists one. Otherwise we set it to be undeﬁned.
Note that the zigzag distance of v to itself is zero. The partition algorithm PA1 works
as follows (see Algorithm 1). Let N1j = A1 and N
2
j = A2, where A1, A2 is output of
PA1. (Note that PA1 is run for each j ∈ [K].)
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Algorithm 1: (PA1)
Input: A1, A2 ← ∅, B ← Nj
Output: A1, A2
1 while B 6= ∅ do
2 Select a vertex v ∈ B;
3 A1 ← A1 ∪B1; A2 ← A2 ∪B2;
4 B ← B \ (B1 ∪B2);
5 forall the nodes u ∈ V discovered by BFS(v) do
6 if dzuv is odd then
7 B1 = B1 ∪ {u}
8 else if dzuv is finite then
9 B2 = B2 ∪ {u}
Lemma 6. For each v ∈ N ij , v has at most two significant neighbours in Nj+1 with
respect to N ij , i ∈ [2].
Proof. First, note that if v and u are selected in diﬀerent iterations of the while loop in
Algorithm 1, there is no zigzag path between them. Therefore, for a single iteration of
the while loop, suppose v ∈ B is selected. We only need to show that for any u ∈ Bi,
u has at most two signiﬁcant neighbours in Nj+1 with respect to Bi, i ∈ [2]. First,
note that v ∈ B2 (its zigzag distance to itself is 0). Since all the other vertices in B2
have zigzag distance to v at least two, v has no signiﬁcant neighbours with respect to
B2 in Nj+1. Now ﬁx i ∈ [2]. Consider any two vertices u1, u2 ∈ Bi, u1 and u2 connect
to the same vertex in Nj+1 only if they have the same zigzag distance to v. Suppose
there exists three diﬀerent vertices v1, v2, v3 ∈ Nj+1, such that they are signiﬁcant
neighbours of u1 with respect to Bi (see Fig. 3.6). By similar arguments as above,
there exists zigzag paths from v to vi, i ∈ [3]. Also note that edges (u1, vi) ∈ G
′, i ∈ [3].
Without loss of generality, suppose v2 is in the circle constructed from the zigzag paths
v to v1, v3 and edges (u1, v1) and (u1, v3). Since G
′ is planar, there exists no edge
between v2 and another vertex in Bi with the same zigzag distance to u1. Therefore,
u1 has at most two signiﬁcant neighbours with respect to Bi in Nj+1.
Next we will partition each set N ij , i ∈ [2], j ∈ [K] into a constant number of
sets {N ikj }k such that each vertex in N
ik
j has at most a constant number of signiﬁcant
neighbours with respect to N ikj in Nj . We provide a partition algorithm which in spirit
is similar to Algorithm 1. For any two vertices v, u ∈ N ij , we say they are connected by
a Nj-path if there exists a path (v, v1, v2, · · · , vs, u) in G
′ such that vℓ ∈ Nj , ∀ℓ ∈ [s].
Nj-distance of two vertices v, u ∈ N
i
j , denoted d
Nj
uv , is deﬁned as the number of edges of
the shortest Nj-path between v and u if there exists one and∞ otherwise. The process
works as PA2 (Algorithm 2). Note that v ∈ B3, because the Nj-distance from v to
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v v′′ u1
v′ v1 v2 v3
. . .
layer Nj
layer Nj+1
Figure 3.6: Relations between Nj and Nj+1
itself is zero. Let N ikj = Ak, k ∈ [3] (where A1, A2, A3 are a partition of N
i
j output by
PA2).
Algorithm 2: (PA2)
Input: A1, A2, A3 ← ∅, B ← N
i
j
Output: A1, A2, A3
1 while B 6= ∅ do
2 Select a vertex v ∈ B;
3 Find Bk’s below by BFS.
4 for k ← 1 to 3 do
5 Bk ← {u ∈ N
i
j | d
Nj
uv ≡ k(mod 3)}
6 Ak ← Ak ∪Bk;
7 B ← B \ (B1 ∪B2 ∪B3);
Lemma 7. For any k ∈ [3], and each v ∈ N ikj , v has at most 2 neighbours in Nj, or
has no neighbours in N ikj nor significant neighbours with respect to N
ik
j in Nj \N
ik
j .
Proof. First, note that if v and u are selected in diﬀerent iterations of while loop in
Algorithm 2, there is no Nj-path between them. Therefore, for a single iteration of the
while loop, suppose v ∈ B is selected. Since v ∈ B3 (Nj distance to itself is 0), v has no
neighbours in B3 nor signiﬁcant neighbours with respect to B3 in Nj \B3 by PA2. Now
ﬁx k ∈ [3]. Consider any two vertices u1, u2 ∈ Bk, u1 and u2 connect to the same vertex
in Nj only if they have the same Nj-distance to v. Next we will show for any u1 6= v
and u1 ∈ Bk, for any k, u1 has at most two neighbours in Nj . Suppose there exist three
diﬀerent vertices u1, u2, u3 ∈ Nj , such that (u1, u2) ∈ G
′ and (u1, u3) ∈ G′. By similar
arguments as above, there exists Nj-paths from v to ui, i ∈ [3]. Since ui ∈ Nj , i ∈ [3],
there exist paths in G′ from v0 to ui, i ∈ [3]. We observe that it is only possible that
u1 is in the circle constructed from the Nj paths v to u2, u3 and paths from v0 to u2
and u3 (the case where u2 or u3 is in the circle constructed by the other two vertices
with v and v0 will violate the planarity of G
′) (see Fig. 3.7). Since graph G′ is planar,
there exists no edge between u1 and another vertex in Nj (due to that such a vertex
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will have a path to v and v0 respectively). Therefore, u1 has at most two neighbours
in Nj .
v u2 u1 u3
v0
layer Nj
Figure 3.7: Relations between Nj and Nj
Combining Lemmas 5, 6 and 7, {N ikj }ijk is an (α, β)- decomposition of G with (α, β) =
(18, 6), thus ﬁnishing the proof.
By Theorem 12 and Lemma 4, and observing that 18min{γ8, 3γ6} = 18γ8 = O(1),
we have
Theorem 13. There is a randomized, individually rational and truthful in expectation
(18γ8 + 1)-approximation mechanism for PG on planar graphs with integer variables.
3.5.2 Better approximation under some mild condition
We will use the 4-color theorem for planar graphs to present an improved (6 + ǫ)-
approximate truthful in expectation mechanism for PG under the following natural
(and mild) assumption: ∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuv ≤ pv (3.15)
This constraint means that if each of v’s neighbours emits only one unit amount of
pollution, the level of pollution in v will not exceed v’s local level of pollution. Let x1
be the optimal fractional solution of PG with binary variables without global constraint
on planar graph G.
Theorem 14. Suppose condition (3.15) holds and R(x1) ≥ 1. There is a random-
ized, individually rational, (ρfr = 6 + ǫ)-approximation mechanism that is truthful
in expectation for PG on planar graphs with integer variables, terminating in time
poly(|I|, log(1ǫ )).
Proof. Note that if condition (3.15) holds, then every independent set is a feasible solu-
tion for PG with binary variables without global constraint. By 4-color theorem [12,121]
for planar graphs, there is an independent set S ⊂ V such that 4R(zS) ≥ R(x
1) where
zS is deﬁned by zv = 1 if v ∈ S and zv = 0 otherwise. Further there is an O(|V |
2)
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algorithm ﬁnding zS [121]. By Theorem 3 of [90] and R(x
1) ≥ 1, there is a deter-
ministic (ρfr = 5 + ǫ)-approximation algorithm for PG with binary variables, running
in poly(|I|, log(1ǫ )) time. Then there is a deterministic (ρ
fr = 6 + ǫ)-approximation
algorithm for PG with integer variables, running in time poly(|I|, log(1ǫ )) [17]. By
Proposition 3, this (ρfr = 6 + ǫ)-approximation mechanism is truthful in expectation
for PG with integer variables.
3.5.3 A PTAS with δ violation of constraints
A PTAS with δ-violation: Our approach to obtain a PTAS has three main steps:
1. Round PG to an equivalent problem P¯G2 with polynomial size integer variables.
2. Using the nice tree decomposition (see Deﬁnition 17 later on this chapter), we
present a dynamic programming approach to solve P¯G2 optimally on a k-outerplanar
graph.
3. By a shifting technique similar to [15], we obtain a PTAS with 1 + δ violation of
local constraints for PG.
Step 1: Rounding Procedure. Recall from (3.12) that PG is equivalent to the
following integer linear program:
max
∑
v∈V
ωvxv (PG)
s.t.
∑
v∈V
xv ≤ p
wvvxv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu ≤ pv, ∀v ∈ V
xv ∈ {0, . . . , qv}, ∀v ∈ V
where ωv = max{0, s
0
v − s
1
v −
∑
u∈δ+
G
(v) s
1
uwvu} and wv,v = 1 ∀v ∈ V , and bv and dv are
both linear with slopes s0v and s
1
v. For each v ∈ V , suppose qv ∈ [2
ov−1 − 1, 2ov − 1).
We next consider an encoding of xv using a bit representation. Let ov = ⌊log2(qv)⌋+1
if qv 6= 2
ov−1 − 1 and ov = ⌊log2(qv)⌋ + 2 otherwise; civ = 2i−1, i ∈ [ov − 1] and
covv = qv − 2
ov−1 + 1. By simple calculations, we know
{xv |xv ∈ Z, 0 ≤ xv ≤ qv} = {
ov∑
i=1
civy
i
v | y
i
v ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [ov]}
for any v ∈ V . Therefore, PG is equivalent to the following integer linear programming
problem (denoted as PG′):
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max
∑
v∈V
ov∑
i=1
ωvc
i
vy
i
v (PG
′)
s.t.
∑
v∈V
ov∑
i=1
civy
i
v ≤ p
ov∑
i=1
wvvc
i
vy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
wuvc
i
uy
i
u ≤ pv, ∀v ∈ V
yiv ∈ {0, 1}, ∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [ov]
Let o∗ = maxv∈V ov and ρ = o∗|V |. Recall that q = maxv∈V {qv} + 1. For any δ > 0,
let
w¯iuv = ⌊
2wuvc
i
vρ
pvδ
⌋ and p¯v = ⌈
2pvρ
pvδ
⌉ = ⌈
2ρ
δ
⌉
for any u, v ∈ V . Then we have the following modiﬁed PG′ denoted as P¯G1:
max
∑
v∈V
ov∑
i=1
ωvc
i
vy
i
v (PG1)
s.t.
∑
v∈V
ov∑
i=1
civy
i
v ≤ p
ov∑
i=1
w¯ivvy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
w¯iuvy
i
v ≤ p¯v, ∀v ∈ V
yiv ∈ {0, 1}, ∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [ov]
Lemma 8. Any feasible solution of PG′ is feasible in P¯G1, and any feasible solution
of P¯G1 is feasible for PG except violating each local constraint by a factor of 1 + δ.
Proof. We only prove local constraints for each direction since the proof of the global
constraint is similar. Let {yiv}v∈V, i∈[ov ] be a feasible solution of PG
′. We know that
ov∑
i=1
wvvc
i
vy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
wuvc
i
uy
i
v ≤ pv, ∀v ∈ V
Then
ov∑
i=1
w¯ivvy
i
v+
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
w¯iuvy
i
v ≤
2ρ
pvδ
(
ov∑
i=1
wvvc
i
vy
i
v+
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
wuvc
i
uy
i
v
)
≤
2ρ
pvδ
pv ≤ p¯v
(3.16)
as desired. On the other hand, suppose {yiv}v∈V, i∈[ov ] is a feasible solution of P¯G1. We
know that
ov∑
i=1
w¯ivvy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
w¯iuvy
i
v ≤ p¯v, ∀v ∈ V
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Then from (3.16) we have:
ov∑
i=1
wvvc
i
vy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
wuvc
i
uy
i
v ≤
pvδ
2ρ
(
ov∑
i=1
(w¯ivv + 1)y
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
(w¯iuv + 1)y
i
v
)
≤
pvδ
2ρ
ov∑
i=1
w¯ivvy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
ov∑
i=1
w¯iuvy
i
v +
pvδρ
2ρ
≤
pvδp¯v
2ρ
+
pvδ
2
≤
pvδ
2ρ
(
2ρ
δ
+ 1
)
+
pvδ
2
≤pv(1 + δ), ∀v ∈ V
Note that for each ℓ ∈ [qv], there is a solution {yiv}i∈[ov ] such that
∑ov
i=1 c
i
vy
i
v = ℓ. If
ℓ ≤ 2ov−1 − 1, set yovv = 0 and if 2ov−1 − 1 < ℓ ≤ qv, set yovv = qv − 2ov−1 + 1. In both
cases there is a unique solution such that
∑ov
i=1 c
i
vy
i
v = ℓ. Hence, there is a one-to-one
correspondence from xv to {y
i
v}i∈[ov ]. It is not diﬃcult to see that for a given xv, the
solution {yiv}i∈[ov ] deﬁned above is the one such that
∑ov
i=1 w¯
i
vvy
i
v+
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
∑ov
i=1 w¯
i
uvy
i
v
is minimized. Now let w¯vu(xv) =
∑ov
i=1 w¯
i
vuy
i
v, for any v, u ∈ V , where {y
i
v}i∈[ov ]
corresponds to the solution of xv. Let Λv = [qv]∪ {0}. Using these notations, we know
that P¯G1 (also PG) is equivalent to the following integer linear programming problem
(denoted as P¯G2):
max
∑
v∈V
ωvxv ( ¯PG2)
s.t.
∑
v∈V
xv ≤ p
w¯vv(xv) +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
w¯uv(xu) ≤ p¯v, ∀v ∈ V
xv ∈ Λv, ∀v ∈ V
Step 2: Preliminaries of tree decompositions on k-outerplanar graphs
Definition 16. A tree decomposition of an undirected graph G = (V,E) is a pair
({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )), where {Xi|i ∈ I} is a family of subsets of V , one for each
node of T , and T is a tree such that:
1.
⋃
i∈I Xi = V ,
2. for all edges (v, w) ∈ E, there exists an i ∈ I with v ∈ Xi and w ∈ Xi,
3. for all i, j, k ∈ I: if j is on the path from i to k in T , then Xi ∩ Xk ⊆ Xj
(running intersection property)
The width of a tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) is maxi∈I |Xi| − 1. The
minimum width of all tree decompositions of G is called treewidth.
42
Definition 17. A tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) of G = (V,E) is called
a nice tree decomposition if T is a rooted binary tree and
1. if a node i ∈ I has two children j and k, then Xi = Xj = Xk (joint node),
2. if a node i ∈ I has one child j, then either Xi ⊂ Xj, and |Xi| = |Xj | − 1 (forget
node), or Xj ⊂ Xi and |Xj | = |Xi| − 1 (introduce node),
3. if node i ∈ I is a leaf of T , then |Xi| = 1 (leaf node).
Lemma 9 ( [77]). For any k-outerplanar graph G = (V,E), there is an algorithm to
compute a tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) of G with treewidth at most
3k − 1 = O(k), and I = O(|V |) in O(k|V |) time.
Given a tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) for G = (V,E) with treewidth k
and I = O(|V |), we can obtain a nice tree decomposition with the same treewidth k and
the same number of nodes O(k|V |) in O(k2|V |) time [84]. Thus, for any k-outerplanar
graph G = (V,E), we can compute a nice tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F ))
of G with treewidth at most 3k − 1 = O(k), and I = O(k|V |) in O(k2|V |) time. In
the following, we will assume there is a nice tree decomposition for any k-outerplanar
graph.
Dynamic Programming (DP). We present a DP approach to solve P¯G2 on a di-
rected k-outerplanar graph using a nice tree decomposition of its undirected version.
Note that a nice tree decomposition of an undirected version of a directed graph is
also a nice tree decomposition of itself. Suppose we have a nice tree decomposition
({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) of a directed k-outerplanar graph G = (V,E). We will use a
bottom-up DP approach for P¯G2. In the following we will present our DP approach to
the more general application of the allocation of pollution licences (application 2).
For any node i ∈ I, suppose Xi = {v
i
1, v
i
2, · · · , v
i
t}, where t ≤ 3k. We say that
vertex vi1 belongs to node Xi. Similarly we say that a vertex belongs to a subtree of
T , meaning that this vertex belongs to some node of this subtree. Recall that given
any allocation of licences {xv}v∈V , the maximum number of cars (and so the maximum
number of licences) allowed at any moment in city v is w¯vv(xv) +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v) w¯uv(xu)
(the local constraint). Let ~ai = (ai1, a
i
2, · · · , a
i
t) denote the number of licences allocated
to vertices in Xi, i.e., a
i
s denotes the number of licences allocated to vertex v
i
s, s ∈ [t].
Similarly ~ℓi denotes the locally maximum number of cars allowed at any moment in
vertices of Xi. Let Gi denote the subgraph generated by all the vertices belonging to
the subtree (node Xi) rooted at Xi. We use Q
i to denote the total number of licences
allocated to Gi. Let Ωi(~ai, ~ℓi, Q
i) denote the optimal objective value of P¯G2 restricted
to the subgraph Gi, when the number of licences on v
i
s and the number of allowed cars
at any moment on i are respectively ais and ℓ
i
s, s ∈ [t], and the total number of licences
on Gi is exactly Q
i. If there is no feasible solution to Ωi(~ai, ~ℓi, Q
i), our DP approach
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will automatically set Ωi(~ai, ~ℓi, Q
i) to −∞. Let w¯uv(xv) ≡ 0 if (u, v) is not an edge in
G. Note that the range of ais we need to compute is in Λv, ℓ
i
s ranges from 0 to p¯vis ,
s ∈ [t] and Qi from 0 to p. The DP approach is as follows:
• Xi is a leaf node or a start node, where t = 1. Ωi(a
i
1, ℓ
i
1, Q
i) = ωvi1
ai1 if the triple
(ai, ℓi, Qi) is feasible, which can be veriﬁed easily e.g. Qi = ai1 and ℓ
i
1 = w¯vi1vi1
(ai1).
Let Ωi(a
i
1, ℓ
i
1, Q
i) = −∞ if the triple (ai, ℓi, Qi) is not feasible.
• Xi is a forget node and suppose its child is Xj = Xi ∪ {v
j
t+1}.
Ωi(~ai, ~ℓi, Q
i) = max
ajt+1,ℓ
j
t+1
Ωj(~ai, a
j
t+1,
~ℓi, ℓjt+1, Q
i)
• Xi is an introduce node and suppose its child is Xj = Xi \ {v
i
t}. Let a
j
s = ais
and ℓjs = ℓis − w¯vitvis(a
i
t), ∀s ∈ [t− 1]. Ωi(
~ai, ~ℓi, Qi) = Ωj(~aj , ~ℓj , Q
i − ait) + ωvita
i
t if∑
s∈[t] w¯visvit(a
i
s) = ℓ
i
t, and Ωi(
~ai, ~ℓi, Qi) = −∞ otherwise.
• Xi is a joint node and suppose its two children j and k are such that Xj = Xk =
Xi. Ωi(~ai, ~ℓi, Q
i) = maxA{Ωj(~aj , ~ℓj , Q
j) + Ωk(
~ak, ~ℓk, Qk)}, where the condition
A = {(~aj , ~ℓj , Qj), ( ~ak, ~ℓk, Qk) | ~aj + ~ak = ~ai, ~ℓj + ~ℓk = ~ℓi, Qj +Qk = Qi}.
• Xi is the root of T , OPT (Q
i) = max~ai,~ℓi{Ωi(
~ai, ~ℓi, Qi)} is the optimal value (social
welfare) of P¯G2 when the total scaled number of licences is exactly Q
i, i.e., the
global constraint satisﬁes
∑
v∈V xv = Q
i.
Analysis of running time of DP. It is not diﬃcult to see that the above DP approach
gives the correct solution of P¯G2 on k-outerplanar graphs. For each node Xi, we need
to keep O(pq3k⌈2ρδ ⌉
3k) = O(|V |q3k+1⌈2ρδ ⌉
3k) number of Ωi values. Each Ωi can be
computed in O(|V |q3k+1⌈2ρδ ⌉
3k) time (this is the worst case running time when Xi is
a joint node). There are O(k|V |) nodes in T . Therefore, the total running time of the
DP approach (by multiplying the above three numbers) is O(k|V |3q6k+2⌈2ρδ ⌉
6k).
Based on the above DP approach, we can solve P¯G2 on any k-outerplanar graph
optimally for any ﬁxed k (which includes any directed tree whose treewidth is 2).
Therefore, for any δ > 0 and ﬁxed k, we can use VCG to get an optimal deterministic
truthful mechanism for PG on any directed k-outerplanar graph that violates each local
constraint by a factor of δ and runs in O(k|V |3q6k+2⌈2ρδ ⌉
6k) time (note that Theorem
15 also works for bounded treewidth graphs).
Theorem 15. For any δ > 0 and fixed k, there is an optimal deterministic truthful
mechanism for PG on any directed k-outerplanar graph G = (V,E) that violates each
local constraint by a factor of 1 + δ and runs in O(k|V |3q6k+2⌈2ρδ ⌉
6k) time, where
ρ = |V |(⌊log2(q)⌋+ 2).
Step 3: PTAS for planar graphs Observe that when there are some boundary
conditions on k-outerplanar, the above DP approach still works. For example, if the
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number of licences of any vertex in any ﬁrst and last face (level 1 and level k face) of
the k-outerplanar graph is zero, we just modify the dynamic programming approach
in a bottom-up manner to set Ωi = −∞ if any vertex v in any ﬁrst and last face is a
parameter of Ωi and its number of licences a
i
v > 0. Then the modiﬁed DP approach
is the desired algorithm for P¯G2 on the k-outerplanar graph under this boundary
condition.
Proposition 5. PG is strongly NP-hard on planar graphs when we allow a δ violation
of local constraints.
Proof. Suppose we restrict PG instances to require that
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuv ≤ pv, ∀v ∈ V (3.17)
Then the maximum independent set problem can be solved as such PG problem with
each pv = 1. Further, observe that if δ = minu,v{wuv}, then even if we allow for
(1+ δ′)-violation of the local constraints, where 0 < δ′ < δ, the maximum independent
set problem can still be solved as such PG problem. Maximum independent set on a
planar graph with degree at most 3 is strongly NP-hard [56]. Theorem 17 provides a
PTAS for PG with q = poly(|V |) and (1 + δ′)-violation, giving a tight approximation
in this sense.
Theorem 16. For any fixed k and δ > 0, there is an O(k2|V |3q6k+2⌈2ρδ ⌉
6k) algo-
rithm for PG with integer variables on directed planar graph G = (V,E) that achieves
ρin-approximation and violates each local constraint by a factor of 1 + δ, where ρ =
|V |(⌊log2(q)⌋+ 2) and ρ
in = kk−2).
Proof. We use OPT (P¯G2) to denote OPT
in
G (P¯G2) omitting the superscript and sub-
script. By Lemma 8, we know OPT = OPT (PG) ≤ OPT (P¯G2). Let P¯G2(i) denote
the P¯G2 restricted on G when setting xv = 0 for each v that belongs to any face f ≡ i
or i+ 1 (modk). Let {x∗v}v∈V be an optimal solution for P¯G2. Then we know∑
i∈[k]
∑
v∈f :f≡i or i+1(mod k)
x∗v = 2OPT (P¯G2)
As a consequence, there exists i ∈ [k] such that
∑
v∈f :f≡i or i+1(modk)
x∗v ≤
2OPT (P¯G2)
k
Observe that {xv}v∈V is a feasible solution for P¯G2(i), where xv = 0 if v belongs to
any face f ≡ i or i+ 1 (modk) and xv = x
∗
v otherwise. Thus,
OPT (P¯G2(i)) ≥ (1−
2
k
)OPT (P¯G2) ≥ (1−
2
k
)OPT
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Level 1 2 i
G1
boundary of G1
i+1 i+2 i+k
G2
boundaries of G2
i+k+1 i+k+2
boundary of G3
GLi
Figure 3.8: An illustration of how to select k-outerplanar graphs
Solving each P¯G2(i), i ∈ [k], then choosing maxi∈[k]{OPT (P¯G2(i))} (which is at least
(1− 2k )OPT ) gives the desired result. Now let us see how to solve P¯G2(i). Note that for
P¯G2(i), xv = 0 for any v who belongs to any face f ≡ i or i+1 (modk). P¯G2(i) consists
of independent k′−outerplanar graphs, each of which has some boundary condition
i.e. the emission amount of any vertex in any ﬁrst and last face is zero and k′ ≤ k.
Suppose the number of these independent k′-outerplanar graphs is Li. Without loss of
generality, suppose these k′-outerplanar graphs are ordered from exterior to interior as
Gs = (Vs, Es), s ∈ [L
i] (e.g. Gs is the subgraph of G constructed by all the vertices of
levels from (s− 2)k + i+ 1 to (s− 1)k + i, s = 2, · · · , Li − 1, with boundary xv = 0 if
v is of level (s− 2)k + i+ 1 or (s− 1)k + i, see Figure 3.5.3).
Let Ωs(Q
s) denote the optimal value if there is a solution such that the total
allocated scaled emission amount to Gs is exactly Q
s with boundary condition and
Ωs(Q
s) = 0 otherwise, which can be solved by the above DP approach on k′-outerplanar
graphs with boundary conditions. Then, it is not diﬃcult to see the optimal solution for
P¯G2(i) is the optimal solution of the following integer linear program (denoted SUB):
max
∑
s∈[Li]
p∑
Qs=0
Ωs(Q
s)ysQs (SUB)
s.t.
∑
s∈[Li]
p∑
Qs=0
QsysQs ≤ p
p∑
Qs=0
ysQs = 1
ysQs ∈ {0, 1}, ∀s ∈ [L
i], Qs = 0, 1, . . . , p.
Let gt(Q) denote the optimal integer value of SUB when only Gs, s ∈ [t] is consid-
ered and the total emission amount allocated to these graphs is exactly Q. Then we
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have the following recursion function (which is essentially the same as that in Lemma 1):
gt(Q) = max
Qt=0,1,··· ,Q
{gt−1(Q−Qt) + Ωt(Qt)}
The optimal value of SUB is maxQ=0,1,··· ,p{gLi(Q)}, which gives the optimal solution
of P¯G2(i) by tracking the optimal value of this dynamic programming approach. The
running time of this approach is O(|Li|p2). Hence, the total running time for obtaining
and solving P¯G2(i) is
O(|Li|p2) +
∑
s∈[Li]
O(k|Vs|
3q6k+2⌈
2ρ
δ
⌉6k) = O(k|V |3q6k+2⌈
2ρ
δ
⌉6k)
We need to solve P¯G2(i), for each i ∈ [k] and then get maxi∈[k]{OPT (P¯G2(i))}. There-
fore, the overall running time is O(k2|V |3q6k+2⌈2ρδ ⌉
6k) as desired.
Let 2k = ǫ in Theorem 16. Also note that ρ = |V |(⌊log2(q)⌋+ 2). We have:
Theorem 17. For fixed δ, ǫ > 0 there is an
O
(
1
ǫ2
|V |12/ǫ+3q2⌈
2(⌊log2 q⌋+ 2)q
δ
⌉12/ǫ+1
)
=
(
|V |q(log2 q + 2)
δ
)O( 1
ǫ
)
(3.18)
time algorithm for PG on directed planar graph G = (V,E) that achieves social welfare
(1 − ǫ)OPT in(PG) and violates each local constraint by a factor of 1 + δ. This is a
PTAS for PG with polynomial size integer variables.
3.6 General objective function for bounded degree graphs
3.6.1 Approximation algorithms
If R(x) (recall from (3.4)) is monotone, we present an algorithm with an approximation
ratio of O(∆) for PG on a graph with maximum degree at most ∆.
Theorem 18. If R(x) with binary variables is monotone increasing, then there is an
(ρfr =
eγ∆+2
e−1 +1)-approximation algorithm for PG with integer variables on graph with
degree at most ∆.
Proof. If xv ∈ {0, 1}, ∀v ∈ V , for any A ⊆ V , we deﬁne g(A) = R(x) where xv = 1,
∀v ∈ A and xv = 0, for any v /∈ A. Observe that R with binary variables is submodular
if and only if g satisﬁes g(A ∪ B) + g(A ∩ B) ≤ g(A) + g(B), for any A,B ⊂ V . For
any A ⊆ V , and v ∈ V , denote by A+ v the set A∪ {v}. Let gv(A) = g(A+ v)− g(A).
Then it is not diﬃcult to see that g(A∪B)+g(A∩B) ≤ g(A)+g(B), for any A,B ⊂ V
if and only if for any A ⊆ B ⊆ V and v ∈ V \ B, gv(A) ≥ gv(B). Next we will prove
that gv(A) ≥ gv(B), which implies that R(x) is submodular.
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Let A ⊆ B ⊆ V and v ∈ V \B. Denote by drA+vu the total welfare change of player
u by adding v to set A. Observe that
gv(A) = dr
A+v
v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)∩A
drA+vu .
By simple calculations,
drA+vv = bv(1)− bv(0)− dv(1 +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)∩A
wuvxu) + dv(
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)∩A
wuvxu),
drA+vu = −du(
∑
u′∈δ−
G
(u)∩A
(wu′uxu′ + wvu)) + du(
∑
u′∈δ−
G
(u)∩A
wu′uxu′).
By convexity of du, we know that
drA+vv ≥ ∆r
B+v
v , ∀u ∈ δG(v) ∩A
drA+vu ≥ ∆r
B+v
u , ∀u ∈ δG(v) ∩A
∆rB+vu ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ δ
−
G(v) ∩B
(3.19)
Hence, gv(A) ≥ gv(B) and R(x) with binary variables is submodular.
For the graph with degree ∆, note that PG is ∆+2 column sparse. By Proposition 2,
there is a randomized ρfr =
eγ∆+2
e−1 -approximate algorithm for PG with binary variables
if R(x) is monotone increasing (which can be derandomized to be deterministic with the
same approximation ratio). Now observe that for a concave function G(x) from R≥0 to
R≥0, we have G(x+y) ≤ G(x)+G(y), for any x, y ∈ R≥0 (without loss of generality let
x ≥ y > 0, by concavity of G, it holds that G(x+y)−G(x)x+y−x ≤ G
′(x) ≤ G′(y) ≤ G(y)−G(0)y−0 ).
By this property, since bv(x) and −dv(x) are concave from R≥0 to R≥0, for any v ∈ V ,
for any feasible solution x = {xv}v and y = {yv}v, we have R(x + y) ≤ R(x) + R(y).
By ellipsoid algorithm for convex programming problem in [64], we can get an optimal
fractional solution of PG denoted as x∗ = {x∗v}v. Let z∗ = {z∗v}v where z∗v = ⌊x∗v⌋,
for any v ∈ V and x∗ = z∗ + y∗. Let y′ be an eγ∆+2e−1 -approximate solution for PG
with binary variables when R(x) is monotone increasing. Note that y∗ is a feasible
fractional solution for PG with binary variables. We know R(y∗) ≤ eγ∆+2R(y
′)
e−1 . Let
x′ be an solution of PG with integer variables such that x′ = y′ if R(y′) ≥ R(z∗) and
x′ = z∗ otherwise. Therefore, we have R(x∗) ≤ R(z∗) + R(y∗) ≤ R(z∗) + eγ∆+2R(y
′)
e−1 ≤
(
eγ∆+2
e−1 + 1)R(x
′).
3.6.2 Truthful in expectation mechanisms
In this section, we will prove that there is an O(γ∆+2) (recall the basic deﬁnitions in
the beginning of the chapter for γ) truthful in expectation mechanism for PG on any
graph with degree ∆ when bv is linear and dv is piece-wise linear with one shift point,
under a further natural assumption of a relaxation of the condition for the slopes of
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functions cv(xv) and dv(xv) (see inequalities (3.20) and (3.21) later in this section). For
each player v ∈ V , let bv(xv) = s0vxv, a linear function starting from the origin with
slope s0v. Let also dv be a piece-wise linear convex function with one shift point where
the ﬁrst part is a linear function starting from the origin with slope s1v, the shift point
is (yv, s
1
vyv) and the second part is a linear function starting from the shift point with
slope s2v ≥ s
1
v (see Figure 3.9).
0 yv
Slope:s0v
Slope:s1v
Slope:s2v
bv(xv)
dv(xv)
Figure 3.9: An illustration of function bv and dv.
As we know if the emitted pollution from player v is large enough, the welfare of
player v should be negative. The damage function is piece-wise linear with one shift
point, which means player v’s welfare (valuation minus damage) will decrease after the
total pollution in v reaches yv. Precisely, when xv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)wuvxu ≥ yv, we should
have s0v ≤ s
2
v. However, we can relax this condition to
s0v − s
2
v −
∑
u∈δ+
G
(v)
s1uwvu ≤ 0. (3.20)
The second condition on the slope s0v is somehow more subtle. Intuitively, player v’s
emitted pollution should not aﬀect his neighbour’s total pollution too much. This
means that if his neighbour u’s pollution reaches yu, then the total social welfare R(x)
should decrease. That is, for any v ∈ V , and any u ∈ δ+G(v), if
∑
u′∈δ−
G
(u)wu′uxu′ ≥ yu,
then
s0v − s
1
v −
∑
u′∈δ+
G
(v)\{u}
s1u′wvu′ ≤ s
2
uwvu. (3.21)
Lemma 10. Let x∗ be an optimal fractional solution of PG under the condition that
functions bv and dv satisfy constraints (3.20) and (3.21), then x
∗ has the following prop-
erty: for each v ∈ V , the local level of pollution in v satisfies that x∗v+
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)wuvx
∗
u ≤
yv.
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Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose there exists v ∈ V , such that
x∗v+
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)wuvx
∗
u > yv. If x
∗
v > 0, by constraints (3.20), we can decrease the value of
x∗v by an amount of α such that x∗v −α+
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)wuvx
∗
u > yv. By simple calculation,
the total social welfare increases by an amount of −(s0v − s
2
v −
∑
u∈δ+
G
(v) s
1
uwvu)α ≥ 0.
Thus, we can do this until either x∗v = 0 or x∗v − α +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)wuvx
∗
u ≤ yv. If the
ﬁrst case holds and the second case does not hold, then there exists u ∈ δ−G(v) with
x∗u > 0. Note that v ∈ δ
+
G(u). Since
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)wuvx
∗
u > yv, if we decrease the value x
∗
u
by α, by simple calculation, the total social welfare increases by at least −(s0u − s
i
u −∑
u′∈δ+
G
(u)\{v} s
i
u′wuu′ − s
2
vwuv)α ≥ −(s
0
u − s
1
u −
∑
u′∈δ+
G
(u)\{v} s
1
u′wuu′ − s
2
vwuv)α, which
is non-negative by constraints (3.21). Here, the value i is deﬁned as follows, if total
pollution in v is below yu then s
i
u = s
1
u, otherwise s
i
u = s
2
u, with the same argument
for siu′ . By this operation, we can decrease the value of v without loss of total social
welfare until the total level of pollution in v does not reach yv.
Lemma 11. If PG functions bv and dv satisfy constraints (3.20) and (3.21) then there
is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm with approximation ratio ρfr = γ∆+2.
Proof. By Lemma 10, we know the optimal fractional solution x∗ can satisfy that
x∗v +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)wuvx
∗
u ≤ yv, for any v ∈ V . Hence, we can modify the constraint (3.6)
in PG to
xv +
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v)
wuvxu ≤ min{yv, pv}. (3.22)
This modiﬁed PG has the same optimal fractional solution as PG. In the modiﬁed PG,
R(x) =
∑
v∈V ωvxv, where ωv = s
0
v− s
1
v−
∑
u∈δ−
G
(v) s
1
uwvu. By Proposition 1, there is a
deterministic polynomial time algorithm for the modiﬁed PG with approximation ratio
ρfr = γ∆+2. This algorithm is also an algorithm for PG with the same approximation
ratio.
With Lemma 11, there is a truthful in expectation mechanism for PG with approx-
imation ratio γ∆+2 = (e+ o(1))(∆ + 2):
Theorem 19. Suppose the bidding strategy s0v of each player v ∈ V satisfies con-
straints (3.20) and (3.21). There is a randomized, individually rational, (ρfr = γ∆+2)-
approximation mechanism that is truthful in expectation for PG on G with degree at
most ∆.
Proof. Since the bidding strategy s0v of each player v satisﬁes constraints (3.20) and
(3.21), by Proposition 3 and Lemma 11, there is a randomized, individually rational,
γ∆+2-approximation mechanism that is truthful in expectation for the modiﬁed PG,
which is also a truthful in expectation mechanism for PG with the same approximation
ratio.
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Corollary 2. If bv and dv are linear functions for any v and the bidding strategy s
0
v of
player v is arbitrary, then there is a randomized, individually rational, (ρfr = γ∆+2)-
approximation mechanism that is truthful in expectation for PG.
Proof. Since dv is linear, it is equivalent to the above piece-wise linear function with
s2v = +∞ and yv = +∞, for any v ∈ V . By Theorem 19, there is a randomized,
individually rational, γ∆+2-approximation mechanism that is truthful in expectation
for PG.
Remark: We cannot anticipate an algorithm with constant approximation ra-
tio for PG on the graph with average degree ∆ (the average degree of a graph G is∑
v∈V |δGun (v)|
|V | ) even if ∆ = 1. Consider a graph G
′ consisting of a complete graph with
n vertices and n2−n isolated vertices with valuation 0. Note that G′’s average degree is
n2
n2
= 1. PG on G cannot be approximated within n1−ǫ unless Unique Game conjecture
fails. Thus, PG cannot be approximated within (n2)
1−ǫ
2 on G′, where n2 is the number
of vertices of G′.
3.7 Literature overview
An invaluable source of pollution control regulations comes from the managerial ap-
proaches in environment policies. The majority of literature in this ﬁeld deals with
symmetric information. This problem however shows a fundamental asymmetry be-
tween the regulatory bodies and pollutants. The research contributions considering
environmental policy with asymmetric information and the diﬀusion nature of pollu-
tion have been limited until recently.
In order to control pollution, an incentive mechanism that is environmentally friendly
and resource eﬃcient needs to be designed and deployed by regulatory authorities. How-
ever, it is not obvious how to design such a mechanism in the presence of asymmetric
information; just as Hurwicz [69] put it: the ﬁrms know that information will be used
by the regulator to design a policy which will aﬀect their proﬁts. Hence, they have an
incentive to manipulate reported information in order to inﬂuence the content of the
policy. In this context, Farell [48] discusses the relevance of the Coase Theorem. This
theorem basically asserts that bargaining will lead to an eﬃcient outcome regardless
of the initial allocation of property if negotiation and trade in presence of externality
are possible and the transaction costs are suﬃciently low. Considering the problems
of incomplete information, that paper shows that voluntary negotiation does not lead
to the ﬁrst-best outcome that maximizes joint surplus in the presence of two-sided pri-
vate information. That is to say, centralised economic institutions such as government
control and intervention, and decentralised institutions such as bargaining and owner-
ship rights, should be viewed as complementary to each other. Therefore, a necessary
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condition for the government when designing an optimal pollution control plan is the
truthful information about ﬁrms.
Kwerel [92], Dasgupta et al. [37] and Spulber [129] have proposed mechanisms that
implement truth telling by ﬁrms to maintain a mild level of pollution. Under this
assumption the ﬁrms can communicate with the regulator but not with each other.
In Kwerel’s scheme [92] ﬁrms are informed in advance that their messages will be
translated into pollution taxes. The regulator issues a ﬁxed number of transferable
pollution licences and oﬀers a subsidy for those licences which ﬁrms hold in excess of
emission. Both the number of licences to be issued and the subsidy rate oﬀered are
calculated on the basis of the cost information provided by ﬁrms.
Kim and Chang [83] constructed an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an
oligopoly market with pollution and suggested a diﬀerential damages mechanism, which
leads to an optimal emission level. McKitrick [103] proposes a Cournot Mechanism for
pollution control under asymmetric information, in which a Nash Equilibrium exists,
is stable and can be reached by iterative computations. Because ﬁrms may attempt
to manipulate the pollution level allocation to their own advantage, the adjustment
rule is exogenous and depends on the actions of the ﬁrms. The approach by Karp
and Livernois [75] is related to that in Conrad and Wang [34]. The authors examined
the steady-state properties of a tax adjustment mechanism in situations where the
government has no information about ﬁrms’ abatement costs.
These prior studies provide an overall framework in the administrative approach
to control pollution. However, those models are only a ﬁrst level of approximation in
characterizing the reality. Although, there is some literature studying an economics
environment consisting of ﬁrms or countries with geographical distinction, few of them
take the diﬀusion nature of air and water pollution into consideration. For instance,
Petrosjan and Zaccour [116] study the problem of allocation over time of total cost
incurred by countries in a cooperative game of pollution reduction. Segerson [126]
develops a general incentive scheme for controlling nonpoint source pollution5 that
considers the diﬀusion nature, in which rewards for environmental quality above a
given standard are combined with penalties for substandard quality. Based on the
work of Petrosjan and Zaccour [116], Belitskaya [18] develops an n-person network
game model of emission reduction. Dorner et al. [45] create a multi-objective modeling
system using Bayesian probability networks to study nonpoint source pollution. Both
the work of Belitskaya [18] and Dorner et al. [45] are diﬀerent from the setting of ours,
in either model assumption or function settings. In addition to these works built on
network framework, Dong et al. [44] models the water pollution problem as a cost
5Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution refers to both water and air pollution from diffuse sources, that is
sources without a specified fixed location. For instance, nonpoint source water pollution affects a water
body from sources such as polluted runoff from agricultural areas draining into a river, or wind-borne
debris blowing out to sea. This work deals mainly with point source pollution.
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sharing problem on a tree network. However, none of the literature mentioned above
takes into account the role of governments in pollution abatement, more speciﬁcally
how to make policies assuming information asymmetry. A model that adequately takes
both factors into account is what we need to tackle such problems in reality.
Few other papers have studied air pollution in relation to network models. Singh
and Datta [128] use artiﬁcial neural network method to identify unknown pollution
sources in the groundwater. Gianessi et al. [58] analyze the national water pollution
control policies. And, ﬁnally, Trujillo and Hugh [135] study multi-objective air pollution
monitoring network design. These papers use networks in a very diﬀerent context from
ours.
Turning into current practice, emission trading is a market-based approach used
to control pollution by providing economic incentives for achieving reductions in the
emissions of pollutants. Various countries have adopted emission trading systems as one
of the strategies for mitigating climate-change by addressing international greenhouse-
gas emission [132].
A central authority (usually a governmental body) sets a limit or cap on the amount
of a pollutant that may be emitted. The limit or cap is allocated and/or sold by the
central authority to ﬁrms in the form of emission permits which represent the right
to emit or discharge a speciﬁc volume of the speciﬁed pollutant [131]. Permits (and
possibly also derivatives of permits) can then be traded on secondary markets. For
example, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) trades primarily
in European Union Allowances (EUAs), the Californian scheme in California Carbon
Allowances, the New Zealand scheme in New Zealand Units and the Australian scheme
in Australian Units [133]. Firms are required to hold a number of permits (or allowances
or carbon credits) equivalent to their emissions. The total number of permits cannot
exceed the cap, limiting total emissions to that level. Firms that need to increase their
volume of emissions must buy permits from those who require fewer permits [131,132].
Currently a simple auction mechanism for selling EUAs is adopted in Europe, see,
e.g., [4]. Furthermore in order to limit the automobile pollution, governments use
policies of car taxation [71], [55]. A radical transport policy introduced in the UK and
ﬁrst applied in Central London resulting in 19% reduction of CO2 emissions (see table
2 in [16]).
3.8 Open problems
We presented a new network model for the pollution control problem and studied planar
and tree networks which model realistic scenarios. These networks can be applied to
model air and water pollution from diﬀuse sources. Our main technical results include a
constant approximation algorithm and a PTAS with a small violation in the constraints
for the case of planar graphs and an FPTAS which is truthful in expectation and a 3-
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approximate deterministic truthful mechanism for the case of trees. We obtained these
results by introducing novel algorithmic techniques for planar and tree graphs which
could be of independent interest.
Many interesting open problems arise from this new model. Our main open question
is to determine whether PG with binary variables on planar graphs admits a PTAS or
whether it is APX-hard. Another direction would be to study lower bounds on truthful
(deterministic, universal, truthful in expectation) mechanisms for PG. Can externality
be used to obtain such lower bounds? Furthermore it would be interesting to generalize
our results to other graphs, e.g., Euclidean graphs.
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Chapter 4
Coverage problems in
wireless sensor networks
4.1 The problems
Modern technological advances in micro-electronic and mechanical systems, digital elec-
tronics, and wireless communications have boosted the low-cost development of multi-
functional sensing devices, called sensor nodes, which, despite their relatively small
dimensions, have exceptionally superior sensing, processing and communication capa-
bilities. A set of spatially distributed sensor nodes which are wirelessly interconnected
constitutes a so called Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [7, 145].
WSNs thanks to their capability to monitor phenomena taking place in almost every
type of environment, are considered to be among the most emerging scientiﬁc domains
in 21st century and have an ever growing variety of applications [3]. However, the
utilization of WSNs is limited because of the strict energy limitations of the wireless
nodes. Speciﬁcally, a sensor node within a WSN dissipates amounts of energy mainly
during communication but also during sensing and processing. On the other hand,
typical sensor nodes are powered by simple batteries. Thus in WSNs comprising of
hundreds or even thousands of randomly deployed nodes, it is impractical to either
recharge or replace the node batteries that have run out of energy. As nodes get
depleted, the continuous monitoring of the whole network is deteriorated while the
energy cost of communication is increased because less multi-hop routing paths remain
available. In this way the network lifetime is rapidly reduced. That is why, great
amount of research in WSNs aims at the maximization of network lifetime [108,149].
Several deﬁnitions of network lifetime use a coverage variant i.e. the continuous
monitoring of whole areas or discrete targets of interest via the sensing nodes of WSNs.
Each sensor node monitors phenomena taking place within its sensing area, which is
typically considered as a disk with the sensor being placed at its center. Due to this
ability, WSNs have a continuously increasing range of applications [13].
The most common deﬁnition for the coverage variant uses 1-coverage to deﬁne the
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network lifetime as the time that the region of interest is covered by at least one node.
However, according to Friedrich and Dressler [39], coverage can be deﬁned in diﬀerent
ways, depending on both the conﬁguration of the region of interest and the accomplished
redundancy of the coverage. Speciﬁcally, according to the region conﬁguration there are
three possible types of coverage. The ﬁrst one is the so called area or volume coverage,
where each point inside a two-dimensional area or a three-dimensional volume must
be covered. The second alternative is the so called target coverage case where only a
ﬁnite set of target points inside an area of interest has to be covered. Barrier coverage
is the third type of coverage case, where a mobile target can pass undetected through
a barrier of sensor nodes.
Similarly, there are two approaches to describe the degree of coverage redundancy
that can be accomplished by a given WSN. The ﬁrst approach is termed α-coverage. It
requires that only a given percentage α of the region of interest is covered by at least
one sensor node. The second approach is named k-coverage. It requires that each point
within the region of interest is covered by at least k sensors.
In the case where sensor nodes are owned by selﬁsh agents who may sell the service
of routing data [11] or for the coverage of an area/set of targets we want to derive
mechanisms that assign right payments to the agents who own the sensors. In this
sense the mechanism encourages them to declare the truth about their battery cost
per unit time (truthful mechanisms). At the same time we also want to maximize the
lifetime of the network. In particular we consider the following optimization problems:
• Budgeted Maximum Lifetime Coverage (BMLC) in which we want to ﬁnd a proper
schedule of active/sleep sensor nodes such that the total time that the areas of
interest are monitored is maximized while a monetary budget is not exceeded.
• Weighted Sensor Cover (WSC) in which we aim at ﬁnding a set of weighted sensor
nodes that monitor all the target points having the minimum total weight.
We study two approaches (each suitable for a diﬀerent scenario) for two problems of
target coverage. In the former, we propose a combinatorial model in which the targets
are covered by the sensor nodes with some probability given on input of the problem.
In the latter we consider a geometric model in which the sensor nodes, the targets and
the base station are deployed in the plane.
4.1.1 Our results
Inspired by applied scenarios in which full sensing is not possible as in the hidden
terminal problem [134], we introduce a random instance model for the budgeted max-
imum lifetime coverage (BMLC) problem and in this model we design a novel truthful
approximate mechanism for this problem. Our mechanism is randomized, polynomial
time and truthful with high probability with respect to both random instances and
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internal randomness of the algorithm. Technically, our approach is based on an inter-
esting reduction from the budgeted maximum lifetime coverage problem to the classic
knapsack problem. Then, we utilize the combinatorial structure of the coverage prob-
lem to prove that with high probability, i.e., on almost all instances of the problem,
this reduction results in a monotone algorithm, that leads to a truthful mechanism un-
der some technical assumptions. Monotonicity, which is an algorithmic property that
is suﬃcient and often also necessary for truthfulness for one parameter agents [14], is
usually diﬃcult to achieve and there are only very few approaches known in literature
towards this goal. Our approach is an example of a new such technique and can also
be of independent interest.
Second, we study the closely related minimum sensor coverage problem in wireless
sensor networks on unit disk graphs, generalize and extend the recent PTAS [97] for
this problem to obtain a monotone algorithm and therefore a truthful PTAS for the
problem where the costs of sensor nodes are the private data of the agents. However,
since the algorithm chooses the minimum cost solution out of many possible ones, hence
a monotone algorithm for every subproblem does not necessarily lead to a monotone
algorithm for the whole problem, as shown in [107]. Thus we modify the algorithm and
consider the stronger notion of bitonicity. We ﬁrst show that the combination of the
bitonic algorithms for each subproblem is monotone and therefore leads to a truthful
mechanism. To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to study strategic
issues for target coverage problems.
We ﬁnally show that the well known reduction based on the primal-dual Garg-
Koenemann framework, ﬁrst used by Berman et al. [19], leads to the same approxima-
tion guarantee as for the classic maximum lifetime coverage problem, even if we have
many additional budget constraints. This implies a polynomial time approximation
scheme (PTAS) for the budgeted maximum lifetime coverage problem in unit disks
graphs (i.e., sensors are unit disks on the plane), and a O(log(m))-approximation for
the problem in general graphs, where m is the number of targets.
4.1.2 Motivation and related work
The simultaneous maximization of network lifetime as well as the network coverage
are considered to be crucially important issues in WSNs and various research ap-
proaches have been proposed to deal with them [9]. For instance, some of them
use the so called Maximum Lifetime Coverage Problem (MLCP) approach, propos-
ing sleep/activate schedules for sensor nodes in order to maximize the lifetime of target
coverage in the ﬁeld [41]. Actually, Cardei et al. [27] ﬁrst proposed the appropriate
scheduling of the operation of the network nodes in order to achieve the extension of
coverage lifetime in a network. Speciﬁcally, they deﬁned two types of operational modes
of nodes and developed a linear programming algorithm and a greedy algorithm to ar-
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range the appropriate alternation of operational modes for each sensor node in order to
both conserve energy and retain the service quality of the coverage. Similarly, Zhu and
Sivakumar [150] proposed a communication strategy called Communication through
Silence (CtS) which primarily uses silence, along with a minimal amount of energy
to deliver information between sensor nodes to achieve energy-eﬃcient communication
without signiﬁcant degradation on overall throughput in WSNs.
The maximization of the coverage of an area under cost-eﬃciency and stability
constraints has also been addressed by applying optimization techniques [82]. Berman
et al. [19] reduced the area coverage problem to target coverage by adding O(N2)
targets whereN is the number of sensor nodes and proposed an O(logN) approximation
algorithm for MLCP. Some other research schemes use clustering methods in order to
achieve eﬃcient organization of sensor nodes into clusters [110].
Alternatively many research works pursue to extend the network lifetime through
energy eﬃcient routing protocols which ensure that data are relayed from source nodes
to destination nodes by using multi-hop routing via the most energy-eﬃcient paths
possible [74].
However, energy eﬃciency may be indeed anticipated from the point of view of the
overall network beneﬁt, but not from the point of view of an individual and selﬁsh
node proﬁt. Generally, a node is considered to be selﬁsh if it does not agree to provide
any of its available resources (battery reserves, CPU cycles, or network bandwidth) to
forward data which are not of its direct interest, even though it expects other nodes to
relay data on its behalf.
In order to stimulate cooperation among nodes in a network various protocols have
been proposed. These protocols may be classiﬁed into two main categories. The ﬁrst
of them includes the so called reputation-based protocols, while the other one is the
market-based (or credit-based) approach.
In reputation-based approach, the behavior of every single node is dynamically
measured by the rest of the nodes that belong to the same network. The incentive
for a node is to keep relaying an estimated amount of traﬃc in order to maintain its
reputation to an acceptable level [101]. The relay of traﬃc from a node with high
reputation is facilitated by other nodes by virtue of its past behavior, and on the other
hand, nodes with poor reputation are isolated from the network participation. These
mechanisms relate the desire of a node to relay traﬃc with its reputation. In order to
achieve the reputation based forwarding methodology, the foremost requirement is the
eﬀective implementation of a truthful and cheat proof mechanism.
For example, Marti et al. proposed in [102] a reputation-based system where nodes
use one mechanism to detect misbehaving nodes and another mechanism to avoid these
nodes during route selection. Michardi and Molva [105] proposed a mechanism which
not only makes decisions about cooperation but also identiﬁes and avoids malicious
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nodes which on purpose drop the data packages they receive. This mechanism uses
a weighted combination of the values of three diﬀerent reputation measures: subjec-
tive reputation (which is mainly based on the past observations), indirect reputation
(which includes only positive reports by other nodes) and functional reputation (which
evaluates task-speciﬁc reputation).
Buchegger and Le Boudec introduce in [22] a protocol, called CONFIDANT, which
aims at detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes, thus making it unattractive to deny
cooperation. For this reason, it uses experienced, observed, or reported routing and
forwarding behavior of other nodes in order to deﬁne trust relationships and make
routing decisions.
All of the above reputation-based protocols were evaluated purely through numerical
case studies. Analytical approaches to study reputation-based systems include the
following: Urpi et al. proposed in [136] a model, based on game theory, which is capable
of formally studying and analyzing strategies for cooperation and as an example they
developed a simple strategy that enforces packet forwarding among nodes.
Srinivasan et al. [130] determined the optimal throughput that each node should
receive and proposed a distributed and scalable acceptance algorithm which is used by
the nodes to decide whether to accept or reject a relay request.
In the market-based (or credit-based) approach, nodes receive a micro-payment (or
credit) for every packet that they forward. In return, nodes can use these payments
(credits) to send their own traﬃc.
Buttyan and Hubaux in [23] proposed the use of a counter, in each node, whose
indication decreases when the node sends an own packet, increases when the node
forwards a packet, and requires to remain always positive. Besides stimulating packet
forwarding, the proposed mechanism encourages the users to keep their nodes turned
on and to refrain from sending a large amount of packets to distant destinations.
Irissappane et al in [72] proposed a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process to
make routing decisions in an energy-eﬃcient and secure manner, when the information
about the sensor nodes is limited.
In [148], Zhong et al. proposed a system to provide incentive to mobile nodes to
cooperate, which determines payments and charges from a game-theoretic perspective,
and motivates each node to report its behavior honestly, even when a collection of the
selﬁsh nodes collude.
4.2 Preliminaries and models
In both BMLC and WSC the base station acts as a coordinator of a game aiming at
the coverage of the targets of interest. The base station pays the agents in order to
incentivize them to dispose their sensors in its service. More precisely the problems are
the following:
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Definition 18 (BMLC). We are given a network consisting of a set of n randomly
deployed sensor nodes each owned by a different agent, a set of m target points and
a base station of fixed locations in sensors’ vicinity. In BMLC we are asked to find a
schedule of sensor nodes’ activity to maximize the lifetime of the network subject to the
constraints that each target is continuously monitored by at least one sensor and that a
monetary budget of the base station is not exceeded.
Definition 19 (WSC). We are given a network consisting of a set of n weighted and
randomly deployed sensor nodes each owned by a different agent, a set of m target
points and a base station of fixed locations in sensors’ vicinity. In WSC we are asked
to find a set of sensor nodes whose weight is minimum subject to the constraint that all
target points are monitored.
4.2.1 Basic definitions
The network consists of the following elements: a base station, a set of sensor nodes
N = {s1, . . . sn}, each owned by a diﬀerent agent, and a set of targets points of interest
T = {τ1, . . . , τm}. The positions of the all the elements are considered ﬁxed. We
assume that all sensor nodes have the same sensing and transmission range and that
m = Θ(n). Each sensor node i has a limited battery capacity denoted by βi (measured
in energy units). A sensor node consumes energy when it is active i.e. when it monitors
its sensing area or when it transmits data. Otherwise it does not consume energy (sleep
mode). We assume that all batteries have the same consumption rate (1 unit of energy
per 1 unit of time). Thus we can measure the capacity of the batteries in time units as
well. We also denote by wi = 1/βi the weight of sensor si.
A sensor node si covers a target τj if the latter is in the sensing range of si. A set
S of sensor nodes that monitor all the target points at the same time will be called a
sensor cover or simply a cover. Denote by r the number of possible covers (note that r
can be exponentially large in n) and the j-th cover by Cj , j = 1, . . . , r. A cover Cj is
active for tj time units, if all its sensor nodes are active for tj time units. We use an
n× r matrix A to represent the set of covers. More speciﬁcally, the rows of A represent
the sensors and the columns represent the covers. If si belongs to Cj then Aij = 1,
otherwise Aij = 0.
In BMLC the objective is the maximization of the total time for which all the
targets are covered i.e. max
∑r
j=1 tj subject to battery and budget constraints. First,
the total time that a sensor is active must not exceed its battery capacity:
r∑
j=1
Aijtj ≤ βi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n (4.1)
Furthermore, the base station has a budget capacity of C monetary units to dispose
to the agents for monitoring the targets of interest so:
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n∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
Aijtjci ≤ C (4.2)
Combining the above constraints we derive the following LP for BMLC:
max
r∑
j=1
tj (LP1)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
Aijtjci ≤ C,
r∑
j=1
Aijtj ≤ βi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
tj ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , r
The non negativity constraints are imposed on tj ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , r due to the fact
that the variables correspond to time units. The cost per time unit ci expresses the
valuation of agent i and is considered to be his private information. Agent i declares to
the mechanism a value (his bid) bi about the cost/time of activity of si. An algorithm
for BMLC takes as input matrix A, the bids of the agents b = (bi, b−i) and the battery
capacities of the sensors βi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. In a feasible solution for BMLC, the algorithm
assigns a value to tj , ∀j = 1, . . . , r. The active time of agent i is the total time its sensor
node is active i.e.
∑
j:si∈Cj tj and his proﬁt is profiti(ci, b) = pi(b)− ci
∑
j:i∈j tj , where
pi is the payment deﬁned in (2.1).
In WSC the valuation of i is his weight wi (measured in monetary units) which
corresponds to the amount needed for the disposal of si to monitor the targets in
sensing area. The proﬁt of agent i is then profiti(wi, b) = pi(b)− wi.
4.3 Our mechanism for BMLC
We introduce here a natural model of randomly generated instances of BMLC that in
fact was considered in the literature before in context of the closely related minimum
cardinality set cover problem, see Vercellis [138]. Suppose the number of targets m is
given. Then every sensor node among n sensor nodes independently at random covers
each target, again independently at random, with probability ǫ > 0, where ǫ is a given
constant. Thus each sensor node covers ǫm targets in expectation. Our analysis carries
out even when each sensor node i covers each target j with probability ǫij , where
0 < ǫij < 1 for all i, j. In this case we have to replace ǫ with maxij ǫij in the analysis.
In this section let us assume that matrix A as deﬁned in the (LP1) for BMLC is
the result of this randomly generated instance of BMLC. That is, each column of A is
a feasible cover.
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We design a mechanism that is truthful with high probability, that is, on almost all
instances in this random instances model. We are only aware of one paper employing
a similar approach using VCG-based mechanisms providing average case bounds for
mechanism design [141]. In contrast to that paper, we need to design a dedicated
mechanism for our problem, which is not VCG. We prove truthfulness of our mechanism
by exploiting the combinatorial structure of BMLC. We call this mechanism Random
Knapsack Greedy (RKG).
We now present a high level outline of the ideas leading to our new mechanism.
Note that BMLC is NP-hard to solve since it is a more general case of the lifetime
coverage problem known to be NP-hard when A is not of polynomial size [19]. Thus,
since the VCG mechanism requires an optimal solution, it does not admit a polynomial
time optimal algorithm unless P=NP. Because we aim at an eﬃcient mechanism, we
are not able to use VCG. Then usually it is a complex task to design a monotone, i.e.,
truthful mechanism. We provide here a new technique which achieves this goal on the
majority of the instances of BMLC. We believe that this technique is of independent
interest. In addition to being theoretically interesting, this approach also is relevenat
to applications, because in practice one usually deploys mechanisms on typical, and
rather not worst-case instances.
We ﬁrst introduce a relaxation of BMLC to an easier problem in such a way that we
are able to design a monotone mechanism for that easier problem (it is the fractional
maximum weighted knapsack problem, that has known monotone greedy algorithms).
Secondly, we need to translate the solution of the knapsack problem back to the original
space of variables of BMLC in a way that preserves monotonicity and enables us to
obtain a good approximation guarantee. The second step requires much care and it
crucially uses combinatorial properties of the random instances of BMLC. We describe
now the details.
To reduce BMLC to the knapsack problem our algorithm introduces a new variable
zi for every battery constraint of sensor node i to be
zi =
r∑
j=1
Aijtj , i = 1, . . . , n, (4.3)
and then we normalize them to the variables yi =
zi
βi
, ∀i ∈ [N ]. With the polynomially
many new variables, (LP1) becomes the following fractional knapsack LP
max
n∑
i=1
βiyi (LP2)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
ciβiyi ≤ C (4.4)
0 ≤ yi ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
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This new system is now polynomial in size and the problem can be solved optimally
in polynomial time by the Greedy algorithm [35]. Greedy sorts the items in decreasing
order of the ratio of proﬁt (βi here) per size (ciβi here), ri =
βi
ciβi
= 1ci . The items are
considered by Greedy in this order and added fully (that is if i is added then yi := 1) to
the solution one by one so long as the current solution does not exceed the budget C.
For the ﬁrst item that violates the budget C only a fractional portion of it is added to
the solution to the extent that the constraint (4.4) is fulﬁlled with equality. Then the
Greedy stops. It is clear that Greedy is monotone since if agent i misreports to a value
c′i < ci this can only lead to higher ri and thus a higher position in the order. In this
case we see that the total time allocated to sensor i, that is, the value of yi = zi/βi,
doesn’t decrease as needed for monotonicity according to Archer and Tardos [14].
Once we have a solution to (LP2), we need to translate it back to the r-dimensional
space of (LP1). This is obtained by solving the system of linear equations (4.3). Note,
that it is crucial that we insist on the exact solution of the system (4.3) to preserve
monotonicity.
As the main technical ingredient of our construction, we will show that it suﬃces
to solve the system (4.3) on a carefully chosen n × n submatrix A′ of matrix A. This
submatrix has to have full rank to guarantee solvability of the system (4.3), and it has
to be column-sparse to guarantee good approximation to BMLC.
The columns of submatrix A′ are generated independently at random and each
consists of exactly q = ⌊α logm⌋ ones, where α is constant to be deﬁned later. Vercellis
[138] considered the randomly generated instances described above for the set cover
problem and showed that the optimal, that is minimum cardinality, solution to the set
cover instance contains q sets. We prove that any randomly generated column of length
n with exactly q = ⌊α log(m)⌋ ones is a feasible cover with high probability (note that
in our notation, a one with index i in this column means that sensor node i is present in
the cover represented by this column, and zero means that sensor node i is not present).
Recall that matrix A is randomly generated by our random instances process, and
we will prove that A′ will be its submatrix with high probability.
Lemma 12. A column of matrix A′ with q = ⌊α log(m)⌋ ones is not a cover with
probability at most 1
md−1
, where α = d
log 1
1−ǫ
and d > 1 is a constant.
Proof. The probability that target τ is not covered by any of the α log(m) sensor nodes
in that column (we denote this event by τ¯), is
Pr(τ¯) = (1− ǫ)α logm = 2α logm log(1−ǫ)
= 2−α logm log(
1
1−ǫ
) = (
1
m
)α log(
1
1−ǫ
)
Let τ1, . . . , τm be all the target points. By the union bound, the probability that the
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cover represented by our column is infeasible is
Pr(τ¯1 ∨ . . . ∨ τ¯m) ≤
m∑
i=1
Pr(τ¯i) =
m∑
i=1
(
1
m
)α log
1
1−ǫ
= m(
1
m
)α log
1
1−ǫ = m−α log
1
1−ǫ
+1
Using the union bound and Lemma 12 we obtain:
Corollary 3. The probability that one vector out of n randomly chosen columns of A′
is not a cover is at most nm−α log
1
1−ǫ
+1 ≤ 1n for a suitable choice of α.
In order to prove that n distinct vectors are linearly independent we will need the
following:
Lemma 13. Suppose we have k distinct 0/1 vectors v1, . . . , vk, each of length n and
each with exactly q = ⌊α logm⌋ ones and let λ1, . . . , λk be k real numbers. Any 0/1
vector v′ with exactly q ones that can be expressed as a linear combination v′ =
∑k
i=1 λi ·
vi is one of the vectors v1, . . . , vk.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. The case of k = 1 is obvious. Now, we will prove
the base case of k = 2. Let v′ = λ1v1+λ2v2. Clearly, it is not possible that λ1 = λ2 = 0,
because then vector v′ does not contain q ones. Furthermore, since v1 6= v2, there is
at least one entry i for which v1i = 1 and v
2
i = 0 and another entry j 6= i for which
v1j = 0 and v
2
j = 1. Because v
′ is a 0/1 vector, we must have that λ1, λ2 ∈ {0, 1}. Now
if λ1 = λ2 = 1, vector v
′ will have more than q ones.
We now consider the cases: If v′j = 1 we have that λ1v
1
j + λ2v
2
j = 1 ⇒ λ1 = 0 and
λ2 = 1, so v
′ = v2. Similarly if v′i = 1, we have that λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0, thus v
′ = v1.
Then, we have that v′j = v
′
i = 0 which is impossible because then λ1 = λ2 = 0. This
proves the base case.
Suppose now that the inductive hypothesis holds for k = s vectors, s ≥ 3. We
will prove that it also holds for k = s + 1. Let v′ be a 0/1 vector such that v′ =∑s
i=1 λiv
i =
∑s−1
i=1 λiv
i + λsv
s. By induction hypothesis the ﬁrst sum is one of the
vectors v1, . . . , vs−1. Now the sum reduces to the induction base case where λ1 = 1
and therefore the claim follows.
Our (randomized) algorithm to construct an n×n submartix A′ of matrix A simply
chooses n distinct columns of A, such that each such column has exactly q = ⌊α logm⌋
ones. By Lemma 13 these columns will be linearly independent. Let A′ be the resulting
matrix formed by these n columns.
Note that in RKG we do not need to explicitly write matrix A, so the time remains
polynomial. We now prove the correctness of our algorithm. Using Lemma 13, we
easily see that:
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Algorithm 3: The RKG Mechanism
Input : Instance of BMLC where each of the targets that each sensor node
selects to cover are chosen independently at random with prob.
ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Output: A polynomial sequence of covers of all targets and the duration (tj) of
their sensor node being active, and payments – one to each sensor
node.
1 Formulate (implicitly) BMLC as (LP1) of possibly exponentially many variables
(one per cover).
2 Deﬁne the variables zi for every sensor node i as zi =
∑r
j=1Aijtj and yi = zi/βi.
Then obtain the fractional knapsack (LP2).
3 Solve (LP2) optimally by Greedy [35].
4 To get a solution for the original variables tj , (independently at random in
expected polynomial time) choose n distinct covers (columns) of matrix A to
form matrix A′ and solve the resulting system (4.3) with A replaced by A′ using,
e.g., Gaussian elimination. (* Note: A′ has full rank with high probability and
there is a unique solution for tj . *)
5 Compute payments as in (2.1). (* Note: The algorithm is single parameter (ci)
monotone, as needed in [14]. *)
Lemma 14. The n columns of matrix A′ as above are linearly independent with prob-
ability 1, i.e., with certainty.
Combining Corollary 3 and Lemma 14 we obtain:
Lemma 15. The n columns of matrix A′ as above are linearly independent with prob-
ability 1, and are all feasible covers with probability at least 1−nm−α log
1
1−ǫ
+1 ≥ 1− 1n ,
for a suitable choice of α such that α = Θ(1/ log( 11−ǫ)).
The above algorithm is truthful and achieves an approximation of α logm with high
probability:
Theorem 20. Algorithm RKG runs in polynomial time, is truthful and achieves an
O(α log(m))-approximation for the randomly generated instances of BMLC with proba-
bility at least 1−nm−α log
1
1−ǫ
+1 if the system of equations (4.3) has a positive solution,
where α = Θ(1/ log( 11−ǫ)) for any fixed ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Truthfulness follows by monotonicity and the use of payments deﬁned by equa-
tion (2.1). The correctness of the algorithm follows by Lemma 15. We will prove now
the approximation guarantee. Let t be the optimal solution of BMLC. Each cover con-
tains at least one sensor node so
∑r
j=1 tj ≤
∑r
j=1 njtj , where nj is the number of sensor
nodes in cover j. Let y¯ be the optimal solution to knapsack, that is to (LP2), obtained
by Greedy. Let t¯ be the corresponding solution of the system (4.3). The value of the
objective is
n∑
i=1
βiy¯i =
n∑
i=1
z¯i =
n∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
Aij t¯j =
r∑
j=1
t¯j(
n∑
i=1
Aij) =
r∑
j=1
nj t¯j
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Since this is the optimal fractional solution to the linear program (LP2), we have that∑r
j=1 njtj ≤
∑r
j=1 nj t¯j . The crucial observation now is that we can express the optimal
solution y¯ to knapsack by any submatrix of A that is full rank. Let A′ be an n×nmatrix
with n columns, each of ⌊α logm⌋ sensor nodes as in Lemma 15. That is with probability
at least 1 − nm−α log
1
1−ǫ
+1, the system of equations z¯i =
∑r
j=1A
′
ij t˜j has a solution t˜
that is a feasible solution to BMLC. As above we now have that
∑n
i=1 z¯i =
∑r
j=1 n
′
j t˜j ,
where n′j refers to the number of sensor nodes in column j of matrix A
′ and we know
that n′j ≤ α logm. This ﬁnally implies that
r∑
j=1
tj ≤
r∑
j=1
njtj ≤
r∑
j=1
nj t¯j =
r∑
j=1
n′j t˜j ≤ α logm
r∑
j=1
t˜j .
Resource augmentation
We note that the system of equations (4.3) does not always have a positive solution for
variables tj , ∀j = 1, . . . , r. In such cases one possible solution is using mobile sensor
nodes by the base station which can cover all the target points while occurring an
additional cost. This notion was used in a slightly diﬀerent way in [47] under the name
of resource augmentation.
4.4 A truthful PTAS for WSC
Our approach follows and enhances the algorithm by Li and Jin [97]. The authors
presented a PTAS that ﬁnds a set of disks (sensor nodes with unit radius in the plane)
which cover all the target points and have the minimum total weight. Our main result
is a modiﬁcation of the guessing phase of the algorithm in order to obtain a truth-
ful mechanism for WSC. Since we consider single parameter agents (here the private
parameter of each agent is the weight), in order to obtain truthfulness, we ﬁrst need
to show that the algorithm is monotone. Then using the payment scheme by [14] we
derive a truthful mechanism for WSC. However, monotonicity is not suﬃcient when
combining several monotone subalgorithms. In order to circumvent this we need the
stronger notion of bitonicity [107], as the algorithm proceeds in iterations and chooses
the minimum cost solution.
4.4.1 The algorithm by Li and Jin [97]
Let ǫ > 0 be a ﬁxed error parameter. We only outline their algorithm here (for details
see [97]). The algorithm consists of the following phases:
General description (plane partition): The algorithm proceeds in iterations choos-
ing the minimum cost solution computed. Let B be the area in the plane in which all
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the target points lie in. Deﬁne a coordination system of x and y axes. The algorithm
proceeds with a constant number of iterations in each of which B is partitioned into
squares, called blocks, of size L = 1ǫ aligned to the coordination system. Each block is
further partitioned into squares of size µ = O(ǫ). The authors present an algorithm
that computes an approximate (1+ǫ) solution for each block and then take the union of
these solutions for whole B. In every iteration each block is shifted two squares to the
right and two squares up and a new solution is computed for every block and therefore
for B. The solution with the smallest weight among those is returned.
The algorithm proceeds with the following three phases in every block:
Steps for each block:
1. Guessing: It guesses whether the optimal solution contains more than K =
O(1/ǫ5) disks. In other words, the algorithm enumerates over all possible combi-
nations of a constant number of disks and returns that combination for which the
objective is minimum. If the optimal solution OPT contains at most K disks the
algorithm enumerates all possible combinations (in O(nK) time where n is the
number of disks) and chooses the combination of disks that cover all the targets
and have the smallest weight. Otherwise it guesses the set G of the K disks with
the largest weight. Assuming that the guess is correct the algorithm discards all
the targets that are covered by G and all the disks with weight larger than the
weight of the cheapest disk in G.
2. Construction of set H: Next, the algorithm chooses a set H of at most ǫK disks
from the remaining ones. The algorithm ﬁrst adds in H the furthest pair of disks
in every square (independently of their weights). Next, a constant number of disks
are added to H. This is done by a careful way to break the uncovered regions
into two subregions which fulﬁll certain geometric properties that are related to
the geometric structure of disks and targets in the plane. The criteria for adding
a disk to cover these subregions depend either on the distance between pairs of
disks or on the intersections of disks. However these criteria are independent of
disks’ weights.
3. Dynamic Programming. Once G and H are found the remaining small pieces of
uncovered targets of the instance are solved optimally by dynamic programming.
4.4.2 Our truthful mechanism
We will describe now how to modify their algorithm to achieve monotonicity. We note
that in order to prove that the algorithm is bitonic it is enough to prove bitonicity for
one of the iterations. Furthermore, observe that the phase of construction of H and the
phase of dynamic programming are bitonic and therefore monotone because the choice
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of the disks is independent of the weights for the former and because we compute the
optimal solution for the latter.
The procedure of standard guessing as shown by Li and Jin is not monotone and
hence not bitonic. As an example consider the case where sensor node si is in the
guessed solution with weight wi and all other sensor nodes with weight larger than
wi are removed. Then if the weight of si decreases too much, this will result in an
infeasible solution since all non guessed sensor nodes will be removed.
In order to achieve bitonicity and therefore monotonicity we use the approach pro-
posed by Grandoni et al. [63] to guess not only the subset of largest weight disks but also
to guess their weights. This step is crucial for bitonicity and does not aﬀect signiﬁcantly
the approximation ratio and the running time of the algorithm.
Let wmin and wmax be the smallest and largest guessed weights of the disks, re-
spectively. Starting from a ﬁxed high weight we keep decreasing its value using binary
search, until all disks are discarded, except from those that were guessed, leading to an
infeasible solution. At this point this value is wmin. Similarly if we keep increasing the
value until no disk is discarded leading to the same solution after some value, we have
found the value of wmax.
The next step is to guess the weights of the disks in a guessed subset. Let T be the
set of all the integer powers of (1+ǫ) between wmin and wmax. For a ﬁxed guessed sub-
set of the K disks we guess the weights in the set T . We then consider all the possible
combinations of weights with values in T . Under each diﬀerent assignment of weights
to disks we have a diﬀerent subproblem. Each subproblem is formed of the K guessed
disks together with one of the possible assignments of the guessed weights of the disks.
The combinations of the K guessed disks is nK and the possible combinations of the
guessed weights to disks is (log1+ǫ
wmax
wmin
)K so in total the number of subproblems is
nK(log1+ǫ
wmax
wmin
)K which is polynomial, for a ﬁxed constant K. Note that the approx-
imation guarantee with additional guess of weights follows the arguments of [63]. We
next prove that this procedure is bitonic.
Lemma 16. The procedure of guessing the disks and their weights is bitonic.
Proof. First ﬁx a set G of the K guessed disks and ﬁx an assignment of weights. Let
wD ∈ T denote the guessed weight of disk D. It is not diﬃcult to see that the procedure
of guessing is monotone. Consider a disk D with original weight wD and suppose it is
in the set G of the guessed disks. If we consider the same instance where D now has
weight w′D < wD then D ∈ G due to the deterministic procedure of choosing disks. We
will now show how the objective of the problem changes according to the change in the
weight of disk D.
Suppose that D /∈ G with weight wD. Then by monotonicity of guessing D /∈ G for
any weight w′D > wD due to the deterministic procedure of guessing. Thus the value
of the objective will not change.
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Consider now the case where D ∈ G with weight wD. By monotonicity D ∈ G for
any weight w′D < wD. Let S denote the ﬁxed set of disks G when D ∈ G has original
weight wD and let w(S) denote its weight. Recall that the algorithm after the guessing
constructs the set H, it then computes the optimal solution on the remaining instance
and among all the possible guesses it chooses that one with the smallest total weight.
Consider now all the possible q solutions by the algorithm S1, . . . Sq in a non-decreasing
order of their weights i.e. w(S1) ≤ . . . w(Sq). Let S
′ be the solution when w′D < wD.
If w(S′) < w(S1) then the output solution has the smallest cost among all the possible
ones and the lemma holds. If w(S1) < w(S
′) then the algorithm will output S1 which
has the smallest weight and the lemma holds.
Combining the bitonicity of construction of H, the bitonicity of the dynamic pro-
gramming procedure and Lemma 16, we have that every iteration of the modiﬁed
algorithm is bitonic and therefore the algorithm is monotone. The payments can be
computed in polynomial time by binary search in order to ﬁnd the critical value. Com-
bining the monotone algorithm with this payment scheme we have the following:
Theorem 21. The modified algorithm described above leads to a truthful PTAS.
The overal algorithm is presented below. We denote by Sij the value returned by
the algorithm Guessing Sensors and Weights (GSW) on shift i for block Bij .
Algorithm 4: The PTAS for WSC
Input : A plane B and ǫ
Output: A monotone PTAS for WSC on B
1 Partition B in blocks B1, . . . , Bp
2 for i← to p do
3 for j ← 1 to p do
4 Partition Bj in q squares
5 Sij = GSW ((B
i
j))
6 Shift each block by two squares to the right and to squares to the top
7 end
8 end
Algorithm 5: Guessing Sensors and Weights (GSW)
Input : A block Bi and ǫ
Output: A monotone PTAS for WSC on Bi
1 Guess a constant number of the most expensive sensors in OPT
2 Guess the weights of the guessed sensors
3 Construct H of O(1/ǫ4) sensors and include it in the solution
4 Solve by Dynamic Programming the remaining instance
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4.5 An extension of the Garg-Konemann
algorithm for BMLC
We prove that the framework of Garg-Konemann [57] used by Berman et al. [19] retains
the approximation guarantee when we have many additional budget constraints (e.g.
a budget on the delay related to the Quality of Service of the transmitted data). The
algorithm reduces BMLC to WSC by losing an approximation factor of (1 + ǫ). Their
algorithm is based on a primal dual approach using LP1 and its dual which we denote
by LP3:
min
n∑
i=1
βiωi + Cω0 (LP3)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
Aij(ωi + ciω0) ≥ 1, ∀j = 1, . . . r
ωi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
The ω0 variable in the above LP corresponds to the budget constraint of LP1. The
authors use an f approximation algorithm for the WSC as a subroutine to ﬁnd an f
approximate minimum weight column on matrix A. We provide below the proof which
essentially follows the proof by Garg and Ko¨nemann [57] for completeness.
The ωi variables of the dual correspond to the weights of the sensor nodes for WSC.
As can be seen from LP3 the additional budget constraint only changes the weight of
sensor node si from ωi to ωi + ciω0. We can then consider their algorithm having as
weights to the sensor nodes the new ones and solve BMLC.
Theorem 22. The reduction of BMLC to set cover by Garg-Konemann is an (1 + ǫ)f
approximation, where f is the approximation factor of set cover.
Proof. The algorithm proceeds in iterations. Let D(k) ≡ D(ωk) = bTωk be the ob-
jective of the dual and gk−1 be the value of the primal variables at the beginning of
the k-th iteration. The algorithm calls an f approximation algorithm for set cover as
a subroutine to choose the minimum weighted column of A. Let q be the minimum
weighted column at k-th iteration and α(ω) = minj
∑
iAijωi be its value. The algo-
rithm ﬁnds the row p for which the value βi/Aij is minimum. The primal variables tq
are increased by bp/Ap,q and thus g
k = gk−1 + bp/Ap,q. The duals change as follows
ωki = ω
k−1
i (1 + ǫ
bpAi,q
βiAp,q
), where ǫ > 0. Furthermore the dual variables are initialized as
ω0i = δ/βi and the algorithm stops at the iteration t for which D(t) ≥ 1. For iteration
k ≥ 1 we have:
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D(k) =
∑
i
βi · ω
k
i
=
∑
i
βi · ω
k−1
i + ǫ
bp
Ap,q
∑
i
Ai,q · ω
k−1
i
= D(k − 1) + ǫ(gk − gk−1) · α(k − 1)
≤ D(k − 1) + ǫ(gk − gk−1) · f · α(k − 1)
So recursively we have that :
D(k) ≤ D(0) + ǫ
k∑
l=1
(gl − gl−1) ·D(l − 1) · f
If we let β = minωD(ω)/α(ω), then β ≤ D(l − 1)/α(l − 1) so
D(k) ≤ mδ +
ǫ
β
k∑
l=1
(gl − gl−1) ·D(l − 1) · f
Deﬁne next
x(i)mδ +
ǫ
β
k∑
l=1
(gl − gl−1)x(l − 1)
for all i ≥ 0 in order to solve the recurrence. We then have:
x(k) = mδ +
ǫ
β
k−1∑
l=1
(gl − gl−1)x(l − 1) +
ǫ
β
(gl − gl−1)x(k − 1)
= (1 +
ǫ
β
(gk − gk−1))x(k − 1)
≤ eǫ(g
k−gk−1)/βx(k − 1)
≤ eǫg
k/βx(0) = mδ · eǫg
k/β
and since D(k ≤ x(k)) we get
D(k) ≤ mδefǫg
k/β
We then obtain
β
gt
≤
ǫ · f
ln(mδ)−1
by the stopping condition D(t) ≥ 1.
We note that the proof can be extended when multiple budgets are considered, pre-
serving the approximation ratio.
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4.6 Open problems
We provided here eﬃcient and truthful mechanisms for coverage problems in sensor
networks. An interesting extension of our work is to combine issues of strategic coverage
by sensors (i.e. truthful payment to battery usage) with issues of incentive based
routing. Another extension would be to add the quality of service (e.g. delays) as a
second parameter of every agent to our basic BMLC problem. We note that the design
of truthful mechanisms for multidimensional problems (even for 2 dimensions) diﬀers
radically than for one parameter.
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Chapter 5
The primal dual method for
network design problems
5.1 The problem
Network design is a topic which includes many problems with numerous applications
including telecommunications, transportation planning and electronics [70]. In the ﬁeld
of Electronics, a classical objective when optimizing the area of Very Large Scale Inte-
gration (VLSI) layouts is the minimum total interconnection on the circuits. Although
there are several other criteria dominating the routing objective like the reliability and
manufacturability issues and noise, minimizing the length of the wires is of huge im-
portance in order to avoid high temperatures of the circuit [29, 86]. Given a number
of pins, called terminal pins we are asked to interconnect them using as less wire as
possible. The circuit might include other junctions which do not necessarily need to be
connected called Steiner pins. In the minimum Steiner tree problem we seek to ﬁnd
the set of Steiner pins in order to minimize the total length of wires to connect the
terminal pins.
Similarly, in communication networks we are given pairs of nodes and again we are
asked to connect them minimizing the total length between them. However, parts of
the network are susceptible to failure or can be destructed for various reasons, thus the
existence of redundant paths between the pairs of nodes is necessary to increase the
survivability [100]. In the Survivable Network Design Problem (SNDP) we are given
pairs of network nodes and a number of required paths for the connection of each pair.
We seek to connect the pairs by the given number of alternative paths having the
minimum total length.
In large networks the components are heterogeneous and thus can be owned by
diﬀerent entities, the agents. Every agent provides services to the central authority of
the network and gets a reward for this service. A task can be for example the forwarding
of messages through his component. Consider the representation of the network by a
graph where each edge represents a component of an agent. We need to connect pairs
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of nodes in the network with the minimum total cost by at least a number of edge
disjoint paths for every pair, where now every edge belongs to a diﬀerent agent. The
input to the problem i.e. the costs of the edges is now given by the agents. We assume
that the costs of the edges are the private information of the agents and that each agent
owns exactly one edge. The problem now becomes more complicated since we have to
cope with the incentives of those agents. An agent declares a price for his service which
however might not correspond to his true cost for the service. Hence, we need to ﬁnd
a solution to the optimization problem which will incentivize all the agents to declare
their true cost, or simply we need a truthful mechanism for the problem.
In this chapter we draw our attention to the network design problems described
above. More precisely we study the Survivable Network Design Problem (SNDP) and
its special cases of Steiner forests and Steiner trees. We survey approximation algo-
rithms that are based on the primal dual method, some of which achieve the best to
date approximation e.g. the algorithm by Goemans and Williamson [62] for Steiner
forests. We then prove that all these algorithms are monotone and thus we can obtain
truthful mechanisms with an appropriate payment scheme similarly to [14]. Because
of monotonicity the payment to agent i, ∀i ∈ E can be computed using binary search
until we ﬁnd the critical value c¯i i.e. the value for which i will be in the solution for
any declared cost c′i ≤ c¯i and out of the solution for any c
′
i > c¯i. We note that we are
not aware of any explicitly written such proofs of monotonicity of these algorithms in
the literature.
5.2 Further related work
There has been a lot of work in the area of approximation algorithms for network design
problems. Especially for the Steiner tree problem the bibliography on approximation
algorithms is vast [24, 61, 76, 119,122,146].
A very simple algorithm which is not diﬃcult to prove that it is also monotone,
achieves an approximation of 2 for the Steiner tree problem. The Minimum Spanning
Tree (MST) heuristic computes the minimum spanning tree on the metric closure of a
graph. Almost all the algorithms that followed are based on an initial computation of
the MST heuristic and then proceed with local improvements.
Until recently no LP relaxation was known with integrality gap smaller than 2.
Byrka et al. [24] presented an algorithm based on iterative randomized rounding with
approximation of ln(4)+ǫ < 1.39 on general graphs and also proved that the integrality
gap is at most 1 + ln(3)/2 < 1.55. Following the results of [24], Goemans et al. [61]
later considered the hypergraphic LP relaxations presented a deterministic ln(4 + ǫ)
algorithm for general graphs and proved an ln(4) upper bound on the integrality gap.
We note that there is no primal dual algorithm known for the Steiner tree problem on
general graphs with approximation ratio better than 2.
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SNDP is known to be NP-hard even when the requirements are equal to 1 for every
pair of nodes and even on the special case of quasi bipartite graphs. On general graphs
it is also known to be NP-hard when the cost of the edges are 1 or 2 [20]. Furthermore,
on quasi bipartite graphs it is hard to approximate within 9695 of the optimal solution [32]
and thus there is no PTAS unless P=NP.
The ﬁrst approximation algorithm for SNDP was given by Williamson et al. [143]
who obtained a ratio of 2k, where k is the maximum requirement of a set. Goemans
et al. [60] improved this ratio to 2Hk presenting a primal dual algorithm, where Hk =
1+ 12+ . . .+
1
k is the harmonic function. The approximation ratio for both was obtained
by primal-dual algorithms. Jain [73] further improved this factor to 2 introducing
the iterative rounding method. Agrawal, Klein, & Ravi [6] obtain a 2-approximation
algorithm using the primal dual method for SNDP where the edge requirements for each
pair of terminal nodes are in {0, 1}. They also obtained a 2 log fmax-approximation
algorithm for SNDP when multiple copies are allowed, where fmax is the maximum
requirement of crossing between cuts of the graph.
5.3 The primal dual method
The Primal Dual Method constitutes a very important tool in combinatorial optimiza-
tion and can be used as a diﬀerent means to solving linear programs. Kuhn ﬁrst
proposed the Hungarian method for the assignment problem [89] which later inspired
Dantzig, Ford and Fulkerson [36] to propose the primal dual method.
For many network design combinatorial problems which are NP-hard, the best
to date Linear Programming (LP) based approximation algorithms use the iterative
rounding [73], the iterative randomized rounding [24] and some algorithms use the
Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) as a subroutine by an iterative primal dual approach
[85]. However the Primal Dual method possesses features that make it valuable to
study. Primal dual algorithms do not require the solution of the LP making them
faster to implement. Furthermore, these algorithms can be customized easily for a
speciﬁc problem and are often monotone, thus leading to truthful mechanisms.
Many fundamental problems in combinatorial optimization such as ﬂows on net-
works, computation of shortest paths and matching either use the primal dual method
[115] or can be described in terms of this method e.g. Dijkstra’s algorithm for shortest
paths [40]. Many of the most fundamental combinatorial problems in P are solved
optimally by the primal dual method [115].
This method uses the LP formulation of two problems, the primal and the dual.
Initially a primal dual algorithm starts with a feasible solution to the dual and an
infeasible solution to the primal. It then gradually improves the objective of the dual
while also improving the feasibility of the primal, assuming that the complementary
slackness conditions are all the time fulﬁlled. The algorithm stops when a feasible
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solution to the primal is found. In this chapter we draw our attention on approximation
algorithms for NP-hard problems that produce a solution based on the primal dual
method. A more detailed terminology of the primal dual method can be found in
[67, 115].
5.4 Preliminaries and models
In the network design problems we are given a graph G = (V,E) representing the
network, a cost function on the edge set c : E → Q+ and a set of requirements. In
the Steiner tree problem the requirement is given set of nodes S ⊆ V called terminals.
More precisely we have the following:
Definition 20 (Steiner tree). Given a graph G = (V,E), a cost function c : E → Q+
and a set of terminal nodes S ⊆ V , find a minimum cost tree that spans the terminal
nodes.
A more general case of the problem is that of Steiner forests, where we are given
subsets of terminal nodes and are asked to connect all the nodes in each of the subsets.
If we also require that every pair of nodes u, v ∈ V are connected by r(u, v) edge disjoint
paths, then we have the generalized Steiner tree problem also known as the Survivable
Network Design Problem (SNDP). This connectivity requirement can be formulated by
a cut requirement function f : 2V → Z+ which speciﬁes the number of edges that need
to cross every cut (S, V \ S) in a feasible solution, namely f(S) = max{r(u, v)|u ∈ S
and v ∈ V \ S}. More formally we have the following:
Definition 21 (SNDP). Given a graph G = (V,E), a cost function c : E → Q+ and a
cut requirement function f : 2V → Z+, find a minimum cost set of edges that connects
each pair u, v ∈ V satisfying the connectivity requirement of f .
The ILP formulation of SNDP is the following:
min
∑
e∈E
cexe (5.1)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(S)
xe ≥ f(S), ∀S ⊆ V
xe ∈ {0, 1}, ∀e ∈ E
where the variable xe denotes whether edge e is taken in the solution or not according
to its value 1 or 0 respectively. We denote by δ(S) the set of edges which have one
endpoint in S and one in V \ S. Relaxing the integrality constraints and dropping the
redundant constraints xe ≤ 1, we get the following LP:
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min
∑
e∈E
cexe (5.2)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(S)
xe ≥ f(S), ∀S ⊆ V
xe ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
and its dual LP is the following:
max
∑
S⊆V
f(S)yS (5.3)
s.t.
∑
S:e∈δ(S)
yS ≤ ce, ∀e ∈ E
yS ≥ 0, ∀S ⊆ V
Note that the number cuts and hence the number of constraints in (5.10) can be expo-
nentially large on the input graph. In the game theoretic setting of the problems, each
edge is owned by a selﬁsh agent. The agent incurs a cost c : E → Q+ when providing
his edge in the service of the network, and this cost is considered to be his private
information.
5.5 Approximation algorithms in network design
We study three approximation algorithms for SNDP and its special cases, all based in
the primal dual method. We ﬁrst study the Steiner tree problem on quasi bipartite
graphs. We continue with the study of Steiner forests on general graphs which are a
special case when function f is proper. We conclude the chapter with the more general
case of general functions f . The three primal dual algorithms that are presented are
based on the general framework of three phases: initialization, edge augmentation and
pruning (see Algorithm 6 below). In the edge augmentation phase, the dual variables
of every unsatisfied set are raised until an edge e becomes tight i.e. the constraint of
the dual LP for e is fulﬁlled with equality namely
∑
S:e∈δ(S) yS = ce. A set S is called
unsatisﬁed if δ(S) < f(S).
In order to break possible ties we consider that initially the edges are numbered
with distinct numbers. If there exists a tie, the edge with the smallest number is added
ﬁrst in the solution. An example of how the algorithm proceeds can be seen in Figures
5.1,5.2,5.3,5.4,5.5 below, reproduced from [137].
Since the agents are single parameter, monotonicity is a suﬃcient condition for
truthfulness. Recall that monotonicity in this problem means that if an agent owning
edge e wins with a cost ce (i.e. is part of the ﬁnal solution), he will keep winning if he
declares a cost c′e < ce.
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Algorithm 6: Primal Dual framework
1 INITIALIZATION:
2 Set A← ∅ and yS ← 0 for every set S ⊆ V
3 EDGE AUGMENTATION:
4 while ∃ an unsatisfied set do
5 Uniformly increase yS for every S until an edge (or arc) e becomes tight
6 Add e to A
7 end
8 PRUNING:
9 return A′ ← {e ∈ A|A \ {e} is infeasible for primal}
v1 v2
v3 v4
v5 v6
20
916
19
6 6
12 12
Figure 5.1: Initial instance at the beginning of the primal dual algorithm where the
black circles represent the required nodes and white circles the Steiner ones
v1 v2
v3 v4
v5 v6
6 6
6 6
20
1916 19
6 6
12 12
Figure 5.2: First and second iteration of the primal dual algorithm where the cicles
represent the values of the duals at the current iteration. The ﬁrst edges that become
tight are (v1, v5) and (v2, v6) with cost 6, however they are added in to the solution in
diﬀerent iterations.
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Figure 5.3: At the third and fourth iteration of the algorithm the edges (v1, v3) and
(v4, v6) become tight respectively
v1 v2
v3 v4
v5 v6
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1
Figure 5.4: In the ﬁfth iteration the edge (v1, v2) becomes tight and we get a connected
tree
5.5.1 Steiner trees on quasi bipartite graphs
In the Steiner tree problem we are given on input two sets of nodes R ⊆ V called the
set of required or terminal nodes and S ⊆ V called the set of Steiner nodes. We are
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Figure 5.5: The returned solution of the primal dual algorithm is represented by the
thick edges
asked to ﬁnd a minimum cost tree that spans all the terminal nodes by possibly using
some of the Steiner nodes. In the special case of quasi bipartite graphs there is no edge
between any pair of Steiner nodes. The goal is to ﬁnd the optimal set of Steiner nodes
I ⊆ S. Computing then the Minimum Spanning Tree on R∪I we give us the minimum
cost solution.
The best to date approximation for Steiner tree on quasi bipartite graphs is 7360 ≈
1.217 due to Goemans et al. [61]. However on quasi bipartite graphs the primal-dual
algorithm by Rajagopalan and Vazirani [120] achieves an approximation of 32 based on
the bidirected cut relaxation described below.
In the bidirected cut relaxation the directed version of the graph is considered
ﬁrst, where each edge e = (u, v) is replaced by two directed edges e′ = (u → v) and
e′′ = (v → u) with costs ce′ = ce′′ = ce. An arbitrary node r ∈ R is then chosen as a
root and according to this node a set of nodes S ⊆ V will be called valid if S contains
at least one terminal and V \ S contains r. A set is called unsatisfied if f(S) = 1, but
there is no edge crossing the cut (S, S¯). A minimally unsatisﬁed set is the smallest
(with respect to inclusion) unsatisﬁed set.
Let ~E be the set of directed edges. Then the ILP formulation of the problem is
shown below:
min
∑
e∈ ~E
cexe (5.4)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(S)
xe ≥ 1, ∀ valid set S
xe ∈ {0, 1}, ∀e ∈ ~E
This ILP can be relaxed to the following LP after dropping the redundant con-
straints xe ≤ 1:
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min
∑
e∈ ~E
cexe (5.5)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(S)
xe ≥ 1, ∀ valid set S
xe ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ ~E
and the dual LP is the following:
max
∑
valid set S
yS (5.6)
s.t.
∑
S:e∈δ(S)
yS ≤ ce, ∀e ∈ ~E
yS ≥ 0, ∀ valid set S
The optimal solution to the above ILP contains the edges that have the minimum
total cost such that there is at least one edge crossing every valid set. The authors
separate the algorithm into two parts called symmetric and asymmetric.
In the symmetric part each dual variable yS corresponds to a proper set S i.e. both
S and V \ S contain terminal nodes. Initially the dual variables of all the proper sets
are set to 0 and the set of edges in the solution A is empty. In every iteration the
algorithm raises uniformly the dual variables of all minimally unsatisﬁed sets (with
respect to inclusion) until a directed edge e = (u, v) becomes tight. If u is a Steiner
node the algorithm halts. In this case u is added to set I and the algorithm proceeds
to the next phase. Otherwise e is added to A. In case there are more than one tight
edges the edge that is added to the solution is chosen in an arbitrary way. Thus in
case of ties the tight edge with the smallest number will be added to the solution. The
symmetric part stops when there is a path consisting only of edges in A that connects
any pair of nodes in R i.e. when there is no unsatisﬁed set.
In the asymmetric part the edges in A are taken in reverse order to which they were
added in the symmetric part. Set arbitrarily a node r ∈ R to be the root. Let S be
a valid set and u ∈ S be a terminal node. If there is a path connecting u and r using
edges in A \ {e} for every u ∈ R \ {r} then e is deleted. This means that there is an
edge crossing every valid set S. Thus the edges of A constitute a directed tree with r as
a root. The algorithm returns the corresponding undirected edges of A. The algorithm
is described fully below.
Definition 22. We say that two sets A,B ⊆ 2V cross if A ∩ B 6= ∅ and A 6⊆ B and
B 6⊆ A.
Definition 23. A family of sets F ⊆ 2V is called laminar if no two sets A,B ∈ F are
crossing.
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Algorithm 7: Primal Dual algorithm for Steiner tree on quasi-bipartite graphs
Input : An edge weighted quasi bipartite graph G = (V,E), a set of terminals
R and a set I = ∅
Output: A Steiner tree on R∪ I of cost at most (3/2 + ǫ) ·OPT
1 INITIALIZATION:
2 Let I = ∅ and yS ← 0 for every proper set S
3 SYMMETRIC PART:
4 while there exists an unsatisfied set do
5 i← i+ 1
6 Uniformly raise yS for every minimally unsatisﬁed set S until some edge
ei = (u→ v) becomes tight
7 if u ∈ S then
8 I =← I ∪ {ei} and i← 0
9 end
10 else
11 Compute MST(R∪ I)
12 end
13 end
14 ASYMMETRIC PART:
15 Pick as a root an arbitrary node r ∈ R
16 for j=i down to 0 do
17 if R∪ (I \ {ej}) is feasible for primal then
18 I ← I \ {ej}
19 end
20 return B ← Undirected(R∪ I)
21 end
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Lemma 17. The family of minimally unsatisfied sets ∪S is laminar.
Proof. For the purpose of contradiction suppose there are two minimally unsatisﬁed
sets S and S′ which have a crossing such that S is unsatisﬁed in iteration i and S′ gets
unsatisﬁed in iteration i′ with i′ > i. However S′ should have been unsatisﬁed in i, but
this contradict the minimality assumption for S.
As a corollary from Lemma 17 we get that if on some iteration i of the symmetric
part an edge e on the boundary of an unsatisﬁed set S becomes tight and chosen in
the solution, then in iteration i+1 (if any) the new unsatisﬁed set that is formed must
contain S and the endnode of e that is outside of S. If in iteration i there is some other
(at most one) unsatisﬁed set S′ that may contain e in its boundary then in any new
iterations any unsatisﬁed set that contains S must also contain S′.
Lemma 18. There are no cycles by the edges of A after the symmetric part.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. In the initialization part the number of
minimally unsatisﬁed sets is |R|. Clearly each set corresponds to a trivial tree. Suppose
that at iteration i we have a collection of trees. In the next iteration, i+1, when an edge
becomes tight, either an unsatisﬁed set will be extended by one edge or two unsatisﬁed
sets which do not have common nodes will be joined into a larger set containing the
edge. In any of the two cases the tree structure is maintained.
Observe that by Lemma 18 the only edges that will be removed in the asymmetric
part are those which are adjacent to one terminal and one Steiner node, since removing
an edge between two terminal nodes would make the problem infeasible. We can now
prove the monotonicity of the algorithm. Based on the above observations we get the
following:
Theorem 23. Algorithm 7 is monotone.
Proof. Consider an instance I in which arc e has cost ce and suppose that e ∈ A after
the deletion step. Now consider the instance I ′ where the only diﬀerence from I is that
e has cost c′e < ce. For the purpose of contradiction suppose that e /∈ A in I ′.
First observe that if e has cost c′e it will become tight either at an earlier iteration
or at the same iteration as when it has cost ce. Thus e ∈ A on I
′ after the symmetric
part. As a result e is deleted in the asymmetric part when it has smaller cost.
Let u1, v1 be two terminal nodes which are connected by a path p on I after the
asymmetric part and suppose e ∈ p. Let e¯ be the last arc that becomes tight and closes
the path p on I. Since e is deleted on I ′ there is another path p′ connecting u1 and v1
such that e /∈ p′. Let e˜ ∈ p′ be the last arc which becomes tight on I ′ before e¯ and closes
the path p′. Figure 5.6 depicts the case of the two paths p and p′. The black circles
represent terminal nodes an white circles the Steiner nodes. The dashed lines represent
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v1 u1
p
e e¯
e˜
p′
Figure 5.6: Instance of two paths closing a cycle between the terminal nodes u1 and
v1. It is also possible that p
′ might share edges with p but e /∈ p′
a path between two nodes. We consider two cases according to the time instance that
e¯ becomes tight.
If e¯ becomes tight on I after e then it must also become tight on I ′ either at the
same or at an earlier iteration since the duals that have e¯ as a boundary can only reach
it earlier. But then we have two paths p and p′ closing a cycle, a contradiction.
Consider now the case where e¯ becomes tight on I before e. If ce¯ < c
′
e then e¯ will
be come tight at the same iteration on I ′ as on I. If c′e ≤ ce¯ ≤ ce then e will become
tight before e¯ on I ′. However the value of the duals around e¯ does not change thus if
e¯ becomes tight on iteration i on I it will become tight on i+ 1 on I in this case. But
again we have a cycle by p and p′ which is a contradiction.
5.5.2 The Steiner forest problem
We will consider the more general class of proper functions:
Definition 24. A function f : 2V → N is proper if f(V ) = 0 and the following
conditions hold:
1. f is symmetric that is f(S) = f(V \ S)
2. f satisfies the maximality property that is f(A ∪B) ≤ max(f(A), f(B)), for any
disjoint sets A,B ⊆ V .
The class of 0-1 proper functions (i.e. 2V → {0, 1}) includes many network de-
sign problems that have been extensively studied in the literature, such as ﬁnding the
shortest path, the minimum spanning tree and the minimum Steiner forest in general
graphs. We will draw our attention to the more general one, the problem of ﬁnding the
minimum Steiner forest in general graphs.
In the Steiner forest problem we are given an edge weighted graph G = (V,E) and
k pairs of terminal nodes {u1, v1}, . . . {uk, vk}. We are asked to ﬁnd a set of edges of
minimum total cost such that ui is connected to vi ∀i ∈ [k]. The primal dual algorithm
for this problem due to Goemans and Williamson [62], achieves an approximation ratio
of 2 which is the best known to date for this problem.
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Algorithm 8 shown below consists of the following phases. Initially the algorithm
begins with an empty forest, A = ∅ and the dual variables for all sets S ⊆ V set to 0.
In the ﬁrst phase the dual variables are uniformly raised until a dual constraint,
which corresponds to a tight edge, becomes tight. This edge is then added to the
solution and the algorithm proceeds in the next iteration raising the dual variables
of the remaining unsatisfied sets. Following this procedure the primal feasibility is
improved. When f(S) = 0 for connected components of A a feasible solution for the
primal has been found. We note that we can break ties in a similar way as explained
in Algorithm 7 in the case of quasi bipartite graphs.
In the second phase the edges in A are considered in the order they were added to
the solution. For each edge e, if the solution A remains feasible without e, then e is
removed from A. The general form of the Steiner forest problem can be written the
following integer program:
min
∑
e∈E
cexe (5.7)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(S)
xe ≥ 1, ∀ unsatisﬁed set S ⊆ V
xe ∈ {0, 1}, ∀e ∈ E
Relaxing the integrality constraints and after dropping the redundant constraints
xe ≤ 1, we get the following LP:
min
∑
e∈E
cexe (5.8)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(S)
xe ≥ 1, ∀ unsatisﬁed set S ⊆ V
xe ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
and the dual LP is the following:
max
∑
S⊆V
yS (5.9)
s.t.
∑
S:e∈δ(S)
yS ≤ ce, ∀e ∈ E
yS ≥ 0, ∀S ⊆ V
Let yS be the dual variable of set S and δ(S) be the set of edges that cross the cut
(S, V \ S). We say that an edge e ∈ E is overtight if
∑
S:e∈δ(S) yS > ce. Let T denote
the set of terminal nodes. The algorithm starts with an initially feasible solution to
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the dual (y = 0) and an infeasible solution to the primal (A = ∅). Initially the active
sets are singletons each for every terminal node. It gradually increases the duals until
a feasible solution to the primal is found.
Algorithm 8: Primal Dual algorithm for Steiner forests and 0-1 proper functions
Input : An edge weighted graph G = (V,E) and a proper function
f : 2V → {0, 1}
Output: A set of edges A connecting all the pairs constituting a Steiner forest
of cost at most 2 ·OPT
1 INITIALIZATION:
2 Let A← ∅, i = 0 and yS ← 0 for every S ⊆ V
3 EDGE ADDITION:
4 while there exists an unsatisfied set S with f(S) = 1 do
5 i← i+ 1
6 Uniformly increase yS for every active set S ∈ V until some ei ∈ E becomes
tight
7 A← A ∪ {ei}
8 end
9 EDGE DELETION:
10 for j=0 up to i do
11 if A \ {ej} is feasible for primal then
12 A← A \ {ej}
13 end
14 return A
15 end
In similar way as for Algorithm 7 we can prove the following:
Lemma 19. There are no cycles after the EDGE ADDITION part of Algorithm 8.
Theorem 24. Algorithm 8 is monotone.
Proof. First observe that the family of unsatisﬁed sets is laminar similarly to the case
of the primal dual algorithm by Algorithm 7 (see Lemma 17). Furthermore notice that
the edges are considered for deletion in order in which they were added and not in
reverse order as in Algorithm 7. It is not diﬃcult to see that Algorithm 8 does not
halt as Algorithm 7. Thus if we follow the proof of Theorem 23 we derive the claimed
result.
5.5.3 General proper functions
We will now consider the case of general proper functions where the range of f can be
any nonnegative integer i.e. f : 2V → Z. The algorithm UNCROSSABLE presented
by Williamson et al. [143], which will be described later, achieves an approximation of
2 · fmax, where fmax is the maximum requirement of f i.e. fmax = maxS f(S).
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The algorithm by Williamson et al. [143] proceeds in phases. It starts with an empty
set A = ∅ and gradually increases the set of edges. Let Ap be the set of edges that have
been chosen at the end of phase p which satisfy the function fp(S) = min{p, f(S)}
i.e. Ap is a feasible solution to IP 5.7 for function fp. If we let fmax = maxS⊆V f(S),
then the algorithm will terminate after phase fmax producing a feasible solution to the
problem.
The set Ap−1 is augmented to Ap by ﬁnding a feasible solution to the following ILP:
min
∑
e∈E
cexe (5.10)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(S)
xe ≥ h(S), ∀S ⊆ V
xe ∈ {0, 1}, ∀e ∈ Ep
where
h(S) =
{
1 if fp(S) = p and |δ(S) ∩Ap−1| < p,
0 otherwise
and Ep = E − Ap−1 is the set of edges considered in phase p. The function h is called
uncrossable if f is a proper function. More formally:
Definition 25. A function h : 2V → {0, 1} is uncrossable if h(V ) = 0 and for two
sets A and B for which h(A) = h(B) = 1 then either h(A ∪ B) = h(A ∩ B) or
h(A \B) = h(B \A) = 1.
In order to solve the above minimization problem, Williamon et al. [143] suggested
the UNCROSSABLE algorithm as shown below that gives a solution with approxima-
tion ratio 2 for any uncrossable function h:
There are two main diﬀerences between UNCROSSABLE and Algorithm 8 for 0-1
proper functions. In the ﬁrst part of Algorithm 8, we increase the variables of the duals
of all the active sets S for which f(S) = 1. However, in UNCROSSABLE the active
sets are computed by the Max-V iolated(h,A) oracle. Max-V iolated(h,A) takes as
input the currently computed solution A and an uncrossable function h and returns a
set of minimally unsatisﬁed sets S (according to inclusion) for which h(S)− |δA(S)| =
maxX h(X)−|δA(X)| > 0, if there exists such a set. These sets are called the maximally
violated sets. Furthermore, UNCROSSABLE diﬀers from Algorithm 8 in the deletion
step too. In UNCROSSABLE the edges are deleted in reverse order to which they were
added in A. We now have the following:
Lemma 20. UNCROSSABLE is monotone.
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Algorithm 9: UNCROSSABLE
Input : An edge weighted graph G = (V,E) and an uncrossable function h
Output: A Steiner forest A of cost at most 2 ·OPT connecting the pair of
nodes (ui, vi), ∀i = 1, . . . , k
1 A← ∅ i = 0 and yS ← 0 for every S ⊆ V
2 C ←Max-V iolated(h, ∅)
3 while there exists a unsatisfied set S ∈ C do
4 i← i+ 1
5 Uniformly increase yS for every unsatisﬁed set S ∈ C until some e ∈ E
becomes tight
6 A← A ∪ {ei} (added edge)
7 C ←Max-V iolated(h,A)
8 end
9 for j=i down to 0 do
10 if A \ {ej} is feasible for primal then
11 A← A \ {ej} (deleted edge)
12 end
13 return A
14 end
Proof. Recall that the Max-V iolated(h,A) oracle returns the set of minimally unsat-
isﬁed sets S for which h(S) − |δA(S)| = maxX h(X) − |δA(X)| > 0, if there is such a
set. Since h : 2V → {0, 1}, the above equality has a positive value when h(S) = 1 and
|δA(S)| = 0. Furthermore the components of any minimally unsatisﬁed set constitute
a laminar family [143]. Consider now the following:
Claim 3. A minimally unsatisfied set is connected.
Proof. Consider a minimally unsatisﬁed set S with h(S) = 1 and for the purpose of
contradiction suppose that it consists of two (or more) connected components X1 and
X2. If an edge becomes tight and it connects X1 with X2 then S will remain unsatisﬁed.
Thus the edge must cross S so it will either cross X1 or X2. Either way one of the
two components will become satisﬁed which means that our assumption of S being the
minimally unsatisﬁed set was wrong. s a result X1 and X2 must be connected.
We will now show that if an edge e is not deleted in the reverse deletion step with
original cost ce, it will not be deleted with cost c
′
e < ce either. We will consider the
possible cases for an edge e.
Before we proceed the following observation will be helpful. Suppose an edge e
is added in one of the iterations of the algorithm connecting two sets X and Y and
suppose that it is later deleted in reverse deletion. Then the possible combinations for
the value of h on sets X and Y are h(X) = 0, h(Y ) = 1, h(X) = 1, h(Y ) = 0 and
h(X) = 1, h(Y ) = 1, omitting the case where h(X) = 0, h(Y ) = 0 as not possible. The
The ﬁrst two cases are symmetric so we will consider next one of them.
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h(X) = 0 h(Y ) = 1
h(Z) = 1X Y
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e′
Figure 5.7: Instance of two sets X,Y with h(X) = 0 and h(Y ) = 1
Consider ﬁrst the case where there are 3 sets X,Y and Z (the current minimally
unsatisﬁed sets) with h(X) = 0, h(Y ) = 1 and h(Z) = 1 as shown in Figure 5.7.
Suppose ﬁrst that e is added before e′. Then by the reverse deletion step it will be
considered for deletion after e′. As can be seen e is redundant as by deleting it the
solution remains feasible. Furthermore if e is added after e′ then it will be considered
for deletion ﬁrst. Again since the solution remains feasible without e it will be deleted.
Consider now the case depicted in Figure 5.8 where h(X) = 1, h(Y ) = 1 and
h(Z) = 1. Similarly as above, we consider the order to which the edges are added in
the solution. If e is added before e′ and e′′ then it will be considered last for deletion.
In this case both e′ and e′′ will not be deleted so that sets Z and W remain satisﬁed
and e will be deleted as redundant. Using similar argument if e is added before e′′ and
after e′ or before e′ and after e′′ it will be redundant and thus deleted.
With this observation let us now consider an edge e having cost initially ce and
suppose that it is added and not deleted in the solution by UNCROSSABLE. Consider
now the same instance with the only diﬀerence that e has now cost c′e < ce. Clearly
raising the duals uniformly, e will either become tight at an earlier iteration or at the
same as with the original cost. Suppose now that e is deleted with cost c′e. Then this
must be one of the cases discussed above and depicted in ﬁgures 5.7 and 5.8. But in
those cases e was deleted as redundant and independently of its cost. As a result e
should be deleted with cost ce, a contradiction.
The overall algorithm for general proper functions achieves an approximation of
2fmax since the algorithm proceeds in fmax phases, each calling UNCROSSABLE as a
subroutine.
Goemans et al. [60] improved the approximation of the above algorithm to 2H(fmax),
where H(k) = 1 + 12 + . . .+
1
k = O(log k) is the harmonic function, by also considering
the broader class of weakly supermodular functions:
Definition 26. A function f : 2V → Z is weakly supermodular if it satisfies the
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Figure 5.8: Instance of two sets X,Y with h(X) = 1 and h(Y ) = 1
following:
1. f(V ) = 0
2. For any two sets A,B ⊂ V at least one of the following holds:
• f(A) + f(B) ≤ f(A \B) + f(B \A)
• f(A) + f(B) ≤ f(A ∩B) + f(A ∪B)
The algorithm follows the general framework of raising the duals at every iteration
until an edge becomes tight and when a primal feasible solution is found the redundant
edges are deleted. The basic change in their algorithm is the selection process of the
edges in phase p. The set of edges Ap must now satisfy fp = f(S)− fmax + p. As the
previous algorithm, the improved one terminates after fmax phases and the solution
Afmax is feasible. Furthermore if f is weakly supermodular, so is fp.
The improved algorithm calls UNCROSSABLE as a subroutine in every phase p =
1, . . . , fmax, which uses an uncrossable function hp(S) in order to augment the set of
edges from Ap−1 to Ap. The uncrossable function is now deﬁned as
hp(S) =
{
1 if ∆p(S) = maxS ∆p(S) = fmax − p+ 1,
0 otherwise
where ∆p(S) = f(S) − |δAp−1(S)| is the deficiency of the set S. Deﬁciency shows the
number of edges we need to add to the current solution Ap−1 from δ(S) in order to
have f(S) and thus a feasible solution.
Theorem 25. Algorithm 10 is monotone.
Proof. Consider two instances of the problem which only diﬀer in the cost of an edge e.
Let its cost be ce in instance I and c
′
e < ce in instance I
′. First observe that if an edge
becomes tight on some phase p it can only be deleted in p and not at any later phase.
This is because the set of edges considered in every phase does not contain any of the
edges added in previous iterations since Ep = E \Ap−1. Suppose that e becomes tight
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Algorithm 10: Primal Dual algorithm for SNDP and weakly supermodular func-
tions
Input : An edge weighted graph G = (V,E) and a weakly supermodular
function f for the requirements of every pair of nodes
Output: A set of edges A which constitute a feasible solution to SNDP of cost
at most 2H(fmax) ·OPT connecting the pair of nodes (ui, vi) with
requirements ruivi , ∀i = 1, . . . , k
1 INITIALIZATION PHASE:
2 A← ∅
3 for p← 1 to fmax do
4 PHASE p:
5 ∆p(S) = fp(S)− |δAp−1(S)|, ∀S ⊂ V
6 hp(S)←
{
1 if ∆p(S) = maxS ∆p(S) = fmax − p+ 1,
0 otherwise
7 Ep ← E \Ap−1
8 A′ =UNCROSSABLE(V,Ep, c, hp)
9 Ap ← Ap−1 ∪A′
10 return Afmax
11 end
in phase p on instance I. We only need to show that if e becomes tight and deleted
in any phase 1 ≤ i < p then the solution on I ′ will be the same to that of instance
I. If e is considered in phase p is it will become tight and will not be deleted since
UNCROSSABLE is monotone.
Let p′ < p be the phase in which e becomes tight and then deleted in instance I ′.
Recall the possible cases of e from Figures 5.7 and 5.8. Suppose that the presence of e
had as result the addition of a new edge e¯ in phase p′. This means that e¯ was necessary
for an unsatisﬁed set. However e¯ becomes tight independently of e so it should have
been added in instance I as well. But this contradicts our assumption. Similarly we
can prove that no other edge was deleted because of the presence of e.
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Chapter 6
Maxmin Heterogeneous Facility
Location Games on the Line
6.1 The problem
Facility location games lie in the intersection of AI, game theory and social choice
theory and have been studied extensively over the past years. In the basic version of
the problem, ﬁrst studied by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [118], a central authority has
to locate a facility on a real line based on the reported preferences of selﬁsh agents. Its
goal is to locate the facility in such a way that the sum of the utilities of the agents
is maximized. 1 However, the agents might misreport their preference and manipulate
the authority if the new location results in a better outcome for them.
In the more general case of the problem there are k facilities to be placed on the
line and each agent reports to the authority his preferred location and his preference
for each of the facilities. In what follows, we focus on the case where the locations of
the agents are publicly known and their preferences are their private knowledge.
One main objective for the planner is to design rules to locate the facility, or mecha-
nisms, that are truthful, i.e. no agent has incentives to misreport his preferences about
the locations of the facilities. The term approximate mechanism design without money,
introduced in [118], is usually deployed for problems like the one described above. Since
it is not always possible to design truthful mechanisms that ﬁnd an optimal solution,
the goal is to design mechanisms that approximately maximize an objective function
under the constraint that they are truthful. In [118] homogeneous facility location
games were studied, where one or two identical facilities have to be placed on a real
line and every agent wants to be as close as possible to any of them. In this setting,
the agents were reporting to the planner a point on the line representing their location.
The objectives in that setting were the maximization of the social welfare, i.e. the sum
of the utilities and the maximization of the minimum utility of all the agents.
1Note that in [118], the objective was to minimize the social cost, which is equivalent to maximizing
the social welfare.
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However, in many real life scenarios the facilities and the agents’ preferences are
heterogeneous, i.e. each facility serves a diﬀerent need and each agent has potentially
diﬀerent needs from the others. In general, an agent might want to: be close to a
facility, be away from a facility, or be indiﬀerent about its presence. Feigenbaum and
Sethuraman [49] studied one facility heterogeneous games where each agent reports his
preferred location on the line while the planner knows whether he wants to be close to
or away from the facility. Zou and Li [151] extended the model of [49] for heterogeneous
2-facility games and studied the social welfare objective for several diﬀerent scenarios
of the information the planner knows. We note that none of [49, 151] studied the case
where some agents were indiﬀerent for some of the facilities. Seraﬁno and Ventre [127]
studied heterogeneous 2-facility games on discrete networks. In their setting, each agent
is located on a node of a graph and either is indiﬀerent or wants to be close to each
facility. The authors studied the case where the planner knows the location of every
agent but not their preferences for the facilities.
We extend the models of [49, 127, 151] and study heterogeneous k-facility location
games (simply k-facility games) on the real line for maxmin objectives, which are im-
portant to measure the fairness of allocation. This class of objectives captures the well
studied minimum utility objective, termed Utility, and the recently proposed mini-
mum happiness objective, termed Happiness. Happiness is a novel fairness criterion
introduced in [104]. The happiness of an agent is deﬁned to be the ratio between the
utility he gets under the locations of the facilities returned by the mechanism over the
maximum utility the agent could get under any possible locations of the facilities. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work on this model. We note that while
our model is a natural extension of the aforementioned models almost none of those
results apply to ours.
We also note that facility location problem on the line can be seen from the net-
works perspective. Consider the problem of distributing the data in the databases of a
company to its data network as mentioned in [127]. The oﬃces are located in speciﬁc
positions, however if we consider reducing their intermediate distance, then the prob-
lem can be modeled as the facility location game on the real line where an oﬃce can
be located in any position of the line.
6.1.1 Our contributions
We prove that there is no optimal deterministic or randomized truthful mechanism for
k-facility games even for instances with k = 2, two agents and known locations of the
agents. We furthermore derive inapproximability bounds for deterministic and ran-
domized truthful mechanisms. We note that the techniques we use are fundamentally
diﬀerent from [127], since in our model the facilities can be located anywhere on the
line without any constraint, making the analysis more complex.
93
We then propose truthful mechanisms for k-facility games. For k = 2 we propose a
general technique that produces approximately truthful mechanisms and can be used
for any maxmin objective. We derive explicit approximation ratios for Utility and
Happiness. More speciﬁcally, we prove that our mechanism is (1 −
√
2
2 )-approximate
for both objectives even if both agents’ locations and preferences for the facilities are
not known to the mechanism. If all the agents are indiﬀerent or want to be close to
the facilities we prove that the mechanism that locates every facility in the middle of
the line is 12 -approximate for both objectives and any k ≥ 2. If the agents’ locations
are known to the mechanism, then we show how we can utilize the optimal mechanism
for the 1-facility game and get a 34 -approximate truthful mechanism for Utility when
k = 2. In the case where all the agents are indiﬀerent or want to be away from the
facilities, we show that the mechanism that locates ⌊k2⌋ facilities at one end of the line
and the rest at the other end is ⌊k2⌋/k-approximate and truthful for both objectives
and any k ≥ 2. Finally, we provide a 12 -approximate randomized universally truthful
mechanism, for both objectives and any k ≥ 2. We note that the majority of our
mechanisms satisfy stronger notions of truthfulness like group strategy proofness.
As a byproduct we show that some of our mechanisms achieve the same approxi-
mation guarantee for the social welfare objective, thus we establish a lower bound that
was not known before and we complement the results of [151].
6.1.2 Further related work
There is a long line of work on homogeneous facility location games [8,43,53,54,98,99,
118, 147]. Diﬀerent objectives and utility functions have been studied as well. In [50]
the objective that the authors studied was the sum of Lp norms of agent’s utilities,
while in [51] it was the sum of least squares. In [52] double peak utility functions were
introduced. The obnoxious facility game on the line i.e. the case where every agent
wants to be away from the facilities, was introduced in [30] and the model was later
extended to trees and cycles in [31]. In [144] the objective of least squares was studied
for obnoxious agents. The objective of maximum envy was recently introduced for
facility location games in [25].
6.2 Preliminaries and model
In a k-facility location game (simply k-facility game), there is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of
agents located on the line [0, ℓ] and a set of k distinct facilities F = {1, . . . , k} that
need to be located on the line. Each agent i is associated with a location xi ∈ [0, ℓ]
(we consider a restricted interval in contrast to [118] where xi ∈ R) and a vector
ti ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k that represents his preferences for the facilities.
If agent i wants to be far from the facility j, then tij = −1, if he is indifferent, then
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tij = 0 and if he wants to be close to j then tij = 1. We will use y = (y1, . . . , yk) to de-
note the locations of the facilities and s = (s1, . . . , sn) to denote the proﬁle of the agents,
i.e. their declared tuples si = (xi, ti), ∀i ∈ N . A vector s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn)
is the vector of tuples excluding si thus we can denote a proﬁle as s = (si, s−i). A mech-
anism M is an algorithm that takes as input a proﬁle s and outputs the locations of the
facilities, i.e. y =M(s). A mechanism is deterministic if it chooses the locations of the
facilities y deterministically and randomized if y is chosen according to a probability
distribution.
We study the two objectives Utility and Happiness. Utility that agent i gets
from facility j, denoted as uij , depends on the distance |xi − yj | and on the agent’s
preference for that facility. Formally, uij(xi, tij , yj) = gij(|xi − yj |) where gij : is an
increasing function if tij = −1, is a decreasing function if tij = 1 and is constant if
tij = 0. For normalization purposes we assume that gij(·) ≤ ℓ for every i ∈ N and j ∈ F
and gij(·) = ℓ, if tij = 0. If yj is chosen from a probability distribution with density
function p(yj), then the expected utility is equal to
∫ ℓ
0 p(yj) ·gij(|xi−yj |)dyj . The total
(expected) utility that agent i gets under y is deﬁned as the sum of the utilities he gets
for each of the facilities, i.e. ui(xi, ti, y) =
∑
j∈[k] uij(xi, tij , yj). Happiness of an agent
for given locations of the facilities is the utility the agent gets under these locations
over the maximum utility the agent could get. Let u∗i (xi, ti) = maxy ui(xi, ti, y). Then,
the happiness of agent i under the locations y is the ratio ui(xi,ti,y)u∗i (xi,ti)
. Thus, Happiness
is maxymini
ui(xi,ti,y)
u∗i (xi,ti)
.
For every agent i ∈ [n] we deﬁne a function hi(ui) that is increasing with ui,
incorporating this way all the diﬀerent objective functions. The function hi(ui) is
considered public knowledge for all i ∈ [n]. We aim at designing mechanisms that
locate the facilities in such a way that the minimum of hi(ui) is maximized. Formally,
we study objectives of the form maxymini hi(ui(xi, ti, y)). Throughout this chapter we
assume that the functions gij and the locations xi of every i ∈ N and j ∈ F are public
knowledge, whereas the preferences of the agents are considered to be their private
knowledge, unless stated otherwise.
Let OPT(s) and M(s) denote the optimal value and the value of mechanism M
for the objective function under the proﬁle s. A mechanism M achieves approximation
ratio α < 1, or it is α-approximate, if M(s) ≥ α ·OPT(s) for any type proﬁle s.
A mechanism is called truthful if no agent can beneﬁt by misreporting his prefer-
ences. Formally, let (si, s−i) be a true proﬁle for which the returned locations by the
mechanism are y and let (s′i, s−i) be any misreported proﬁle with returned locations y
′.
A mechanism M is then truthful if ui(xi, ti, y) ≥ ui(xi, ti, y
′). A randomized mecha-
nism is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful
mechanisms and truthful in expectation if no agent can increase his expected utility by
misreporting his type. A mechanism is called group strategy proof if for any coalition
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of the agents no one can beneﬁt by jointly misreporting their proﬁles. Furthermore
a mechanism is called false-name proof if no agent can beneﬁt by using multiple and
diﬀerent identities in the game.
We note that the solution to the optimization problem can be solved eﬃciently for
both objectives by the following LP (assuming that the objective functions are linear):
max ǫ
s.t. hi(ui(xi, ti, y)) ≥ ǫ, ∀i
y ∈ [0, ℓ]k
where we are searching the values of the locations (variables y) and the largest value
of variable ǫ such that hi(·) is larger than ǫ.
6.3 Inapproximability results
In this section we provide inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms for 2-
facility games considering hi(ui) = ui. We study two prominent objective functions,
namely the Utility and the Happiness objectives. We prove that placing the facilities
on the locations that maximize the objective under the declared preferences of the
agents, is not truthful even on instances with two agents. Furthermore, we provide
inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. In the rest of the chapter we follow
the literature assuming that the utility of agent i ∈ N from facility j ∈ {1, 2} is deﬁned
as:
uij(xi, tij , yj) =


|xi − yj |, if tij = −1
ℓ, if tij = 0
ℓ− |xi − yj |, if tij = 1.
(6.1)
Again, the utility of agent i from the facilities is the sum of the utilities over all the
facilities, i.e. ui(xi, ti, y) = ui1(xi, ti1, y1) + ui1(xi, ti2, y2).
6.3.1 Utility
We ﬁrst study the Utility objective, deﬁned as maxymini ui(xi, ti, y) and prove that
there is no 0.851-approximate deterministic or randomized truthful mechanism.
Theorem 26. There is no α-approximate deterministic truthful mechanism for the
2-facility game with α ≥ 0.851.
Proof. Let us consider the instances I and I ′ depicted in Figure 6.1, where the white
circles correspond to the two agents. Agent a1 is located in 0 and agent a2 in x > 0,
where x will be speciﬁed later in the proof. Without loss of generality we assume that
ℓ = 1. On instance I the preferences of a1 are t1 = (−1, 1), while a2 has preferences
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t2 = (0, 1). It is not hard to see that the optimal locations for the facilities are y1 = 1
and y2 =
x
2 where each agent gets utility 2−
x
2 . The optimal locations are depicted by
black circles in the ﬁgure.
On instance I ′ agent a1 has the same preferences as on instance I while the pref-
erences of agent a2 are t
′
2 = (−1, 1). The optimal locations for the facilities in this
instance are y1 = 1 and y2 = x where each agent gets utility 2− x.
−11
0
x
2
y2
01
y1
ℓx
(a) Instance I
−11
0
y2
−11
y1
ℓx
(b) Instance I ′
Figure 6.1: Example for preferences in {−1, 0, 1}2
Instances I and I ′ show that the mechanism which locates the facilities on the
optimal locations is not truthful. On instance I agent a2 can declare t
′
2 = (−1, 1) and
increase his utility from 2− x2 to 2.
Let M be a truthful mechanism. First observe that M will locate facility f1 on 1
on instance I, since any other location decreases the utility of agent a1 and thus does
not achieve the maximum approximation guarantee on this instance e.g. if f1 = 1 − ǫ
then u11 = 1 − ǫ which results in smaller utility for a1 than when we place f1 on
1. Suppose that M locates facility f2 on y2 ≤ x on instance I. If x < y2, then the
approximation ofM on instance I is not optimized, since this approximation guarantee
could be increased by setting y2 = x.
Since M is truthful, facility f2 cannot be located on any y
′
2 > y2 on instance I
′.
If y′2 > y2, then agent a2 from I could declare preferences t′2 = (−1, 1) and increase
his utility. We consider the following two cases concerning the location y′1 in which M
locates facility f1 on I
′:
• y′1 ≥ x. Then, obviously y1 = 1 since otherwise the utility of both agents in I ′
is decreasing and thus M does not achieve the maximum approximation. As a
result, under M agent a2 gets utility at most 2 − 2x + y2 and thus M achieves
approximation 2−2x+y22−x on instance I
′. Furthermore, on instance I, agent a1 gets
utility 2−y2, since as explained earlier, M locates f1 on 1. Thus, on this instance
the approximation of M is 4−2y24−x . Observe that the approximation guarantee of
M on I is decreasing with y2 while on I
′ it is increasing with y2. If we optimize
the approximation guarantee and solve for y2 we get that y2 =
6x−2x2
8−3x . If y
′
1 > x,
then the approximation of M is at most
4− 2 · 6x−2x
2
8−3x
4− x
=
4x2 − 24x+ 32
3x2 − 20x+ 32
. (6.2)
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• If M locates f1 on y
′
1 < x on instance I
′, then observe that there is no location
y′2 for f2 such that both agents get utility strictly larger than 1. In this case M
achieves an approximation of at most
1
2− x
. (6.3)
Observe that the approximation guarantee in (6.2) increases with x while in (6.3) it
decreases with x. If we optimize on the approximation guarantee of M , we have to
solve for x the equation −4x3 + 29x2 − 60x + 32 = 0. The unique solution in [0, 1] is
x = 13−
√
41
8 . Using this value in (6.2) and (6.3) we get that any deterministic truthful
mechanism on instances I and I ′ achieves approximation less than 0.851.
The above inapproximability bound can be extended to randomized mechanisms
too.
Theorem 27. There is no α-approximate randomized truthful mechanism for the 2-
facility game with α ≥ 0.851.
Proof. We will use again the instances from Figure 1 to prove the claim setting x =
13−√41
8 . Recall that the optimal utility is
4−x
2 on instance I and 2− x on instance I
′.
Let M be a randomized truthful mechanism. Observe that the mechanism should
locate facility f1 on 1 on instance I in the same way as in proof of Theorem 26; every
other location for f1 decreases the approximation guarantee of M . Suppose now that
M locates f2 on y ∈ [0, 1] according to the probability distribution p(y). Without
loss of generality we can assume that p(y) = 0 for every y > x. This is because
the approximation guarantee of M can be increased if we locate the facility on x
instead of some y > x. Hence, under M agent a1 gets utility 1 from f1 and utility∫ x
0 p(y)(1− y)dy = 1−
∫ x
0 p(y)ydy from facility f2, so
u1 = 2−
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy
in total, on instance I. Similarly, agent a2 gets utility 1 from f1 and utility 1 − x +∫ x
0 p(y)ydy from facility f2 so in total
u2 = 2− x+
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy
On instance I ′ we have to consider two cases according to the location in which M
places facility f1. If M locates f1 on y
′
1 ≥ x, then without loss of generality we can
assume that f1 is placed on 1 since every other location decreases the utility of both
agents. Suppose that M places f1 on 1 with some probability and f2 on y according to
the probability distribution π(y). We can assume that M does not locate f2 on y > x,
since the utility of both agents could increase by placing it on x instead. Thus agent
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a2 gets utility 1− x from facility f1 and utility 1− x+
∫ x
0 π(y)ydy from facility f2 on
instance I ′, thus in total
u′2 = 2− 2x+
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy
Since M is truthful we have that
∫ x
0 π(y)ydy ≤
∫ x
0 p(y)ydy. If this was not the case,
agent a2 could declare preferences (−1, 1) and increase its utility on instance I. As a
result the approximation guarantee of M on I ′ is at most
1
2− x
·
(
2− 2x+
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy
)
(6.4)
The approximation guarantee on instance I will be 24−x ·(min{u1, u2}) and since u
′
2 < u2
the best approximation guarantee of M on I is at most
2
4− x
·
(
2−
∫ x
0
p(y)ydy
)
(6.5)
M achieves the best approximation on both instances when the quantities from (6.5)
and (6.4) are equal. Hence, if we equalize them and solve for the integral we get
that
∫ x
0 p(y)ydy =
6x−2x2
8−3x and the approximation guarantee is less than 0.851 on both
instances for the chosen x.
If the mechanism locates f1 on y
′
1 < x, then on any location for f2 there will be an
agent with utility at most 1 and the approximation guarantee of the mechanism will be
at most 12−x < 0.851. Thus, in all possible cases the approximation of M is bounded
by 0.851.
The non existence of optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms can be extended
even on instances with three agents where no agent has preference −1 for any facility
(Fig. 6.2). The same holds if no agent has preference 1 (or 0) for any facility (Fig. 6.3-
Fig. 6.4). We call these instances “two-preference instances”.
Theorem 28. For any k ≥ 2, there is no optimal deterministic truthful mechanism
for Utility for the k-facility game even on two-preference instances with three agents
and known locations.
6.3.2 Happiness
The second objective that we study is Happiness. Using similar arguments as in the
Utility objective we get the following:
Theorem 29. For any k ≥ 2, there is no optimal deterministic truthful mechanism for
Happiness for the k-facility game even on two-preference instances with three agents
and known locations.
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Figure 6.2: Example for preferences in {0, 1}2. The agent located on 0 in the instance
I can declare preferences (1, 1) and increase his utility by moving the facility f2 closer
to 0.
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Figure 6.3: Example for preferences in {−1, 1}2. The agent located on ℓ − ǫ in the
instance I can declare preferences (−1, 1) and increase his utility by moving the facility
f2 closer to ℓ− ǫ.
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Figure 6.4: Example for preferences in {−1, 0}2. The agent located on 0 in the instance
I can declare preferences (−1,−1) and increase his utility by moving the facility f2 away
from 0. Observe that in Instance I ′ there are two optimal solutions (y1 = 0, y2 = ℓ and
y1 = ℓ, y2 = 0). However, this does not aﬀect the correctness of our example assuming
that the mechanism chooses a solution deterministically.
6.4 Deterministic mechanisms
In this section we propose deterministic truthful mechanisms. An initial approach would
be to consider each facility independently and place it to its optimal location. As we
already proved, placing one facility on its optimal position is a truthful mechanism.
Furthermore, since we locate the facilities independently no agent has an incentive to
lie. However, this mechanism achieves poor approximation if for example the agents
want to be away from the facilities. Consider the case where there are n agents on
locations 0, 2ℓn ,
3ℓ
n , . . . ,
(n−1)ℓ
n , ℓ each of whom has preferences (−1,−1). Observe that
the optimal location for one facility is to be placed on ℓn since this location maximizes
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the minimum distance between any agent and the facility. Thus, both facilities will be
placed on the same location ℓn . Then the agent located in 0 has utility
2ℓ
n , the minimum
over all the agents. It is not hard to see that an optimal solution is to locate facility
f1 on 0 and facility f2 on ℓ where each agent gets utility ℓ. Hence, the mechanism that
locates the facilities independently in their optimal locations is 2n -approximate.
The example above provides evidence that a mechanism with good approximation
ratio should not put both facilities on the same location if there are agents who have
preference −1 for the facilities. In the worst case the agent that is closest to the facilities
might have preference −1 for both of them and thus get low utility. On the other hand,
the facilities should not be far away from each other. This is because, in the worst case
again, an agent might have preference −1 for the facility that is close and preference 1
for the facility that is far from his location.
Using the intuition gained from the discussion above we propose a mechanism for
the 2-facility game that combines these ideas and places the facilities symmetrically
away from the endpoints of the line.
Algorithm 11: Mechanism 1
Input : Utility functions ui(xi, ti, y) for each i ∈ N and objective function
maxymini hi(ui(xi, ti, y))
Output: Locations y = (y1, y2)
1 Maximize mini hi(ui(xi, ti1 , z) + ui(xi, ti2 , ℓ− z)) with respect to ℓ, for all
possible xi ∈ ℓ and all possible combinations of (ti1 , ti2)
2 Set y1 = z and y2 = ℓ− z
Mechanism 1 searches for the optimal value of variable z, under the constraint that
0 ≤ z ≤ ℓ, such that the two facilities are placed in y1 = z and y2 = ℓ− z. It solves the
problem of facility location when all the information of the agents (i.e. their location
and their preferences) is kept private. Since it does not use any information of the
agents and thus it is truthful. It does not even require the locations of the agents since
it optimizes over all possible locations. We could apply the same mechanism having the
locations as input but this would not change the worst case approximation guarantee.
We next use Mechanism 1 to derive approximate truthful mechanisms for Utility and
Happiness.
Case ti ∈ {−1, 0, 1}2. Under the Happiness objective, Mechanism 1 returns the
locations y = (z, ℓ− z) where z = (1−
√
2
2 )ℓ.
Lemma 21. ∀i the Happiness of agent i is ui(xi,ti,y)u∗i (xi,ti)
≥ 1−
√
2
2 .
Proof. We have to prove the claim for every possible ti and every xi. We will show that
the chosen y is optimal for Mechanism 2 and that it achieves the desired guarantee.
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Notice that if an agent has type 0 for some facility, then he gets utility at least ℓ no
matter where the facilities are located. Moreover, we note that the maximum utility
an agent can get is bounded by 2ℓ. Hence, any agent that has preference 0 for some
facility gets at least 1/2 of the maximum utility.
Let xi be the location of agent i and let ti be his preferences. Without loss of
generality we can assume that xi ≤
ℓ
2 , since similar analysis can be applied for xi >
ℓ
2 .
Furthermore, let y = (z, ℓ − z) be the locations of the facilities. We will consider the
cases where xi ≤ z and xi > z. The following two tables show the utility that agent i
gets under y when located on xi and the corresponding ratio for every case.
ti ui(xi, ti, y) u
∗
i (xi, ti) Ratio
1, 1 ℓ+ 2xi 2ℓ ≥ 1/2
-1, 1 2z 2ℓ− xi ≥ z/ℓ
1, -1 2ℓ− 2z 2ℓ− xi ≥ 1/2
-1, -1 ℓ− 2xi 2ℓ− 2xi ≥ (ℓ− 2z)/(2ℓ− 2z)
Table 6.1: Case analysis when xi ≤ z.
ti ui(xi, ti, y) u
∗
i (xi, ti) Ratio
1, 1 ℓ+ 2z 2ℓ ≥ 1/2
-1, 1 2xi 2ℓ− xi ≥ 2z/(2ℓ− z)
1, -1 2ℓ− 2xi 2ℓ− xi ≥ 2/3
-1, -1 ℓ− 2z 2ℓ− 2xi ≥ (ℓ− 2z)/(2ℓ− 2z)
Table 6.2: Case analysis when xi > z.
Our goal is to ﬁnd a z ∈ [0, ℓ] that maximizes the minimum ratio. Notice that
z
ℓ ≤
2z
2ℓ−z for every z ∈ [0, ℓ/2]. The optimal guarantee of Mechanism 2 is achieved
when zℓ =
ℓ−2z
2ℓ−2z . If we solve for z, the feasible solution is z = (1 −
√
2
2 )ℓ and the
approximation guarantee follows.
Observe that if at least two facilities need to be located, then maxymini ui(xi, ti, y) ≥
maxymini
ui(xi,ti,y)
u∗i (xi,ti)
, since u∗i (xi, ti) ≥ ℓ. Thus, Mechanism 1 can be used for both Util-
ity and Happiness. Furthermore, since Mechanism 1 does not use any information of
the agents, it possesses all the desirable properties like group strategy proofness and
false name proofness.
Theorem 30. For 2-facility games Mechanism 1 is (1−
√
2
2 )- approximate group strategy
proof and false name proof for Utility and Happiness even when both the locations
and preferences are not known.
Theorem 30 shows the sharp contrast between 1-facility and 2-facility games where
both locations and preferences are private. Recall that for 1-facility games, when the
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locations of the agents are private, there is no deterministic truthful mechanism with
bounded approximation guarantee as shown in [49].
Case ti ∈ {0, 1}
2. In this case, under the Happiness objective, Mechanism 1 returns
the locations y = (ℓ/2, ℓ/2). Observe that ui(xi, ti, y) ≥ 2(ℓ−|xi−
ℓ
2 |) = 2ℓ−|2xi−ℓ| ≥ ℓ
for every possible combination of xi and ti. Notice also that u
∗
i (xi, ti) = 2ℓ for every
possible (xi, ti). As a result Mechanism 1 is
1
2 -approximate for the 2-facility game. It
is not hard to see that if there are k facilities, all located on ℓ2 , then ui(xi, ti, y) ≥
k
2 ,
while u∗i (xi, ti) = k. Furthermore, observe that
∑
i ui(xi, ti, y) ≥
1
2
∑
i u
∗
i (xi, ti) and
thus the mechanism achieves the same approximation for social welfare too and the
theorem follows:
Theorem 31. If ti ∈ {0, 1}
k for every i ∈ N , then the Mechanism that locates every
facility on ℓ2 is
1
2 -approximate for Utility, Happiness and social welfare.
We next show that if every agent has preferences in {0, 1}2 and the agents’ locations
are known, then for the mechanism that places each facility independently on its optimal
location, denoted as OPT2 is 34 -approximate for the 2-facility game with the Utility
objective.
Theorem 32. OPT2 is 34 -approximate for Utility.
Proof. Before we analyze the approximation guarantee of the mechanism, let us ﬁrst
study the locations in which the mechanism places the facilities. Since the preferences
of each agent are in {0, 1}2, it is not hard to see that the optimal location for each
facility is the median point between the locations of the leftmost and the rightmost
agents that want to be close to the facility.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the agent with the minimum utility
under OPT2, denoted as a1, has preferences (1, 1). If ti = (1, 0), then the agent would
have utility at least 32ℓ since any other agent who wants to be close to the ﬁrst facility
is located in distance at most ℓ from a1’s location. The maximum utility the agent can
get is 2ℓ, so the mechanism is 34 -approximate.
Suppose that a1 is located on x ≤
ℓ
2 . Without loss of generality we can assume
that he is located on 0, since for any other location the agent would be closer to the
facilities and thus his utility would have increased. Observe that agent a1 will deﬁne the
locations of the facilities along with the rightmost agents. Clearly if the rightmost agent
has preferences (1, 1), then OPT2 is optimal. We can then assume that the rightmost
agent, denoted as ar1 , has preferences (0, 1). Observe that in the worst case ar1 will be
located on ℓ, since on any other location the utility of agent a1 will be lower. We have
to consider the two possible preferences for the second rightmost agent with preference
1 for the ﬁrst facility and prove that OPT2 achieves the desired approximation. We
will use ai to denote this agent and xi to denote his location.
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We ﬁrst consider the case where agent ai has preferences (1, 1) and xi ≥
ℓ
2 . The
utilities of the agents for the facilities under the locations (y1, y2), where y2 ≤ xi, are
u1 = 2−y1−y2, ui = 2−2xi+y1+y2 and ur1 = 1+y2. OPT
2 will locate the facilities
on y1 =
xi
2 and y2 =
ℓ
2 and the utility of agent a1 will be u1 =
3−xi
2 . The locations of the
facilities that make the utilities of these three agents equal provide an upper bound on
the utility that agent a1 gets under the optimal solution, since any other solution would
yield lower utility for at least one of these agents. The locations of the facilities that
equalize the utilities of the agents are y1 = 2xi− ℓ and y2 = ℓ−xi and thus the optimal
utility of agent a1 is bounded by 2ℓ−xi. Hence, OPT
2 is α = 3−xi4−2xi ≥
3
4 -approximate.
In the case where xi <
ℓ
2 , it is not diﬃcult to see that agent a1 gets utility at least
5
4ℓ under OPT
2. Under the optimal solution the utility of the agents is bounded by
3
2ℓ, since there are no locations for the facilities where both a1 and ar1 get more than
3
2ℓ. In this case the mechanism is
5
6 -approximate.
If the preferences of ai are (1, 0), then similar analysis can be applied.
Case ti ∈ {−1, 0}
2. Under Happiness, Mechanism 1 returns the locations y = (0, ℓ).
For every possible combination (xi, ti) we get that ui(xi, ti, y) ≥ ℓ and that u∗i (xi, ti) ≤
2ℓ. Again, the mechanism can be generalized for the k-facilities game by locating ⌈k2⌉
facilities on 0 and facilities ⌊k2⌋ on ℓ.
Theorem 33. If ti ∈ {−1, 0}
k for every i ∈ N , then Mechanism 1 is ⌊k2⌋/k-approximate
for Utility, Happiness and social utility.
6.5 A Randomized Mechanism
We next provide a randomized universally truthful mechanism for k-facility games.
Algorithm 12: Mechanism 2
1 With probability 12 set yj = 0 for every j ∈ F
2 With probability 12 set yj = ℓ for every j ∈ F
Theorem 34. Mechanism 2 is 12 -approximate for the Utility, Happiness and social
welfare.
Proof. It is easy to see that the mechanism is universally truthful since in each case
it chooses a ﬁxed location. We will prove that every agent gets utility at least ℓ2 in
expectation from every facility. Suppose that the agent i ∈ N is located on xi and has
preferences ti. Let us study the expected utility the agent gets from the facility fj . If
tij = 1, then the agent’s utility is ℓ− xi when yj = 0 and xi when yj = ℓ. If tij = −1,
then the agent gets utility xi if yj = 0 and ℓ−xi if yj = ℓ. If tij = 0, then the agent gets
utility ℓ irrespectively to yj . The agent gets utility at least
ℓ
2 in expectation from each
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facility. As a result the agent gets utility at least k·ℓ2 in expectation. The maximum
utility the agent can get is k · ℓ. The happiness of the agent is at least 12 . Since the
Happiness objective is a lower bound on the Utility objective the claim follows for
these two objectives. Furthermore, the expected social welfare is at least n · k·ℓ2 while
the maximum social welfare is trivially bounded by n · k · ℓ. Thus the claim follows for
the social welfare too.
6.6 Open problems
We studied heterogeneous k-facility location games on the real line for maxmin objec-
tives. For k ≥ 2, we derived inapproximability bounds for deterministic and random-
ized truthful mechanisms for the Utility and Happiness objectives. We provided
deterministic truthful mechanisms and a universally truthful mechanism that achieve
constant approximation.
Many questions arise from this study. The most obvious is to derive tight bounds
for truthful mechanisms. First, we leave as an open problem whether the optimal algo-
rithm to the optimization problem is truthful. Interestingly, apart from OPT2 truthful
mechanisms that use the agents’ locations and beat the approximation guarantee of the
optimal algorithm do not seem easy to design. We conjecture that there is no truthful
mechanism that locates the facilities sequentially and uses the locations of the facilities
already placed in a non trivial way. Another interesting question is to study other
objectives, like the envy for heterogeneous facility location games. Finally, another line
of research is to extend our model on cycles, trees, or higher dimensions.
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Conclusions
In this thesis we studied approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms for opti-
mization problems in networks having applications in smart cities and urban planning.
We presented new mechanism design models and new techniques which could be of
independent interest.
More precisely our techniques in order to obtain truthfulness of the mechanisms vary
depending on the problem. As we have seen for single parameter agents monotonicity
is a suﬃcient condition for truthfulness. However this property is algorithm speciﬁc
and thus we do not have a general way of proving whether an algorithm is monotone or
not. It is well known that the classes of greedy algorithms (Chapter 3) and primal dual
algorithms (Chapter 4) can be made monotone in general. Our novel approach was to
restrict the data instances of the problem and obtain monotonicity and thus truthfulness
with high probability on most of the instances. We are not aware of a similar approach
in the literature and we believe that it could be of independent interest.
A general question is whether the condition of monotonicity can be added as an
additional constraint in an LP and whether this way we could have monotone LP’s i.e.
a solution to the LP that would directly imply monotonicity.
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